



# CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION IN EURO-MED REGION: RESEARCHES, PRACTICES, POLICIES Research Report

## ORGANIZATIONS:

University of Calabria, Italy; Association of Environmental Justice in Israel (AEJI); Institute for Migration Development & Integration (IMDI) Albania; Farhat Hached for Research & Democracy (FHIRD) Tunisia; Genista Research Foundation (GRF) Malta; University of Chieti – Pescara Italy

July  
2021

# Climate Change and Migration in Euro-Med Region: Researches, Practices, Policies

**Editing:**

**Carmit Lubanov, Mark Causon**

The project of Climate Change and Migration in Euro-Med Region: Socio-Economic Development and Intercultural Perspective is supported by Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF)

Project No: ALF/CFP/2020/IRP/24

The content of the report is the sole responsibility of the applicant and partners organizations and does not necessarily reflect the position of ALF

Applicant and Partners organizations:

University of Calabria (Unical) Italy, Association of Environmental Justice in Israel (AEJI), Institution Migration Development and Integration (IMDI) Albania, Farhat Hached Institute for Research and Democracy (FHIRD) Tunisia, Genista Research Foundation (GRF) Malta, University of Chieti-Pescara Italy



*This report is protected under Creative Commons Rights (CC), Non-Commercial use (NC).*

*It should be stated the full title/sub title of the report.*

*The credit for the cover pages' images is: front page the Project of "Climate Change and Migration in Euro-Med Region: Socio-Economic Development and Intercultural Perspective"; back page of AEJI.*

## Content:

	Page
<b>Introduction. The Research in its Three Sections</b> Gilda Catalano, University of Calabria	<b>3</b>
<i>Section I</i> <i>Climate Change, Human Rights under International Laws and National Barriers</i>	
<b>1. Environmental and Climate Change Migrations: A Sociological and Legal Overview</b> Mara Maretti, Paola Puoti, Alfredo Agustoni, Ferdinando Franceschelli, University of Chieti/Pescara and Alfredo Alietti, University of Ferrara	<b>21</b>
<b>2. Migration in Albania: so close so far</b> Drita Avdyli Institution for Migration, Development, Integration	<b>39</b>
<b>3. Climate Migration – Chronicle of Pre-Predicted Crisis?</b> <b>What can we learn from national characteristics in the fields of climate, environment, culture and economic development in relating to outlining of climate migration in the Euro-Med region?</b> Carmit Lubanov, Association of Environmental Justice, Israel	<b>49</b>
<i>Section II</i> <i>Push Factors and the Run towards to Euro-Med Regions</i>	
<b>4. Climate Migration in Euro med Area: a case study bibliometric analysis</b> Mara Maretti, Alice Tontodimamma, Roberta Di Risio, Vanessa Russo, University of Chieti-Pescara	<b>71</b>
<b>5. The Other Side of Illegal Migration</b> Mohamed Amine Kouki, Farhat Hached Institute for Research and Democracy	<b>85</b>
<b>6. From the Hospitality Culture to the Culture of Environmental Sustainability: from Riace to Camini</b> Maria Francesca D’Agostino, University of Calabria	<b>100</b>
<b>Comment to 6. Welcoming of Migrants in Calabria among SPRAR, SIPROIMI, SAI (2015-2021)</b> Gilda Catalano, University of Calabria	<b>109</b>
<b>7. Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Malta and Portugal</b> Mark Causon, Genista Research Foundation and Ana Onofre Sonhos de Igualdades	<b>118</b>
<b>8. Migrant Labor and Agri-Food-Environmental Transformations in Southern Italy</b> Alessandra Corrado, University of Calabria	<b>124</b>
<i>Section III</i> <i>Climate, Environment, Migration. From Present to Future</i>	
<b>9. Empowerment of Young Migrants in Malta</b> Mark Causon, Genista Research Foundation	<b>157</b>
<b>10. Climate and Migration – Power, Perception and Policy. What can we learn from public opinion Surveys in the Euro–Med region? Is there a link between the public attitudes in the two fields, and what can be deduced from the perceptions in relation to the outline of climate migration' strategic plan in a regional perspective?</b> Carmit Lubanov, Association of Environmental Justice, Israel	<b>175</b>
<i>Section IV</i> <i>Open Resources</i>	
<b>11. 'Climate Migration – New Chapter'. Mapping of Information Sources and an Outline for Future Activity</b> Carmit Lubanov, Association of Environmental Justice in Israel and Mark Causon, Genista Research Foundation	<b>194</b>

## **Introduction. The Research in its Three Sections**

Gilda Catalano, University of Calabria

### **1. Introduction**

The Mediterranean Region is becoming a central player in climate change. This implies the urgency to better work for the impacts of these changes in all aspects of our life: in the fertility of ecosystems, in the economic production, and in life styles where a change of cultural paradigm is urgent.

Current government actions are the basis for the future of the international community, which will face a greater global transformation if we do not change our societies very quickly.

Among the most urgent and complex processes laying into our social worlds - both rich and poor societies - is the impact of climate change on populations. Within this framework, actually there is a term, still controversial, to grasp this link: climatic migrations.

At the heart of this project: the attempt to investigate this link “climate-migration”. The project aimed at building additional knowledge on the issue of climate migration. It has tried, through various paths, to trace the importance of the so-called “climate’s driver”, caught in its autonomy and specificity. Through different research methods: data collection, face-to-face and online interviews, new processing and re-reading of pre-existing data, the analytical use of various regional and national reports - especially info from the most affected and vulnerable areas. These different ways have served to study the links between the various factors inside the national and international migration.

The overall analysis of the project highlights the need to recognize the link between the ecological crisis and the forced migration, as well as to include environmental migration among the priorities of the international political agenda: not only because of the legal protection’s need, but because it is also important to become aware of the dramatic social consequences at a global scale.

To achieve this general objective, it has been necessary to deal with the different thematic and empirical aspects at the basis of this research.

First of all, the issue of the terminology. As the Agustoni/Alietti/Puoti/Franceschelli/Maretti multi-voiced article “*Environmental and Climate Change Migrations in Euro-Med Area: a socio-legal perspective*” shows: it illuminates the various shadows underling the current expressions, such as *climate change*, *environmental refugees*, *climate migration*. It is a theoretical excursus made up of concepts and terms, which cannot ignore legal language. Rethinking of the legal, political and institutional framework: it is an important action, above all to be harmonizing more flexible laws and to be increasing a constant collaboration between the three territorial levels (local, national and supranational).

This first part of the all-articles report cannot ignore the conceptual and legal question, as the starting point of the discussion.

As far as the Third Party is concerned, it cannot fail to question itself about the ways to strengthen technical and practical actions at the international level, improving the ability to manage future climate changes and the impacts on millions of people, by different geographical areas.

But between the First and the Third Sections there is the Second Part; it represents a dive into the territorial aspects of migration, both in the communities of departure and in those of arrival: mobility, escape, welcome, exploitation, entrepreneurial skills are concepts marking this second part.

Let's take a closer look at the three parts that make up the meeting of our contributions.

## 2. First Section

In February 2021, the “United Nations Human Rights Committee” ruled on the case of Ioane Teitiota. It says that *"People fleeing immediate danger due to the climate crisis cannot be sent back to their home countries"*. It is the story of an inhabitant of the island of Kiribasi who had asked New Zealand an asylum because his home was threatened by the rising sea levels. His request has been granted. The decision is important for two reasons. The first reason: because the Committee rules on an appeal lodged by an individual seeking protection from the effects of climate change. Second: because international human rights law requires States, for the first time, to repatriate climate displaced people. While not binding, the decision is based on the International Human Rights Law (Iccpr), which is instead binding. In essence, the Committee's reasons could be adopted by other courts, especially European ones.

In this part, we ask if there will be new glimpses on how climate migrants should be recognized (Gonzalez 2021).

The epistemological-juridical article by Agustoni/Puoti/Alietti/Franceschelli/Maretti *"Environmental and Climate Change Migrations: a socio-legal perspective"* questions this aspect: there is still no common international framework on displaced migrations by climatic causes. Today the expression "environmental migrants" defines *"an army of human beings fleeing natural disasters, rising sea levels, drought and desertification"*. The numbers of this phenomenon are already high and, because of the current increase in the earth's temperature, the UN and many International Organizations estimate how environmental refugees will be more than 200 million in 2050. As this article recalls, these people do not still fall under the protection of the *1951 Geneva Convention*: they have not considered refugees because they have not been persecuted. This Convention is arguably conceived in a post-war Europe, long time before climate change became a global issue.

In relation to the climate migration and the recognition of climate refugees, what is the role of the regulatory updating, as the authors of the article evoke? Environmental refugees are people in need of protection, being exposed to drastic territorial changes - although not *on the run* from a political regime (Greenpeace 2017).

Asylum seekers who do not fall within the definition of the Geneva Convention are generally classified according to this simplification (Myers 1999):

- a. "De facto" refugees: people hosted by a country for humanitarian reasons.
- b. “In orbit” refugees: persons seeking asylum in another country.
- c. “Immigrants”’: people who migrate for economic reasons and cannot avail the fact of being persecuted by the state of origin.

d. Environmental refugee: those fleeing from environmental disasters to which a primary assistance is often offered for humanitarian reasons.

In 1985, in his book *“Environmental Refugees”* El Hinnawi had already distinguished three types of refugees - actually classified as:

- *People who move temporarily due to environmental stress*, for both natural and anthropic disasters but they can return to their places of origin for a reconstruction at a later time.

- *Persons permanently displaced and relocated to another area*. This group of displaced people is often suffering the effects of disasters caused by natural disasters and development projects (such as large dams).

- *People who move temporarily or permanently because they cannot be supported by their land resources*, because of environmental degradation.

This is the theoretical framework where the two articles of this first part move their analysis from.

The law changes the reality if the resolutions also change in the international legal framework. There is an essential role for the legal courts in addressing the climate crisis. For example, the *Libération* newspaper reports how a French court accepted a Bangladeshi man's application for a residence permit due to medical reasons, related to pollution. This is the first case in a European Court on immigration to be recognizing air pollution as a risk factor. The answer to the phenomenon obviously cannot be entrusted only by the legal courts. The environmental complexity suggests managing it as a much broader structural fact: the economic, climatic and conflict reasons are indistinguishable - as Lubanov recalls in the article *“Climate Migration - Chronicle of Pre-Predicted Crisis? What can we learn from national characteristics in the fields of climate, environment, culture and economic development in relating to outlining of climate migration in Euro-Med region intervenes on this topic?”*

Her analyses are also close to the *“Global Climate Litigation Report of 2020”* (UNEP 2020). Here, UNEP also explains how climate lawsuits have almost doubled in the past three years. In 2017 there were 884 in 24 countries; at the end of 2020, there were at least 1,550 in 38 countries, 39 including the judicial system of the European Union. The report lists recent cases from Colombia, India, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines and South Africa: they show a trend of further growth in the global South. According to this Report, the plaintiffs' background is becoming increasingly diverse and it includes non-governmental organizations, political parties, seniors, migrants and indigenous populations.

The article *Climate Migration. Chronicle of Pre-Predicted Crisis? What can we learn from national characteristics in the fields of climate, environment, culture and economic development in relating to outlining of climate migration in Euro-Med region intervenes on this topic?* - through a quantitative and comparative study - underlines how the perception of climate change for the populations of the Euro-Med region has changed, underlining how citizens have been increasingly attentive to this aspect in the last decade. And this obviously also affects the growing demand for courts to access justice and exercise their right to a healthy environment.

Together with the article by Agustoni/Puoti/Franceschelli/Alietti/Maretti, both writings analyze how it is not often easy to identify the causal relationship between migration and

climate change. It is often easier to establish a link between the movement of people and sudden environmental phenomena such as a cyclone, whilst it may be more difficult to determine this relationship about a slow and continuous phenomenon, such as drought. They observe how a direct causal relationship is not necessarily established between climate change and forced migration. Economic, social, ecological and geopolitical variables are intertwined and distinct phenomena are overlapping (drought, floods, etc.). All this makes more difficult to clearly identify the link between climate change and migration, as well as to isolate the factors inducing or inhibiting it. This aspect is also illustrated by Drita Avdyli in her “*Migration in Albania: so far, so close*” where she highlights the specificity of migration in this country: lot of immigrants and emigrants, complicating the juridical framework, too. A specific viewpoint that let us show this complexity.

Furthermore, to overload the interpretation, there is a *poverty trap*: the poorer you are, the less you move. Poverty and mobility do not always go hand in hand. The poorest people are particularly vulnerable to environmental changes and to their impacts because their resources to move are limited. As Carmit Lubanov recalls, each State of the Euro-Med Region has struggled to develop a common strategy on these issues for various reasons (political, economic, cultural aspects). Especially on the new pact for migration. Already in the 2007 *Global Forum on Migration and Development* (GFMD), mayors from around the world have examined the challenges of effective local and national coordination on the issue of migration (IOM, 2020).

The two articles in this first part, therefore, take up themes on an epistemological basis: one following the juridical path, and the other one marking a path of comparative research.

Two main ways seem to appear on the proposals that the two articles outline.

Following the article “*Environmental and Climate Change Migrations: a socio-legal perspective*”, a crucial step is also to expand the *United Nations Guiding Principles* (UNHCR 2004) and to be reflecting on the reinterpretation of the Geneva Convention, with a view to also extending international protection to the spectrum of the economic and social conditions producing migration. The attempt is to create an *ad hoc* instrument of international law, less fragmented than the current one.

By Lubanov's article, it is the theme of the investment in mitigation measures to be taken up, in order to minimize the catastrophic consequences underlying the displacement. This implies using the same principle underlying the legal framework governing political refugees, and applying it to climate refugees: the collective responsibility of the international community is relevant when individuals are no longer able to avail themselves about the protection of their state.

### 3. Second Section

The first part also has served to illuminate how world communities in the South suffer the consequences of environmental degradation and climate change, showing paradoxically how the populations - which have less contributed to the degradation of the planet and to its overheating - are also the same population paying the higher environmental costs, in terms of social inequalities and violation of human rights. The costs of the crisis we are experiencing

are unequally distributed between the North and the South of the world. Developing countries remain the geographical context where the most consistent migratory flows, both international and internal, move.

Therefore, the process of contemporary migration requires a new and broader interpretation, which considers environmental and climatic factors as the drivers of forced migration both within the borders of a state and beyond national borders. In doing this, the testimonies, the life stories, the interviewees play a fundamental role.

This second part highlights the stories of those who leave and those who are welcome, in a context of social contradictions. The so-called push and pull factors in migrations are joined together through the narrations of those who go away and those who receive.

This second part begins with an important premise. With the article by Maretti/Tontodimamma/Dirisio/Russo "*Climate Migration in Euro-Med Area: a case-study bibliometric analyses*": it explains, through a bibliometric research combining different methods, how awareness is progressing towards a closer link between migration and climate. By highlighting the most studied concepts and areas in the last fifteen years by the academic world, this article tries to answer the question how this broader focus in new zones testify an increased sensitivity on this topic; from their bibliometric approach, it seems that this problem is more and more urgently perceived and studied, even by the scientific world. This paper is relevant because its methods, too: it maps the features of diverse departures areas as the co-occurrence analysis and topic analysis, also focusing on migration routes crossing the Euro-Med regions.

After the opening through this detailed article, the paper "*The other side of illegal migration*" by Mohamed Amine Kouki starts with the history of a journey: from Tunisia to South Europe, specifically towards Italy. It is not only a story of migration but of young migration. There is a link between the contribution of Mohamed Amine Kouki and Mark Causon: responsible participation in the life of unaccompanied foreign minors is a crucial aspect (a theme of whom Causon will also deepen in the third section of this Report). A minor foreigner - without assistance and representation from his parents or adults legally responsible for him/her - is subject to protection. Thinking about migrations, especially by Tunisian young people (as explained in the case study by Kouki towards Italy), means to underline the importance of a people network for the protection of migrants and for the protection of young migrants. This active network starts with the implementation of an educational knowledge specific - as also Causon's articles point out in this section and in the next one. Promoting creative uses of *social media* and stories are both an "ancient" and a "modern" tool to enhance linguistic and technical IT skills.

The raising awareness for the protection of minor migrants is based on the fact that people, communities and organizations are able to accompany them along the path. In fact, not only the Causon's articles, but both Kouki and D'Agostino also explain some important activities, especially aimed at adolescents on the themes of hospitality, respect and solidarity. Furthermore, here, the paper "*Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Malta and Portugal*" by Causon and Onofre stresses the capability of migrants to be active in their host communities, thus interconnecting these issues to Corrado's article on decent works within the agriculture sector in Southern Italy.



Promoting competent and responsible communities, willing to carry out experiences of solidarity is the guiding word in the D'Agostino writing. In *"From the hospitality culture to the culture of environmental sustainability: from Riace to Camini"*, the activities analyzed are centered on favoring the development of social skills among migrants to face a good relationship with others, and in order to facilitate a better insertion in life contexts.

Since the countries of origin of migrants are often told exclusively as places of war, misery or oppression, her article gives a voice to those who were left their countries and reborn in the new ones, sharing testimonies and life stories on the themes of migration, multiculturalism, value of otherness, pluri-linguism, or helping to build an "open to the world" School. The information paths on various areas, including the theme of human rights, are essential to reduce and avoid xenophobic and hostile attitudes, often exacerbated by the lack of knowledge of the history and culture of different peoples.

This path of empowerment of vulnerable people and groups is a topic treated by D'Agostino, especially from the point of view of the host communities. Her article deals with groups and networks, aimed at spreading inclusion and integration policies between different subject. Main verbs/words used in local interviews are: *"we protect and care for and citizenship rights; we solicit experiences of a solid life; experiment with innovative services; it carries out social economy projects, to fight against the mafias and to promote justice"*. The welcoming cases illustrated by D'Agostino, such as Camini, is a reality rooted in the Calabrian context that cooperates with multiple Italian and foreign places in order to enhance the presence and subjectivity of the variegated social worlds. D'Agostino talks about the solidarity culture by learning from the experiences of associative life and social enterprise. The case of Camini, not only manages research and training courses, elaborates cultural materials, facilitates collaborations between organized civil society and institutions, promotes intervention strategies for the human, economic and social development of Southern Italy and/or other Souths. These aspects are to be deepened, from an organization's viewpoint in the long Comment to her article (more than an Appendix) *"Welcoming of Migrants in Calabria among SPRAR, SIPROIMI, SAI, 2015-2021"* by Gilda Catalano.

In this second part, in various ways, the training courses have been characterized in an innovative way both for the choice of the professional profile and for the methodology of construction of the training plan. As for the first aspect, the choice is consequential to an analysis within the labor market relating to the study of the professional needs by the places. It is evident how the local labor market in Southern Euro-Med country suffers from a training shortage of specific figures (artisans) of assistants to the basic person. The second innovative aspect concerns with the construction of a training plan carried out in direct collaboration with the entrepreneurs (who later become the trainers themselves), in a continuous and organic relationship between the world of work and the world of training - as Causon and Onofre also underline in *"Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Malta and Portugal"*.

As Causon and Onofre write, professional training workshops with a plurality of actors (students, companies, training institutes, host communities) favor the growth of entrepreneurial skills and the increase in the employability of the subjects involved, in crafts, social services, new professions such as beekeeping.

It is intercultural dialogue in practice.

Unfortunately, there are not only improved work skills and basic theoretical knowledge into the formal European work system.

Alessandra Corrado's article "*Migrant Labor and Agri-Food-Environmental Transformations in Southern Italy*" talks about poorly paid work in agriculture and it shows the attempts by migrants' network to get decent jobs. The work in agriculture and the relationship with lands can also allow a more responsible, conscious, strong reply by migrants. Here the paradox reported is that migrants employed in agriculture escape from arid lands, finally to be in the situation to cultivate others' pieces of land in the host territories and to feed the peoples who host them. *The trap of the fertile land - as said Ahmed in an interview (see: Unical Research Report).*

Land degradation implies a loss of biological and above all agricultural productivity. If we think of the African continent, whose economy is based on agriculture and, as well, if we think that Africa is one of the areas of the world most exposed to desertification, we understand how this paradox is huge on the relationship between land and migrants.

Corrado article refers - indirectly - to the lands of origin of the workers. Alongside more natural factors, such as aridity, drought, erosion, it also reminds us of anthropogenic factors such as: technically incorrect agricultural practices implemented with the aim of immediately maximizing yields, excessive use of agricultural resources, the lack of crop rotation, the forced introduction of livestock farming with serious imbalances of the agro-ecosystem, or even the poor optimization of water. Or even how the urbanization processes and their livelihood aggravate the situation.

As far as the attempts to measure the cause-and-effect relationship between desertification and migration are relatively recent - although already a previous study by UNCHR' analyzed the link between unsustainable use of land and water in migrations from Mexico to the United States (Nawrotzi 2014). The interviews carried out by Alessandra Corrado show the difficulty of having normal living conditions in own country and the attempt to find socio-economic solutions elsewhere, above all because of the unfertile lands, once cradles of fertility. In her interviews, workers from Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria (not only from Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso) indicate how the land degradation contributes to international human mobility, and to the worsening of living conditions - often both for those who leave and for those who remain.

The Second Section is the empirical face of the first Section, highlighting the contradictions revealed by its early articles.

#### **4. Third Section**

In 2005, the *Institute for Environmental and Human Security of the UN* warned that the International Community should prepare to receive more than 50 million environmental refugees in 2010. Today in 2021, leading international scholars and institutions affirm that 200/250 million environmental refugees will be reached (one every 45 in the world) by 2050, with an average of 6 million men and women forced to leave their territories every year (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2021).

Indeed, already in 2007, the non-governmental organization *Christian Aid* declared the environmental refugees will be about one billion in 2050, of which 250 million due to floods, hurricanes and 645 million due to the construction of dams or for the construction of other projects. To these numbers, others to be added: the many displaced people for decisions that require the construction of dams or industrial plants, involving the destruction of urban centers,

of lands, and living environments. Thus, the economic and political degradation risks triggering a vicious circle.

Many numbers are also provided by international institutions, even if they are estimated for defect.

Fortunately, almost the entire scientific/academic world, as well as the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) and other international organizations, agree on these figures. This is a problem, not only for the governance of countries that have to manage the problem of environmental refugees on their territory, but also for the exacerbation of situations of deprivation and social injustice at the local and international level.

The Third Part deals with this theme: the passage from the present situation to the future.

In the background of this third part, the primary link with the first section remains: the legal delay reveals the serious lack of a legal status for environmental refugees and there are few countries in the world that have tried to give an answer, such as Sweden and Finland. These two countries are the only two members of the Union to have included "environmental migrants" in their respective national migration policies (Hush 2018 about the *Aliens Act*). Within its asylum system, Sweden includes people who cannot apply for refugee status but still need protection; Sweden recognizes natural disasters and, unlike what happens in the United States with TPS, the protection can become definitive. Finland also recognizes environmental migrant status and protects those fleeing natural disasters.

So, as Lubanov writes in *Climate and Migration – Power, Perception and Policy. What can we learn from public opinion Surveys in Euro–Med region? Is there a link between the public attitudes in the two fields, and what can be deduced from the perceptions in relation to outline of climate migration' strategic plan in a regional perspective?* it is a question of rethinking global governance, starting from the need to give answers to people who daily see an increasingly denied future, and moving from international cooperation policies capable of building peace in the world through a new enlargement of human rights.

The institutional path is slow but quite constant, fortunately.

For instance, in the American legislation, 1990 is the year when the TPS, Temporary Protected Status, was promulgated. TPS provides protection for people "*in the United States who are temporarily unable to return to their country due to an ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary situation*". In the event of natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, epidemics) the State of origin must apply for TPS only to its citizens which are on the American soil: the serious limitation of TPS, in fact, is that they can be benefited only by those who are already in the United States at the time of the disaster or conflict.

For instance, another important appointment in 2008. In response to the challenges by the troubled *African Great Lakes* region, the African Union and the United Nations gave life to the *Conference on the Great Lakes Region* which led to the ratification of the *Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region*. The Pact entered into force in 2008 and it is important because it was the first multilateral instrument in the world to oblige member states to adopt and implement the *United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*.

Another appointment is in 2009. The African Union adopted the *Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons*. The *Kampala Convention* became the first legally binding regional instrument in the world to impose on states the obligation to provide protection to IDPs. Unfortunately, to enter into force and become legally binding it had to be ratified by at least 15 member states of the African Union, but it was ratified by only 7 of these: Uganda, Sierra Leone, Chad, CAR, Zambia, Gabon and Somalia. The Convention applies to the uprooting caused by several factors, among which explicit reference is made to natural or man-made disasters.

Many steps forward from yesterday.

In her article, Lubanov recognizes that numerous advances have been over the years in favor of official recognition of environmental refugees, but there are still "denial" theories, tending to compare environmental refugees to seasonal migrants or migrants for economic reasons.

Many "deniers" still remain now. *The International Institute for Environment and Development* (IIED 2009) compares environmental refugees to seasonal migrants and it suggests interpreting these escapes as traditional migrations, deriving from adaptation strategies to change. Among the "deniers", it is an emerging tendency to compare the environmental refugee with the economic migrant, so that climate-migration's relationship would be nothing more than an adaptation strategy. Therefore, not a synonym of vulnerability but rather the result of a choice, determined to diversify community income.

But the question of time is important. Climate change is happening with a greater speed and intensity than initially predicted. Therefore, future challenges, adaptation policy and mitigation policy must come to the center of policy debates. As Causon shows in his paper "Empowerment of Young Migrants: the case of Malta", where he uses the case-study of a small island, Malta, to put into the international agenda some policies for future. Just starting from youth migrants.

The studies, the debates, the actions undertaken for the future recognition of environmental migrants have not found a valid solution to the problem yet, both due to rapid and to slow onset disasters. With the first statement, the former does not have the time to plan and organize the migration for events such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes and tsunamis; whilst the latter are put over a longer period and therefore might have the opportunity to develop measures of different adaptation. On the one hand we are talking about real displacement - produced by unpredictable events albeit in areas at risk - on the other hand we talk about migration.

Both the articles underline how migrations are never completely induced by exogenous factors such as poverty and scarcity of resources, but instead depend on an endogenous environmental component that determines the will or the necessity to migrate. The complexity of the phenomenon leads to the need for a multidimensional analysis that examines in depth all the factors of migration. To do this, a multi-sectoral approach is required, an approach that uses the tools of environmental investigation. In this regard, it is emphasized how many geographic tools (such as the mapping system GIS, Geographic Information System) and many demographic analysis tools have recently been used in the field of migration, with excellent results. Such an approach seems to be optimal to fully understand today's migrations and to be able to predict future trends - as Causon and Lubanov write.

The vulnerability of communities and the consequent choice of migration are strictly linked to the degree of social, economic and cultural development. As Lubanov's article points out, the

study of the distribution by gender and age of a population, the level of education, the level of health and income of a society contribute substantially to predicting vulnerability, as well as adaptation strategies of the communities themselves.

Regarding a more “local” dimension, as the article by Causon stresses, what emerges is that it is not enough to produce global quantitative estimates on environmental migration if the specific vulnerability elements leading to the phenomenon are not fully understood.

The adoption of a multidisciplinary method based on the study and comparison of specific cases is relevant in order to be able to cover most of the areas of the world at risk, as well as in order not only to underline preventive action solutions. So, the articles by Causon and Lubanov underline some signs of future scenarios.

From all the relevant points in this Third Section, we can elaborate this table.

- |   |
|---|
| a. First of all, the international community should formally recognize the plight of climate migrants. At present, it is difficult to find a <i>refugee</i> definition under the international law, including environmental degradation as a "valid" driver of displacement. International recognition should be obtained in order to put this issue on the major international political agendas.  |
| b. Secondly, it is important to create inclusive, transparent and responsible adaptation policies. The scale of current and future environmental changes requires a crucial role of central governments. Furthermore, benefits can be maximized and risks minimized if vulnerable populations are significantly involved in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of responses to environmental change.   |
| c. It is important to continue research to understand the causes and consequences of migration, by monitoring their numbers. Scholars should develop better communication and working relationships among different actors dealing with human rights, the environment and migration.  |
| d. The international community should help generate incentives to retain skilled labor in developing countries but also to enable developing countries to reap the benefits that only a fluid labor market can bring. International regulations on labor migration, adaptation to climate change and capacity building in vulnerable countries are intrinsically linked. Migration will be used by some households in exposed countries as a means of adaptation to climate change. But clearly there must be a balance of policies promoting incentives for workers to stay in their home countries, while not closing the door to international labor mobility. |
| e. We should be ready and face them by having many of the resources - including the knowledge, skills and relationships - necessary to protect the dignity and fundamental rights of people threatened by environmental shifts.   |

## 5. Fourth Section. Sustainable Resources: open remarks

All these sections let us know the necessity to a different way of thinking about Sustainable Development. The concept of sustainable development - although widely used in scientific literature, the private sector and public discourse - still needs to reach a consensus in terms of widespread representations.

In the current literature there is a vast diversity of concepts related to sustainable development and related to each other: *Green Economy*, *Blue Economy*, *Circular Economy* whose meanings

can vary according to the number of perspectives and fields of observation (Harlow, Golub and Allenby 2013).

This plurality of declinations is probably due to the lack of clear conceptual limits in the basic theoretical assumptions, which risks perpetuating some points of confusion between the different conceptualizations. Many authors still state that it remains difficult to reach a univocal definition, just as it is difficult to apply the practices invoked in practice: it is an impasse fomenting further discussions on the subject even in an extra-scientific field.

It is underlined how the inability to translate, not only the concept of Sustainable Development in all its forms, but also to incorporate this discourse within the environment, can damage the credibility of the concept. Therefore, the heterogeneous studies on these terms should probably better articulate the existence of numerous applications, knowing that they depend on the perspective orientation chosen.

If on the one hand, on an international scale, a certain acceptance of the idea of sustainability emerges, on the other hand the interpretation of the term is still considered inconsistent and ambiguous.

In the wide range of conflicting concepts on the category of Sustainable Development, one of the unsolved aspects lies in understanding the link between sustainable paths and environmental protection. Usually, the numerous discussions attached to the terms of "sustainable, sustainability and sustainable development" are unified by the attempt to improve long-term human well-being through the management of the environment as an environmental system. But is it possible to spread a more widespread representation of a social set within the environment?

Beyond this point, there are other aspects that go beyond the terminological confusion. Among the many dilemmas, one wonders not only how much the concept is able to combine environmental protection and socio-economic well-being, but also how much it includes the possibility of achieving forms of social equity between geographically polarized areas (Rios-Osòrio *et al.* 2013); or how this concept is Eurocentric, essentially forged within the meshes of Western culture (Mori and Christodoulou, 2012).

This final reflection aims at dwelling on these knots, with the aim of contributing in the future to identify some axioms that underpin it, animated by the conviction of a profound scientific discussion before being used from a programmatic point of view (Bolis, Morioka and Sznalwar, 2014).

At the moment, from many paths, many academics and many international organizations explore some scenarios. Among the most current scenarios, we show these five:

*1. Sustainability within a rapid social development:* this optimistic scenario assumes a world moving towards a model of sustainable development with a demographic transition triggered by investment in health and education, also due to a steady increase in income levels linked to a reduction in poverty and inequalities.

*2. A moderate social development:* this scenario is "in between" the challenges deriving from mitigation and from medium intensity adaptation. It can describe the continuation of our development today, with little progress in achieving the reduction of dependence on fossil fuels.

3. *Fragmentation of social development*: this scenario forecasts the fragmentation of the world into extremely rich areas and areas extremely poor with a stalemate in the demographic transition, based on very high fertility rates linked to the lack of countryside literacy and schooling.

4. *Social Inequality*: large inequalities in human capital in terms of education and income, by a reduced ability to adapt to a minimum mitigation of many companies suffering from the dire consequences of climate change, also produced by high-income countries. In this scenario. A lower fertility characterizes the fragmented areas, in relation to the previous one.

5. *Traditional development*: this scenario underlines the economic growth as problems solver of nature criticalities, pointing out better education levels and decreasing rates of fecundity all over the world.

#### 5.1. *How to reach the more optimistic scenario*

With specific regard to climate change and migration, it can be considered the product on a global scale of the individual anthropogenic activities implemented at the local level (deforestation, extraction, of fossil fuels, impacting economic activities operated by states and multinational companies). The issue of environmental migrations also becomes global, both if they take an internal or international character.

How it can be better connected to a more sustainable development is a complicate answer,

From the whole work of research, it is possible retrieve this possible diagram, where a new cultural paradigm could have a relevant role. We have no formula. Through this table, we try to optimize the results we have received from our research in terms of recommendations

#### A. *Improve knowledge of the phenomenon and develop data collection:*

Clarify the terminology relating to environmental migration.
Analyze how other factors (such as sex, conflicts or economic, political, and cultural elements) interact with environmental ones and analyze the impact on vulnerability and possible migratory outcomes.
Develop a strategic research program to improve data and knowledge on the links between migration and the environment.
Use scenario-based approaches to get a better picture of future migration patterns and flows related to climate change and environmental degradation.
Prepare country reports or regional reports, (especially for the most vulnerable countries) to assess the existing evidence on migration and the environment and share the experience gained.

#### B. *Strengthen policy and institutional, administrative and legal contexts:*

Formulate strategies that involve local public, private and non-governmental actors in all phases of policy planning, from the assessment of the need for planning and implementation.
Development of strategies to facilitate regular immigration, in response to environmental factors and development of solutions for those already on the move, including temporary residence authorization for environmental migrants.

Extend regional consultation and cooperation.

Act in partnership at all levels and between a variety of actors.

*C. Strengthen operational and technical skills:*

Develop preparedness measures and programs to prevent and manage displacement and minimize the impact of forced migration, through measures such as early warning systems, contingency planning and strengthened humanitarian assistance and protection capacities, in particular for the most vulnerable groups.

Focus on local communities, especially in vulnerable areas, in an attempt to mitigate any negative impacts of environmental factors on living conditions.

Constructing methods of managing migration flows.

Facilitating immigration as an adaptation strategy by integrating migration issues into existing tools, such as National Adaptation Action Programs, Strategic Poverty Reduction Plans and National Climate Change Programs.



## References

- Alexander D., (2012), *Models of Social Vulnerability to Disasters*, RCCS Annual Review, n 4. Available on line: <https://journals.openedition.org/rccsar/412>
- Behringer W. (2013), *Storia culturale del clima. Dall’Era glaciale al Riscaldamento globale*, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri.
- Bolis I., Morioka S.N., Sznalwar L. I (2014), “When Sustainable Development Risks Losing its Meaning. Delimiting the Concept with a Comprehensive Literature Review and a Conceptual Model”, *Journal of Cleaner Production*, v. 83, pp. 7-20.
- Brambilla A. (2017), “Migrazioni indotte da cause ambientali”, *Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza*, n. 2, pp. 1-27.
- Brown O. (2008), “The numbers game”, *Forced Migration Review, Climate Change and Displacement*, n 31, pp. 8-9.
- Calzolaio V. (2010), *Ecoprofughi- Migrazioni forzate di ieri, di oggi, di domani*, Rimini, NdA Press.
- Calzolaio V. and Pievani T. (2016), *Libertà di migrare. Perché ci spostiamo da sempre ed è bene così*, Torino, Einaudi.
- Crespo Cuaresma J. and Lutz W., (2015) *The demography of human development and climate change vulnerability: A projection exercise*, Wien Yearbook of Population Research, vol. 13, pp. 241-261.
- Dolšak N. and Ostrom E. (2003), *The Challenges of the Commons*, London, The MIT Press.
- El-Hinnawi E. (1985), *Environmental refugees*, Nairobi, United Nations Environment Programme.
- Gage A. (2015), *The next best time for demographers to contribute to climate change research*, “Vienna Yearbook of Population Research”, vol. 13, pp.19-22.
- Ghosh A. (2017), *La grande cecità: Il cambiamento climatico e l'impensabile*, Venezia, Neri Pozza.
- Gomez Cantero J., (2015) *Cambio climático en Europa 1950-2050. Percepción e impactos*, Bruxelles, Los Verdes-Ale/ Equo.
- Gonzalez J. (2021) “American Judicial Rejectionism and the Domestic Court’s Undermining of International Human Rights Law and Policy After Human Right Violations Have Occurred in the State”, *Washington International Law Journal*, 13 april, vol 30, n 2. available online at: <https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol30/iss2/12>.
- Harlow J., Golub A., Allenbly, B. (2013), “A review of utopian themes in sustainable development discourse”, *Sustainable Development*, v. 21, n. 4, p. 270-80.
- Hush E. (2018), “Developing a European Model of International Protection for Environmentally-Displaced Persons: Lessons from Finland and Sweden”, *Columbia Journal of European Law*, available online at: <http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/cjel/preliminary-reference/2017/developing-a-european-model-of-international-protection-for-environmentally-displaced-persons-lessons-from-finland-and-sweden/>

Long K. And Crisp J. (2010), “Migration, mobility and solutions: an evolving perspective”, *Forced Migration Review*, n.35, pp.56-57.

Masika, R. (2002) (Ed.), *Gender, Development and Climate Change*, Oxford, Oxfam Publishing.

Myers N., (1999), *Esodo ambientale. Popoli in fuga da terre difficili*, Milano, Edizioni Ambiente.

Mori, K., and Christodoulou, A. (2012), “Review of Sustainability Indices and Indicators: Towards a New City Sustainability Index (CSI)”, *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, n. 32, pp. 94-106. Available online at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2011.06.001>.

Nawrotzki R. (2014), “Climate Migration and Moral Responsibility”, *Ethics Policy Environment*, n.17(1), pp. 69-87.

Piguet, E. (2008), “Climate change and forced migration”, *UNHCR Research Paper*, N. 153. Available on line at: <https://www.unhcr.org/en-lk/47a316182.pdf>

Ríos-Osorio, L.A., Salas-Zapata, W., Espinosa-Alzate, J.A. (2013). “Resiliencia socioecológica de los agroecosistemas. Más que una externalidad”, in: Nicholls, C.I., Ríos-Osorio, L.A., Altieri, M.A. (Eds.), *Agroecología Y Resiliencia Socioecológica: Adaptándose Al Cambio Climático*, Medellín, Cyted, pp. 60-76.

Schwartz, M.L., Notini, J. (1994), *Desertification and Migration: Mexico and the United States*, Natural Heritage Institute, San Francisco, US Commission in Immigration Reform.

## Reports

“Assessing the costs of adaptation to climate change” (2009), International Institute for Environment and Development, IEED.

Available at:

<https://data.globalchange.gov/assets/a2/a4/55a2ae44e48a57d2f8f271d812d9/11501IIED.pdf>

“Atlante Nazionale delle aree a rischio di desertificazione” (2007), Ministero dell’Ambiente e della Tutela del Territorio, Rome, Italy. Available on line: <https://www.mite.gov.it/biblioteca/atlante-nazionale-delle-aree-rischio-di-desertificazione>

“Cambiamenti climatici e governance della sicurezza: la rilevanza politica della nuova agenda internazionale” (May 2010), Rapporto del Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale. Available on line: [https://www.parlamento.it/documenti/repository/affariinternazionali/osservatorio/approfondimenti/Approfondimento\\_16\\_CESPI\\_Clima.pdf](https://www.parlamento.it/documenti/repository/affariinternazionali/osservatorio/approfondimenti/Approfondimento_16_CESPI_Clima.pdf).

“Centro Documentazione sui Conflitti Ambientali” (2016), A Sud Onlus. Available on line: <http://cdca.it/category/Pubblicazioni/report-di-progetto/>

“Climate induced-migration: a growing problem” (June 2010), German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Available on line: <https://www.gmfus.org/commentary/report-climate-induced-migration-growing-problem>.

“Climate change, migration and critical international security considerations” (2010), International Organization for Migration (IOM). Available online at: <https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mrs42.pdf>

“Climate and health country profile: Italy” (2018), Organizzazione Mondiale della Sanità, OMS, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC. Available on line at: <https://apps.who.int/iris/rest/bitstreams/1097302/retrieve>.

“Climate change, migration, and displacement” (2017), Greenpeace. Available online at: <https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/20170524-greenpeace-studie-climate-change-migration-displacement-engl.pdf>

“Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: A UNHCR perspective” (2009). United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR. Available on line at: <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/environment/4901e81a4/unhcr-policy-paper-climate-change-natural-disasters-human-displacement.html>

“Climate Justice: Seeking a global ethic” (2009), International Caritas Internazionale. Available on line at: <https://www.preventionweb.net/publications/view/13163>.

“Disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation” in IOM’s response to environmental migration (2011). Available on line at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/disaster-risk-reduction-and-climate-change-adaptation-ioms-response-environmental>.

“Environmentally displaced people. Understanding the linkages between environmental change, livelihoods and forced migration” (2008), Refugee Studies Centre Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford (Authors: Camillo Boano, Roger Zetter, Tim Morris). Available on line at: <https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/files-1/pb1-environmentally-displaced-people-2008.pdf>.

“Future floods of refugees A comment on climate change, conflict and forced migration”, (April 2008), Norwegian Refugee Council (Author Vikram Odedra Kolmannskog). Available online at: [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70912A52F9B3C530C125754500520BBD-nrc\\_April08.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/70912A52F9B3C530C125754500520BBD-nrc_April08.pdf)

“Gli indicatori del clima in Italia nel 2016” (2017), Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca Ambientale, ISPRA. Available on line at: <https://www.isprambiente.gov.it/files/2017/pubblicazioni/manuali-linee-guida/statoamb72.pdf>

Global Climate Litigation Report of 2020”, (2020) UNEP. Available on line at: <https://www.unep.org/resources/report/global-climate-litigation-report-2020-status-review>

Global Report on Internal Displacement (2021), Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. Available on line at: <https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/2021-global-report-on-internal-displacement>

“Global Warming of 1.5 °C (SR15)”, (2018) International Panel for Climate Change, IPCC. Available on line at: Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C (SR15)”, [https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15\\_spm\\_final.pdf](https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf)

“Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration” (2018), World Bank. Available on line: [https://climate-diplomacy.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/WorldBank\\_Groundswell-Preparing%20for%20Internal%20Climate%20Migration.pdf](https://climate-diplomacy.org/sites/default/files/2020-10/WorldBank_Groundswell-Preparing%20for%20Internal%20Climate%20Migration.pdf)

“Human Development. Overcoming barriers: Human mobility and development” (2009), United Nations Development Programme UNDP. Available on line at: [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/269/hdr\\_2009\\_en\\_complete.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/269/hdr_2009_en_complete.pdf)

“Human Rights and Desertification” (2008), United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, UNCCD. Available on line at:

<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/Submissions/UNCCD.pdf>.

“Human Security, Climate Change and Environmentally Induced Migration” (June 2008), United Nations University, Institute for Environment and Human Security.

Available on line at: [http://www.iesp.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/pdf/\\_QOXBVUDYWX-6102009181115-IUBILTNZOG\\_.pdf](http://www.iesp.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/_QOXBVUDYWX-6102009181115-IUBILTNZOG_.pdf)

“Human tide: the real migration crisis” (2002), Christian Aid. Available on line at: <https://www.christianaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/2017-08/human-tide-the-real-migration-crisis-may-2007.pdf>

“In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement” (2009), Koko Warner from UNU-EHS and Charles Ehrhart, CARE International Institute.

Available on line at: [https://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/clim-migr-report-june09\\_media.pdf](https://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/clim-migr-report-june09_media.pdf).

“Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change”: <https://www.ipcc.ch/2021/06/29/wg1-ar6-release-date-and-approval-session-details/>

“Internally Displaced Persons and Electoral Participation: a brief overview” (2016) International Foundation for Electoral Systems, IFES. Available on line at:

<https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/idps-electoral-participation-october-2016.pdf>

“Migration and environmental change: examining the relationship” (2015), European Commission, EC.

Available on line at: [https://knowledge.unccd.int/sites/default/files/inline-files/Biblio\\_MIGRATION\\_Update\\_Sept\\_2015.pdf](https://knowledge.unccd.int/sites/default/files/inline-files/Biblio_MIGRATION_Update_Sept_2015.pdf)

“National climate change vulnerability and risk assessments in Europe” (2018), European Agency for Environment (AEA). Available on line at: <https://op.europa.eu/it/publication-detail/-/publication/b8c3e32f-4832-11e8-be1d-01aa75ed71a1/language-en>

“Outlook on Migration, Environment, Climate Change” (2014), International Organization for Migration, IOM. Available on line at: [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mecc\\_outlook.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/mecc_outlook.pdf)

“Protecting environmentally displaced people Developing the capacity of legal and normative frameworks” (2011), Refugee Studies Centre Oxford Department of International Development University of Oxford (Project Coordinator: Roger Zetter). Available on line at: <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4da579792.pdf>

“Rapporto periodico sul rischio posto alla popolazione italiana da frane e inondazioni” (2021), Istituto di ricerca per la protezione idrogeologica del Consiglio nazionale delle ricerche, IRPI-CNR.

Available on line at: <http://polaris.irpi.cnr.it/report/last-report/>

“The impact of disasters and crises on agriculture and food Security” (2018), Food and Agriculture Organization for UN, FAO. Available on line at: <http://www.fao.org/3/cb3673en/cb3673en.pdf>.

The Net-Zero Challenge: Fast-Forward to Decisive Climate Action (2020), World Economic Forum. Available on line at: <https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-net-zero-challenge-fast-forward-to-decisive-climate-action>

“United Nations Guiding Principles” (2004), UNHCR. Available on line at: <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/idps/43ce1cff2/guiding-principles-internal-displacement.html>

“World Migration Report 2020” (2020), International Organization for Migration, IOM, available on line at: <https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2020>

## **FIRST SECTION**

### **Climate Change, Human Rights under International Laws and National Barriers**

## **1. Environmental and Climate Change migrations: A Sociological and Legal Overview**

Mara Maretti, University «G. d'Annunzio» of Chieti-Pescara, Paola Puoti, University «G. d'Annunzio» of Chieti-Pescara, Alfredo Alietti, University of Ferrara, Alfredo Agustoni, University «G. d'Annunzio» of Chieti-Pescara, Ferdinando Franceschelli University «G. d'Annunzio» of Chieti-Pescara

### *Abstract*

*Since earliest times, humanity has been on the move. With increasing frequency, migration phenomena are triggered by the negative impacts of climate change and environmental degradation. Although the topic of such migration has become crucial in the public debate and on the political agenda, it is still not clearly, explicitly and fully defined and regulated. Bearing in mind the need to better clarify the terms of the subject matter, this report addresses the issues at stake from both a sociological and an international law perspective, also in order to find the key elements of a definition (or a plurality of definitions).*

### **Introduction**

The present paper faces the topic of climate change and environmental induced migrations under a couple of specific points of view, namely a sociological viewpoint and an international law one. Accordingly, the report's structure is twofold: in the first section, entitled «Environment and Migration. Genealogy of a Concept and of an Issue», an analysis of the debate on the figure of the environmental migrant and refugee, paying a particular attention to the relationship between the environmental drivers and other drivers in the decision to migrate, will be carried out.

In the second section of the report, entitled «The legal status of environmental and climate migrants in international law», an analysis of the case-law on the subject matter - under an international law viewpoint - will be brought about, heading to point out how courts and other quasi-judicial bodies have figured out the relevance of climate/environmental degradation on the phenomena of cross-border migration, thus providing a contribution to the definition of the legal status of climate and environmental induced migrants.

### **I. Environment and Migration. Genealogy of a Concept and of an Issue**

Our presentation starts from the main and classical definition of IOM (International Organization of Migration) stated in 2007 and generally adopted: «*environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons, who, for compelling reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living*

*conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or chose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad»* (IOM; 2007; 1-2). This definition opened a series of discussions and analyses in order to understand how the environmental issue and climate changes are related to migration as a push factor. Inside this horizon of meaning, several high-profile studies have set out to determine correlations between environmental degradation and human migration. Nevertheless, the relationship between environment and migration is far from being clear and defined. In the first section of the presentation, we analyze the debate on the figure of the environmental migrant and refugee, with a particular attention to the relation between environmental drivers and other drivers in the decision to migrate.

Moreover, it is important to rebuild the genealogy of the relationship between migration and environmental issues. In the last decades, let us say since the Eighties, a broad debate concerning the role of environmental drivers in explaining migrations has risen (see table 1). Quoting Piguet (2013), we can say that we cannot speak of a mere appearance of an issue, but, rather, of a disappearance and of a subsequent and sudden reappearance, and that the disappearance of the environmental factors in the field of migration studies deserve at least the same attention then their later reappearance. Actually, in XIX Century's positivistic Geography, considering authors such as Ratzel and Ravenstein, the link between environmental factors and migrations is taken for granted. The peak of this kind of environmental determinism can be found in the works of Ellsworth Huntington (1922), imputing the fall of the Roman Empire to environmental factors, that can explain a «domino game» effect of migratory flows from Central Asia, due to environmental factors.

It follows a period of *oblivion*, starting from the thirties and during the «golden age» (1944-1971), when the anthropic factor seems to prevail on the natural one: it is no longer mankind that depends on natural factor, but nature that depends on human development. During this period, in migration studies, the typical driver is the economic one. Nevertheless, geopolitical changes during the sixties and, in particular, oil crisis and the rise of ecological concern at the beginning of the seventies, seem to change the terms of the issue.

The reappearance of the environmental «stone guest» is conventionally identified in the midst of the Eighties, when the term «*environmental refugee*» appears in the title of Essam El-Hinnawi's United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) paper (1985). Nevertheless, the concept's initial use may be as early as the Seventies when it was first invoked by Lester Brown, the founder of the World Watch Institute, in the context of the rising environmental concern that matches the first oil crisis and the issue of Meadows report (Saunders, 2000). Piguet (2013) imputes this renewed attention to the rise of environmental concern, to the increasing number of documented natural hazards and to the «triumphant rise to political saliency» of climate change but, particularly, of climate science and climate expertise.

Table 1. Genealogy of studies on migration and environment

- Geographical and Ecological Determinism (Ratzel, Ravenstein, Huntington, Dennery, Vogt): 1880-1940
- Oblivion (Taft, Isaac, Wolpert): 1930-1970
- Rediscovery (Forrester, Meadows, Lester Brown, Tickell, El Hinnawy, Myers, Homer-Dixon): 1970-2020



- Resizing (McGregor, Suhrke, Morrissey, OIM, Foresight Report, Piguet): 1990-2020

This latter aspect is particularly considered by Romain Felli (2016) who frames the origins and rise of the climate issue (and of a debate concerning the relevance of environmental drivers of migrations) within the historical context of the Cold War and of the subsequent advent of neoliberal policies (see table 2). At the end of the Sixties, the Cold War is at a turning point. The United States are involved in the Vietnam war, that corrodes their prestige in the Western World, and discover for the first time their energetic dependency on abroad – that will give to the energy issue an increasing relevance in the dynamics of the international conflicts. (Price-Smith, 2015; Agustoni, 2019). The geopolitical context seems to feed an imagery of catastrophe – that is, first of all, rather than an ecological catastrophe, the catastrophe of the American way of life and, more generally, of capitalism. *Rediscovery* of the environmental drivers of migrations and their subsequent *resizing* at the beginning of the Nineties has an important historical and ideological meaning, when we consider the crisis of the Golden Age at the end of the Sixties and the collapse of Soviet Union at the end of the Eighties, with the rise of neoliberalism.

*Table 2. Climate issue and historical context*

• <b>Rediscovery</b>	<b>Resizing</b>
• Maximalism (alarmism)	Minimalism
• <i>Exodism</i>	<i>Resilientism</i>
• Cold War, Energy Crisis, Conservatism	Neoliberalism

On the basis of this debate, our discussion shows the fundamental cleavage between scholars. The point of view of El-Hinnawi, Myers and other scholars, sometimes called «*maximalist*» (German Environment Agency, 2020), «*alarmist*» (Suhrke, 1994; Piguet, 2013) or «*exodist*» (as we like to say), can often be summarized starting from some variables: 1. The environment is a strong push factor, whose impact can be isolated from other factors: therefore we can speak about a specific issue as *environmental migrations*; 2. Environmental migrations are generally forced migration, cause displacement, so that we can identify a category of *environmental refugee*; 3. Environmental migrations are expected to take place as a mass phenomenon with a clear international and intercontinental connotation, so that we can prefigure future *environmental exodus* (or, maybe, *invasions*; see tab. 3). In particular, Norman Myers, a conservationist biologist, distinguishes himself for several papers and a book where he resorts to an imagery of future environmental exodus.

According to Felli, this point of view is typical of a conservative fear of an invasion from abroad, menacing local cultural values and rooted life-styles. What can be defined as an exodus from the point of view of the contexts of emigration, becomes an invasion from the point of view of the host countries, so that the exodist perspective contains within itself the typically conservative imagery of Samuel Huntington’s «*clash of civilization*». As other authors underscore, it is basically depoliticizing and anti-historic, and failing to take account of the local context in migrations (Morrissey, 2012).

This theoretical configuration is challenged, particularly since the Nineties, by an alternative one, that we can call «*minimalist*» (Piguet, 2013; German Environment Agency, 2020) or «*resilientist*» (as we like to say), supported by a great amount of case studies: 1. Environmental factors can be hardly isolated by other factors, such as political or economic ones, so that it is not easy to speak about environmental migrations; 2. Migration is not a forced response to environmental change, but it should rather be understood in the frame of a resilient strategy that involve families and social networks, so it cannot be understood as a form of displacement, with few exceptions; 3. Environmental migrations cannot be understood as an exodus or an invasion, lacking its massive and harmful connotation. On the contrary, they involve what Felli calls *triple gain*: a gain for the country of arrival, that needs manpower; a gain for the country of departure, due to the remittances; and a gain for families and social networks, that can guarantee their adaptation; 4. Environmental displacement due to dramatic events, such as war, severe drought, flood or earthquake, is generally an internal and not an international kind of migration (or, at least, crossing one border; see tab.1).

The main nexus between this kind of point of view and the rise of neoliberalism consists in its attitude to place the problems and their possible solution at an individual or community level, emphasizing, on the other side, the virtuous effects of adaptive individual choices at a national and global level, like if an «invisible hand» drove migratory phenomena. Migration is a way for individuals and families to cope with climate change. It cannot be considered a problem, but rather the opportunity for a *triple gain* (Felli, 2016): for the individual and his family, first of all, as a solution of their problems; for the national community, secondly, due to the economic impact of remittances; third, for global labor market, whose demand can in this way be satisfied. From this kind of perspective, the problem may be represented, rather than from the ecological driver as a cause of displacement, from the resistance or from the impossibility to move of several social actors: the problem of immobile or trapped people becomes increasingly relevant, as shown in tab. 4.

*Table 3: Exodism vs. Resilientism*

	Exodists	Resilientists
Paradigm	Determinism, behaviourism	Complexity, Agency
Agency	Forced migrations	Adaptive strategies
Consequences	Exodus	Triple gain
Ideological connotation	Conservatism, Malthusianism	Neoliberalism
Problem	Displacement/Invasion (loss of identity, «clash of civilization»)	Immobile, trapped

*Table 4: Mobility and Immobility factors and outcomes (source: Zickgraff and Perrin, 2015)*

Need to migrate	YES				NO			
Desire/availability to migrate	YES		NO		YES		NO	
Capacity to migrate	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
	related	trapped	immobile		migrant	trapped	immobile	

From these reflections it is necessary to identify a sort of common background about the environmental migration debate on the basis of a conceptual framework within which to broaden the discussion on an issue that presents a complex articulation. In this sense, *«the degradation of the environment is socially and spatially constructed; only through a structural understanding of the environment in the broader political and cultural context of a region or country can one begin to understand the «role» but also the specific definition it plays as a factor in population movement»* (Loneragan, 1998, p. 8). The analysis of the climate change and environmental factors in the migrations processes or refugee diaspora is a real challenge for the scholars for understanding how this articulated relationship can be clarified by a continuous research on the mechanisms in action. The definition is clear enough, as the debate over the years has established, regardless of the different points of view, as previously written. Our task is to establish whether and how the environmental factor is the main or indirect effect of «traditional» migration pressures.

## II. The legal status of environmental and climate migrants in international law

In June 2011, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, described the issue of climate migrations as «the defining challenge of our times», and urged countries to adopt new measures to cope with climate-induced displacement within and across borders.

The IPCC since its first synthesis report in 1990 envisaged the risk for the future of an increase in migrants and environmental refugees, in particular from the poorest countries. According to the 2014 AR5 of the IPCC, «Long-term environmental change, sea level rise, coastal erosion, and loss of agricultural productivity ... will have a significant impact on migration flows» (IPCC, 2014, para. 12.4.1.3.).

A recent JRC report (EU Commission, 2021), through a modelling exercise to investigate the climate change–migration nexus, confirms a significant association between net migration and drought intensity, which is more accentuated in rural areas.

Within the international community, a shared position about the identification of a specific category of environmental and climate change migrants/refugees has not been

reached yet, and no legal definition for climate change and environmental migrants has been accepted. Most of the scientific community, scholars and governmental and non-governmental institutions, except for some scholars (Myers, 1993, pp. 752-761. See also Myers, 1997, pp. 167-182), do not believe that an autonomous category of environmental and climate change migrants/refugees could be identified. That is why they generally avoid resorting to expressions like «environmental refugees», «climate refugees», etc.

Climate change and environmental migrants are not entitled to a proper legal status like the one which is provided for refugees. Furthermore, a legal definition of this sort is still lacking.

Some underlying problems, although still partially unsolved, can be identified as follows (see: McLeman, Gemenne, 2018, pp. 10-11):

A) *The multiple causes*: environmental and climate change factors are usually a concurrent cause of migration, so it is often rather complex to isolate them from other competing factors and, therefore, to place the migrant precisely in a certain category. In particular, this applies both to cases where there is concurrence between climate change and other environmental factors, and when there is a combination with non-environmental factors.

B) *The definition of Refugee under 1951 Convention, which does not fit to environmental/climate migrants*: the generally accepted definition of «refugee», which is contained in the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugee does not expressly include among the beneficiaries of the status those who are forced to migrate for climate change or environmental degradation factors. Moreover, this definition assumes that the asylum seeker has suffered or is likely to suffer one or more acts of persecution, a situation that does not arise from migration triggered by climate change and environmental degradation.

C) *«Threat multipliers» of security and migration*: in some cases, there are environmental and resource scarcity problems that cause (alone or together with other factors - in this case we refer to «threat multipliers» that increase the risk of conflicts in unstable contexts) situations of conflict, which lead to migratory phenomena; in other cases, instead, it is the situation of conflict itself that causes environmental degradation and resource scarcity that, in turn, trigger migration. It is, therefore, difficult in such cases to fully understand what the real origin of the migratory phenomenon is, since environmental factors are sometimes the cause and sometimes the consequence of conflict situations followed by migration.

More and more studies and academic works are addressing the problem of the link between the phenomenon of land grabbing for environmental reasons and forced displacement (Vigil, 2018; Yang, He, 2021, p. 324; Stocchiero, 2021).

Quoting Vigil (2018): «...The complex impacts of climate change on human mobility have gained increased attention, but *an invisible and growing number of people are also being displaced – paradoxically – by the very measures taken in the name of addressing it*. Although mitigation and adaption interventions are crucial in order to decrease the likelihood of forced displacement, climate response measures such as agro-fuel production and carbon forest projects have been amongst the main drivers of the global land rush which is unprecedented in scale since the colonial era...».

It is worth recalling the 2012 IFC's Environmental and Social Performance Standards, in particular PS5, relating to «Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement», which provides as follows: companies seeking to acquire land for their business activities – whenever it can lead to relocation and loss of shelter or livelihoods for communities or individual households – are requested as long as possible to avoid involuntary resettlement and to minimize their impact on displaced persons through mitigation measures (such as fair compensation and improvement of living conditions). With this aim, active community engagement throughout the process is essential.

At the regional level one can recall the criticisms raised against the EU regulatory and policy framework on biofuels, because it has encouraged large-scale foreign investments in developing countries, thus leading to a conversion of land use from the cultivation of crops for local food, to the cultivation of crops used for the production of conventional biofuels and bio-liquids, such as vegetable and seed oils (Acconci, 2017, p. 1040).

According to the FOCSIV Report 2020, in order to avoid forced displacement caused by land grabbing, it is also necessary: a) to ask States to introduce clauses within trade and investment treaties recognizing the right to land for local communities; b) to encourage States to complete the negotiation of the nascent UN Treaty on Business and Human Rights, a binding instrument which could make the difference in tackling the grave socio-economic negative effects of the activities of multinational enterprises in developing countries; c) to improve and support the guidelines of the Committee on World Food Security.

Although the issue at stake is very crucial in the public debate and in the political agenda, it is not clearly, explicitly and fully addressed through international law. Nevertheless, some elements which might contribute to better outline the issue of (cross-border) climate change/environmental induced migrations may be inferred from a number of sources adopted at the international level.

In this regard, several branches of international law come into play, namely climate change and environmental law (even though they do not contain any provisions that would be useful – if taken alone – to solve the question at hand), international economic law concerning international trade and foreign investments, human rights law, refugee law. Sound importance should be given to the latter - which relates to the status, treatment and protection of refugees and asylum seekers, basically relying on the principle of *non-refoulement* - although it does not provide a legal definition of climate or environmental refugee, and does not include such categories among those which strictly fall within its scope.

According to the climate law regime, migration triggered by climate change (as well as by environmental degradation) may be considered as a tool for increasing «livelihood resilience» and as a legitimate and autonomous measure of adaptation to climate change.

Under international customary law, the *non-refoulement* principle should be taken into account: namely its evolution from Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention to the extensive interpretation of the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, which is envisaged by universal and regional instruments of international law on human rights.

The current meaning of this rule includes at least the prohibition of *refoulement* to a country where there is a reasonable risk that the person concerned would suffer a violation of his or her internationally recognized fundamental rights, or injury to his or

her life, liberty or mental and physical integrity, particularly (but not only) in the form of torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.

To implement the principle of *non-refoulement*, the concepts of vulnerability of the individual in the group - bearing in mind that such concept is capable of evolution -, and of a safe country (i.e., a place where the respect for fundamental rights and essential living conditions are ensured), are crucial.

When it comes to the national level, it must be pointed out that immigration policies and rules – as well known – are regulated by domestic laws, mostly being under the sovereignty of the Governments (and to some extent within the competences of the EU, as concerns the 27 EU's member States).

If, on the one hand, immigration policies belong to the sovereignty of the States, on the other hand, this sovereignty is limited by their obligations established by the international rules on the treatment of foreigners, in particular those on international protection.

From this perspective, domestic laws hardly ever allow people to legally cross the State's borders when their rights are affected by the worst impacts of climate change or other environmental degradation: in summary, such people are prevented from leaving their Countries and from having their rights protected in Countries other than their own. Only few States are willing to provide temporary protection against repatriation of migrants who do not qualify for refugee status and who are unable to return home, owing to climate/environmental conditions in their Countries.

The issue of migrations triggered by climate change and environmental degradation, has been addressed at the international level in a number of instruments under different approaches. Sometimes such instruments address, to some extent, the issue at hand within a legal framework, but the results do not seem to be fully adequate. In this respect, here follows a list of examples:

- 1995 EU Parliament: motion for a resolution at the sitting of 19 May 1995 (B4-0551/95) on the potential use of military-related resources for environmental strategies, which refers to the topic of the impact of climate change on migration.
- 2011 EU Parliament, «Climate Refugees»: legal and policy responses to environmentally induced migration (study). To tackle the problem, it is necessary to focus on the issue of international cooperation and development aid in order to increase the resilience of the most vulnerable areas.
- 2015 Paris agreement. It does not go far beyond establishing in the Preamble that: «Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the rights (...) of (...) migrants».
- 2015 UN 2030 Agenda and 17 SDGs (UNGA Resolution A/RES/70/1): it provides a framework for development actors to engage in projects related to climate change and mobility. The agenda pledges that «no one would be left behind» and makes clear, inter alia, that an orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people will be facilitated, which would also include environmental/climate induced migrations.
- 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (UNGA Resolution A/RES/71/1), faces the problem at stake although in quite general terms.
- 2018 UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (A/RES/73/195) which for the first time covers all dimensions of migration: beyond acknowledging the

link between climate change/environment and migration, provides a set of measures to protect climate displaced people.

- 2018 UN Global Compact on Refugees (A/73/12-Part II) acknowledges the interaction between climate change/environmental degradation and refugees' movements, but does not explicitly recognize those factors as suitable of triggering refugee movements in itself.
- 2018 UN Framework Principles of Human Rights and the Environment, issued by the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and the environment in 2018. According to Principle 14.41.h), «Natural disasters and other types of environmental harm often cause internal displacement and transboundary migration, which can exacerbate vulnerabilities and lead to additional human rights violations and abuses».
- 2018 Report of the Task Force on Displacement: the Task Force on Displacement (established within the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts) adopted a set of Recommendations according to which (par. 33), parties are invited to «consider to assist internally displaced persons, including those displaced as a result of the adverse effects of climate change, and strengthen efforts to find durable solutions, taking into account the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, as appropriate» and to «Facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people».
- 2019 Council of Europe - Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2307 - A legal status for «climate refugees»: «The Assembly therefore calls for specific action to be taken at local, national and international levels, as follows: ... 5.4. To develop in the asylum systems of member States and in international law protection for people fleeing long-term climate change in their native country».
- 2020 EU New Pact on Migration and Asylum (COM 2020 609, 23 September 2020) seems little challenging on climate change/environmental induced migrations.

Moving on to consider the case-law, some elements which might contribute to better define the more relevant issues related to (cross-border) climate change/environmental induced migrations could be inferred from a number of legal instruments, i.e., judgments, decisions, views, etc., delivered by national/international courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in which such issues are addressed through a systemic interpretation of international law and, in some cases, of national legislation. Such instruments might provide some more insights about the evolution of the issue of the legal status of climate change and environmental migrants, which could be useful to better define the subject matter.

The recognition - by Courts and quasi-judicial bodies responsible for evaluating the requests for international protection - of the international protection to environmental/climate change migrants, should be based on a case-by-case analysis. It should also be anchored, on the one hand, to the criteria for granting international protection, and, on the other hand, to the principle of *non-refoulement*.

These criteria are usually implemented in a restrictive way by the above-mentioned bodies, in particular as regards the element of the «compulsion» of migrants to leave their Countries to migrate or seek asylum in other States.

Therefore, through a number of decisions, International Courts and quasi-judicial bodies, regional Courts and national Courts are contributing (or are expected to contribute) to an

evolution of the subject matter. For example, the UN Human Rights Committee, in a decision (View) which will be shortly better discussed, ruled on the prohibition of *refoulement* linked to environmental/climate change factors.

Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, in ruling, for example, on the right to health (i.e., the medical and health care needs of sick migrants), could somewhat intercept the requests for protection triggered by environmental/climate reasons.

National Courts, finally, are currently playing the most important role in the process of evolution at stake, in the context of lawsuits which have been decided and/or are pending in several Countries (Italy, France, New Zealand, etc.).

Four «decisions» which have strongly contributed to the said process of evolution will be here discussed in details:

*1) UN Human Rights Committee, case Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, Views, 7 January 2020*

The UN Human Rights Committee, in its first ruling on a complaint by an individual seeking asylum from the effects of climate change, has stated that countries may not deport individuals who face climate change-induced conditions that violate the right to life.

Among the national proceedings filed by the applicant against the government of New Zealand, the Immigration and Protection Tribunal, in its decision of 25 June 2013, even issuing a negative decision concerning the applicant's claim for asylum, argued that it did not exclude the possibility that environmental degradation could «create pathways into the Refugee Convention or protected person jurisdiction». Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of New Zealand denied the applicant's subsequent appeals concerning the same matter.

The Committee ruled on a case of a Kiribati's citizen who claimed the recognition of its right of political asylum in New Zealand, due to the danger to his and his family's survival caused by climate change which, causing a rise sea level in the Pacific area, had put at risk of submersion the island of Tarawa, in the Republic of Kiribati, in which the applicant lived with his relatives, creating social tensions that previously did not happen, from which the applicant argued by proposing a comparison between its situation and that of a migrant fleeing the war.

The Committee ruled on a fundamental principle of international law: the risk that climate change may affect the applicant's human rights in the Country of origin, entails the prohibition of *refoulement* by the State where protection is sought.

Moreover, the Committee affirmed the principle that States have the obligation to ensure and guarantee people's right to life, and that this right also extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and potentially lethal situations that can lead to the loss of life, or in any case a substantial worsening of the conditions of living, including environmental degradation, climate change and unsustainable development, which are some of the most serious and urgent threats to the life of present and future generations and which can negatively affect well-being of an individual, causing a violation of his right to life. This is an innovative approach for the Committee, which provides for an anticipation of the



moment in which the violation of the human right to life occurs. It strongly differs from the approach followed up to then, according to which, to have a violation of the right to life committed, the violation must have already been committed or there must be an imminent risk of its violation.

A number of such examples can be found in the past:

- The Human Rights Committee (Decision on the case *V.M.R.B. v. Canada*, UN Doc CCPR/C/33/D/236/1987, Communication No. 236/1987 adopted on 18 July 1988, at par. 6.3) ruled as follows: «The Committee has also examined whether the conditions of articles 2 and 3 of the Optional Protocol have been met. It observes that a right of asylum is not protected by the Covenant. With regard to the author's allegation that his right to life under article 6 of the Covenant and that his right to liberty under article 9 have been violated, the Committee finds that he has not substantiated either allegation. With regard to article 6 of the Covenant, the author has merely expressed fear for his life in the hypothetical case that he should be deported to El Salvador. The Committee cannot examine hypothetical violations of Covenant rights which might occur in the future».
- In another case (Decision on the case *E.W. et al. v. The Netherlands*, UN Doc CCPR/C/47/D/429/1990, Communication No. 429/1990 adopted on 29 April 1993, at par. 6.4) the Human Rights Committee ruled that «For a person to claim to be a victim of a violation of a right protected by the Covenant, he or she must show either that an act or an omission of a State party has already adversely affected his or her enjoyment of such right, or that such an effect is imminent, for example on the basis of existing law and/or judicial or administrative decision or practice».
- Again, in another past example, the Human Rights Committee (Decision on the case *Gerardus Aalbersberg and 2.084 other Dutch citizens v. The Netherlands*, UN Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1440/2005, Communication No. 1440/2005 adopted on 14 August 2006, at par. 6.3) ruled as follows: «The Committee finds that the arguments presented by the authors do not demonstrate that they are victims whose right to life is violated or under any imminent prospect of being violated».
- Similarly (Decision on the case *Nicole Beydon and 19 other members of the association «DIH Mouvement de protestation civique v. France*, UN Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1400/2005, Communication 1400/2005 adopted 28 November 2005 at par. 4.3) «The Committee recalls that for a person to claim to be a victim of a violation of a right protected by the Covenant, he or she must show either that an act or an omission of a State party has already adversely affected his or her enjoyment of such right, or that such an effect is imminent, for example on the basis of existing law and/or judicial or administrative decision or practice». And also, in another case (Decision on the case *Z.H. v. Australia*, UN Doc. CCPR/C/107/D/1957/2010, Communication No. 1957/2010 adopted 24 April 2013, at par. 8.4), the Committee found that the applicant «has not experienced any direct threat to his life».

2) *Tribunale di L'Aquila, Italy, case M.M., Order, No. 1522/2017, 16 February 2018*  
In a ruling handed down in 2018 in the case *M.M.*, an Italian domestic Court recognized the right of a Bangladeshi citizen to protection for humanitarian reasons, according to the Italian domestic legislation in force at that time (Italian Legislative Decree no. 286/98), founding that he was reduced to poverty following an environmental disaster consisting of the floods that had caused the loss of his croplands. The Court acknowledged that «due

to the climatic changes in progress» significant variations in the rise of the water level could occur.

It should be noted that other Italian domestic Courts have also ruled on claims submitted by migrants who complained about the impossibility of surviving in their counties of origin due to the environmental disasters that had occurred. See, for example: Court of Appeal of Bologna, Section II, Judgment, 29th March 2016, No. 524, which upholds Court of Bologna, Order, 18th November 2014.

*3) Cour Administrative d'Appel de Bordeaux (France), case I.A., Arrêt (Judgment), 18 December 2020*

In a ruling dated back to 2020, a French administrative Court ordered to issue a temporary residence permit to a migrant, for medical treatment in light of the serious environmental and health conditions in Bangladesh, as the applicant, who suffered from severe respiratory diseases, if he was repatriated, would not be allowed access to the essential health care he needed.

The Court highlighted that Bangladesh is one of the most polluted countries in the world, and at the same time the health treatments needed by the asylum seeker were not available in that Country.

Such situation of exceptional gravity justified the issue of a temporary residence permit.

*4) Corte di Cassazione (Italy), case I.L., Order, No. 5022, 24 February 2021*

The Italian Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione), delivered a ruling on a request of protection lodged by a migrant who had been forced to migrate due to a large environmental disaster occurred in the Niger Delta.

The Italian Court ruled that the rights to life, freedom and self-determination must be ensured not only in relation to situations that can be framed in the context of an armed conflict, but also in relation to conditions of social, environmental or climate degradation, or to contexts of unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, which involve a serious risk for the survival of the people.

In other words, the assessment of the situation of danger must not be conducted solely with regard to the case of armed conflicts, but - more generally - with regard to the existence, in practice, of a condition which might diminish the fundamental rights under an unavoidable minimum threshold.

The Court therefore affirmed a basic principle that applies when a situation which may amount to an environmental disaster or may severely affect natural resources occurs, and entire groups of the population are precluded from their enjoyment. In such cases, the judges, who are requested to assess the widespread dangerous condition of the applicant's country of origin, for the purpose of recognizing humanitarian protection, should be very careful about the risks for the rights to life and human dignity which stem from environmental degradation, climate change or unsustainable development in the applicant's country of origin.

According to the Court, the hearth of personal dignity which marks the status of refugee, includes not only the existence of a situation of armed conflict, but also other situations capable of exposing the fundamental rights to life, freedom and self-determination of the

individual at the risk of zeroing or reducing below the minimum threshold, including cases of environmental disaster, climate change and unsustainable exploitation of natural resources. Recalling the Teitiota case, the Italian Court upholds the principle affirmed by the UN Committee therein: when a clear evidence of an environmental or climate problem occurs, the claimant's request can be accepted. But if the country of origin is addressing environmental degradation and climate change though important (i.e., through challenging measures of mitigation and adaptation to climate change), the claimant's request can be refused. The approach followed by the Italian Court, besides being an important point of reference in terms of the human rights at stake, also places the legal instruments for climate action, provided for in the framework of the UNFCCC, at the center of the debate.

On the basis of the arguments which have been discussed so far, taking a look at the future and possible developments of the question of the «legal status of environmental and climate migrants in international law», it seems to be quite clear that:

- the lack of an agreed terminology which might exactly define such legal status, should not be condemned;
- from the differentiation between voluntary or forced migrations, or from an extension of the application of the refugee status, should not be expected any solutions.

Instead, the question at stake could be addressed as follows:

- under the point of view of the protection of human rights (all human rights), focusing not so much on the fact that climate change and environmental degradation can be push-factors for migrations, but rather on the negative effects of climate change and environmental degradation on the economic, cultural and social rights of people forced to migrate;
- through an increasingly consistent application of the principle of *non-refoulement*;
- through an improvement and an increasingly effective application of the legal instruments on climate change provided for in the framework of the UNFCCC, which already play an important role in assessing the adequacy of the commitment of the State of origin in averting situations of serious impact of climate change (and environmental degradation) that could trigger migrations.

## References

- Acconci, P. (2017), "Biofuel Production Through Sustainable Investments from The Standpoint of The European Union", *Rivista di Diritto Internazionale*, 4, p. 1040.
- Agustoni, A. (2019), *Energia, potere e società. Una prospettiva di sociologia storica*, Roma, Aracne.
- Ammer, M., Nowak, M. (2010), *Legal Status and Legal Treatment of Environmental Refugees*, Berlin, Umweltbundesamt.
- Antwi-Agyei, P., Dougill, A.J., Stringer, L.C., Codjoe, S.N.A. (2017), "Adaptation opportunities and maladaptive outcomes in climate vulnerability hotspots of northern Ghana", *Climate Risk Management*, 19.

- Behrman, S., Kent, A. (2018), *Climate Refugees - Beyond the Legal Impasse?*, London, Routledge.
- Bates, D.C. (2002), “Environmental Refugees? Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental Change”, *Population and Environment*, 23, 5, pp. 465–77.
- Black, Richard, W. Neil Adger, Nigel W. Arnell, Stefan Dercon, Andrew Geddes, and David Thomas (2011), “The Effect of Environmental Change on Human Migration”, *Global Environmental Change*, 21, December, pp. 3-11.
- Bompan, E. (2021), “Rifugiati climatici e ambientali, arriva il riconoscimento giuridico in Italia”, *Oltremare*.
- Brambilla, A. (2017), “Migrazioni indotte da cause ambientali: quale tutela nell’ambito dell’ordinamento giuridico europeo e nazionale?”, *Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza*, 2, pp. 1-26.
- Brambilla, A., Castiglione, M. (2020), “Migranti ambientali e divieto di respingimento”, *Questione Giustizia*, 14 February.
- Brambilla, A., Castiglione, M. (2019), “Migrazioni ambientali: libertà di circolazione vs. protezione?”, *Cosmopolis Rivista di filosofia e teoria politica*, 2.
- Dun, O., Gemenne, F. (2008), “Defining environmental migration: Why it matters so much, why it is controversial and some practical processes which may help move forward”, *REVUE Asylon(s), Exodes écologiques*, 6.
- Ehrhart, C., Thow A., de Blois M., Warhurst A. (2008), *Humanitarian implications of climate change mapping, emerging trends and risk hotspots*, London, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and CARE International.
- El Hinnawi, E. (1985), *Environmental Refugees*, Nairobi, UNEP, p. 4.
- EU Commission (2021), JRC Technical Report, Population dynamics, climate change and variability in Western Africa: the case of Sahel regions.
- Felli, R. (2016), *La grande adaptation*, Paris, Seuil.
- Franceschelli, F. (2019), *L’impatto dei cambiamenti climatici nel diritto internazionale*, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica.
- Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change* (2011), Final Project Report, London, The Government Office for Science, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/migration-and-global-environmental-change-future-challenges-and-opportunities>.
- IFC – World Bank Group (2012), *Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability*, 1 January, <https://www.ifc.org>.
- IOM (2018), *Implementation of the Workplan of the Task Force on Displacement under the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM)*, UNFCCC – Pillar II: Policy – International/Regional Activity II.2 Mapping Human Mobility (Migration, Displacement and Planned Relocation) and Climate Change in International Processes, Policies and Legal Frameworks 1 - Analysis Report.
- IPCC (2014), Assessment Report 5 - Human security in Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, para. 12.4.1.3.
- German Environment Agency (2020), *Migration, Environment and Climate Change. Literature Review*.
- IOM (2007), *Discussion note: Migration and the Environment*, Ninety-fourth session, MC/INF/288, pp. 1-2.
- Kälin, W., Schrepfer, N. (2012), *Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches*, Geneva, UNHCR.

- Loneragan, S. (1998), “The role of environmental degradation in population displacement”, *Environmental Change and Security Project Report*, 4, p. 8.
- Maletto, F. (2020), “Non-Refoulement e cambiamento climatico: il caso Teitiota c. Nuova Zelanda”, *SIDIBlog*, 23 March.
- Mallick, B., Schanze, J. (2020), “Trapped or voluntary? Non-migration Despite Climate Risks”, *Sustainability*, 12, pp. 1-6.
- McAdam, J. (2012), *Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law*, Oxford, OUP.
- McLeman, R., Gemenne, F. (2018), “Environmental migration research”, in McLeman, R., Gemenne, F. (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration*, London, Routledge, pp. 10-11
- Myers N. (1993), “Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World. Estimating the scope of what could well become a prominent international phenomenon”, *BioScience*, 43, 11, pp. 752-761.
- Myers N. (1997), “Environmental Refugees”, *Population and Environment*, 19, pp. 167-182.
- Myers, N. and J. Kent (1995), *Environmental exodus: An emergent crisis in the global arena*, Washington DC, The Climate Institute.
- Morrisey, J. (2012), “Rethinking the 'debate on environmental refugees': from 'maximilists and minimalists' to 'proponents and critics'”, *Journal of Political Ecology*, 19.
- Neil Adger, W., Safra de Campos, R., Mortreux, C. (2018), “Mobility, displacement and migration, and their interactions with vulnerability and adaptation to environmental risks”, in McLeman, R., Gemenne, F. (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration*, London, Routledge, pp. 30-31.
- Piguet, E. (2013), “From «Primitive Migration» to «Climate Refugees»: The Curious Fate of the Natural Environment in Migration Studies», *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 103, 1, pp. 148-162.
- Price-Smith, A.T. (2015), *Oil, Illiberalism and War. An Analysis of Energy and US Foreign Policy*, Cambridge, The MIT Press.
- Ragheboom, H. (2017), *The International Legal Status and Protection of Environmentally-Displaced Persons: A European Perspective*, Leiden, Brill Nijhoff.
- Renaud, F., Bogardi, J.J., Dun, O., Warner, K. (2007), *Control, Adapt or Flee: How to Face Environmental Migration?* Bonn, UNU-EHS InterSections, 5.
- Renaud, F.G., Dun, O., Warner, K., Bogardi, J.J. (2011), “A Decision Framework for Environmentally Induced Migration”, *International Migration*, 49, Supplement 1, pp. 5-29.
- Saunders, P. (2000), “Environmental refugees: the origins of a construct”, in Stott P., Sullivan S. (Eds.) *Political Ecology: Science, Myth and Power*, London, Arnold.
- Schloss, C. (2021), “Climate migrants – How German courts take the environment into account when considering non-refoulement”, <https://völkerrechtsblog.org>, 3 March.
- Sciaccaluga, G. (2020), *International Law and the Protection of «Climate Refugees»*, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
- Scissa, C. (2021), “Migrazioni ambientali tra immobilismo normativo e dinamismo giurisprudenziale: un’analisi di tre recenti pronunce”, *Questione Giustizia*.
- Scott, M. (2020), “Table of Cases”, in Scott, M., *Climate Change, Disasters, and the Refugee Convention*, Cambridge Asylum and Migration Studies, Cambridge, CUP, pp. XIII-XVIII.

Stocchiero A. (Ed.), *I padroni della terra. Rapporto sull'accaparramento della terra 2021*, Roma, FOCSIV, <https://www.focsiv.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/LG2021-02.07.2021-Web.pdf>.

Stoler, J., Brewis, A., Kangmennang, J., Beth Keough, S., Pearson, A.L., Rosinger, A.Y., Stauber, C., Stevenson, E.G.J. (2021), “Connecting the dots between climate change, household water insecurity, and migration”, *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, 51, pp. 36-41.

Suhrke, A. (1994), “Environmental degradation and population flows”, *Journal of International Affairs*, 47, 2, pp. 473-496.

Thornton, F. (2018), *Climate Change and People on the Move: International Law and Justice*, Oxford, OUP.

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the African Development Bank, African Union (2014), *Guiding Principles on Large Scale Land Based Investments in Africa*, Addis Ababa.

Vigil S. (2018), *Green grabbing - Induced displacement*, Roma, ISPI, [https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/commentary\\_vigil\\_23.03.2018.pdf](https://www.ispionline.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/commentary_vigil_23.03.2018.pdf).

Warner K., Kälin W., Martin S., Nassef Y., Lee S., Melde S., Entwisle Chapuisat H., Frank M., Afifi T. (2014), *Integrating Human Mobility Issues within National Adaptation Plans*, Bonn, UNU-EHS, 9.

Wilson, A.J.S., Orlove, B. (2021), “Climate urgency: evidence of its effects on decision making in the laboratory and the field”, *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, 51, pp. 65-76.

Withol de Wenden, C. (2017), “I nuovi movimenti migratori. Il diritto alla mobilità e le politiche di accoglienza”, Milano, FrancoAngeli.

World Bank (2014), *The Practice of Responsible Investment Principles in Larger-Scale Agricultural Investments*, World Bank Report No. 86175 – GLB, Washington DC, World Bank.

Yang B., He J. (2021), “Global Land Grabbing: A Critical Review of Case Studies across the World”, *Land*, 10(3), p. 324, <https://www.mdpi.com/journal/land>.

Vogt, W. (1948), *Road to survival*, New York, William Sloane.

Zickgraf, C. (2021), “Climate change, slow onset events and human mobility: reviewing the evidence”, *Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability*, 50, pp. 21-30.

Zickgraf, C., Vigil, S., de Longueville, F., Ozer, P., Gemenne, F. (2016), *The Impact of Vulnerability and Resilience to Environmental Changes on Mobility Patterns in West Africa*, KNOMAD Working Paper Series, World Bank Group.

Zickgraf, C., Perrin, O. (2015), in IOM, *World Migration Report 2015. Immigrants and Cities, New Partnership to Manage Mobility*, Geneva, IOM.

## Relevant case-law

### ● International bodies

1. Inter-American Court of Human Rights – Case of Kawas-Fernández v. Honduras – Judgment (Merits, Reparations and Costs) – 3 April 2009
2. Inter-American Court of Human Rights - Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 requested by the Republic of Colombia - The Environment and Human Rights - 15 November 2017
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Case Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, UN Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016, Views adopted by the Committee under article 5 (4) of the Optional Protocol, concerning communication No. 2728/2016, 24 October 2019

4. Rights of Indigenous People in Addressing Climate-Forced Displacement – Complaint to multiple UN Special rapporteurs - 15 January 2020

● **National bodies**

5. Refugee Status Appeals Authority New Zealand, 72189-72190-72191-72192-72193-72194-72195/2000, 17 August 2000
6. Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia, 0907346 [2009] rrt 1168, - Case «Kiribati» - 10 December 2009
7. Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand, [2013] NZIPT 800413, Case «Kiribati», 25 June 2013
8. Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand, [2014] NZIPT 800517-520, 4 June 2014
9. Supreme Court of New Zealand, [2015] NZSC 107, Case «Ioane Teitiota», 20 July 2015
10. Tribunal Administratif du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg - 3e Chambre, 11 July 2017
11. Tribunale di L'Aquila (Italy), RG 1522/17, case M.M., Order, 16 February 2018
12. VGH Baden-Württemberg (Germany), A 11 S 1203/19, Urteil (Judgment), 29 October 2019
13. Cour administrative d'appel de Bordeaux - 2ème Chambre (France), no. 20BX02193 and no. 20BX02195, Arrêt (Judgment), 18 December 2020
14. Corte di Cassazione - Sezione II Civile (Italy), RG 23925/19, case I.L., Order, No. 5022, 24 February 2021

## 2. Migration in Albania: So Close So Far

Drita Avdyli, Institute for Migration, Development, Integration

### **Abstract**

*As part of the Western Balkan, as a country with borders with Italy and Greece, as EU member states, Albania has been and is the bridge of Migration Movements. In this paper I deal with the specificity of Migration in Albania, mainly by focusing on Juridical Aspects of Albania towards Refugees and Asylum.*

key words: illegal migrant, border police, climate change

### **1. Introduction**

There are 18.000 foreign migrants in Albania, who live and work, but this number has been increasing during the last period, characterized by climate changes and by earthquakes in the country. It has also increased thanks to legal regulations and fulfillment of the legal framework for foreigners and economic assistance.

During the pandemic period, this number has significantly increasing the number of irregular migrants, just at a time when the economy was not working and many activities were reduced, leading to a deterioration of the situation.

The local government and many NGOs took immediate measures towards this situation, such as: raising community awareness of their reception and social assistance to these contingents, especially towards the unaccompanied children.

In relation to the Readmission Agreements with border states, many irregular migrants have returned to their country of origin but many people took advantage of the migrants' fluxes by using Albania as a Crossing Bridge, especially by passing throughout Italy in various ways.

Many migration specialists helped with volunteer groups the migrants by increasing the reception capacities but also by training courses (civic education about Albanian country, professional language trainings and other activities). Numerous trainings have been done in the Border Police and Local Authorities, by many international organizations, such as by Frontex, UNHCR, Pameca, to help all actors, arranging all the necessary needs.

Many researchers are dealing with this issue thanks to their studies.

One important attempt is to create an opportunity: that is to reduce the number of migrants and to increase the conditions and regulatory mechanism, in order to improve the benefits for the all actors, Albania and neighboring countries included.

In my paper I will write about two points: one point is focused on the general situation of migration in Albania, whilst a second issue is concerned with all the laws the Albania is implementing towards Asylum Politics.

### **2. About the specificity of Albanian migration**

The help that the Albanian population offers to migrants is often not fully considered. From Greece to Croatia and Slovenia, along the *Balkan Route* which is never really closed, people transit via Montenegro, via Kosovo, via Serbia, are rejected and are trapped, often in Bosnia - Herzegovina.



Since 2009 this transit flows and began to rise, in parallel with the increasingly stricter closure of all the other access routes to Europe.

Albania acceded to the 1951 Geneva Convention and its regulatory framework is adapting to the European acquis. Its law 121/2014 provides that the Albanian State must inform the applicant about his rights no later than fifteen days from the presentation of the application for international protection. Applications are registered by the border authorities, after which they pass to the Directorate for Political Asylum and Citizenship. There is an appeal option.

The last year has led to significant changes in the origin and paths followed by migrants, and especially by unaccompanied foreign minors entering and leaving.

It should be noted that Albania receives migrants but also expels young unaccompanied migrants (YUM) and especially to Italy.

Also, with reference to this component of immigration, which frequently has to be distinguished from migration characterizing adults. A further element generating disturbances appears to be linked to the Covid-19 infection, with the consequent measures of restriction of people's movements, together with the worsening of the economic crisis and the worsening of the already precarious living conditions in the countries of departure.

With regard to the origin of minor unaccompanied migrants, in Italy for example, the majority origins in the Albanian and Kosovar countries which, overall, account for about 20% of the total and represent.

For instance, the presence of such a large number of minor migrants from Albania to Italy is probably linked to some factors, among which the main ones are - not only due to the geographical contiguity and the precarious economic situation - in particular in rural areas, the impossibility of obtain a residence permit for work reasons in Italy, a traditional destination for Albanian immigration.

These conditions could induce some families to send teenagers who are about to come of minor age to Italy, so that, at the age of eighteen, they have the possibility of converting the permit for minors with that for work or study reasons. It must also be considered that in Italy, where there is a well-integrated diaspora of over 450,000 people of Albanian origin, the members of this community are able to represent an important reference for young compatriots, especially at the end of the reception period and in perspective for job search. Therefore, the only hope for a young Albanian to obtain a residence permit in Italy is to arrive as a minor alone. Another motivation - also linked to the search for employment - refers to the shortcomings of the Albanian school system and the possibility of following, in Italy, higher quality study paths that can lead to qualified job placements, even from the point of view with a view to remuneration.

It seems that the Covid-19 pandemic, with the spread of contagion fears has led to the interruption of this flow.

### *2.1. Migrants and seeking asylum*

Many Albanians are still seeking asylum in EU countries. Since 2019, Albania has the highest number of asylum seekers in terms of population (with 59 applications per 10,000 inhabitants), according to data from the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), elaborated in relation to the population.

Albania outstrips even countries like Syria or Afghanistan by a significant margin. According to data from the *European Asylum Support Office*, Albania is ranked among the top 10 countries of origin of asylum seekers.

In terms of population, by a significant margin, Syrians are in second place, with 39 applications per 10,000 inhabitants, or about 20 fewer than Albanians.

In a second position, there are Afghans, with 17 out of 10,000, respectively followed by Venezuela with 14, Iraq and Colombia with 9 and 7.

Among the top 10 countries of origin, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Nigeria have the lowest number of applications in terms of population. The Turks and Iranians asked three questions per 10,000 inhabitants, followed by Pakistanis and Nigerians with 1 question.

Besides, data from the *European Asylum Support Office* (EASO) indicate that asylum applications from Albania were 22.9 thousand, a slight increase of 2% compared to the previous year, returning to a trend up after four years, when the number of asylum seekers was decreasing.

In last two years, EASO data show that about 15,000 cases are being treated. Overall, over 90% of applications submitted for the first time as asylum seekers are rejected, as Albania is considered a safe country.

### **3. Problematic aspects in Albania Flow**

The issue of refugees in Albania is deep.

After the Kosovo emergency, Albania no longer had to face the same terrible humanitarian crisis.

At any rate, the refugee problem has not been solved for this. The relevant legislation is not yet fully implemented in guaranteeing the rights of refugees and asylum seekers.

Furthermore, Albanians try to leave the country and apply for asylum abroad.

In the last twenty years, 9,900 people have fled from Albania who have applied for asylum mainly in the US and the UK. At the same time, on average at least about 150 people per year apply for asylum in Albania. Sometimes, the Albanian government decides to transfer some people to other countries. Usually, this solution is chosen when the repatriation of refugees does not give guarantees of security or if the State that received the refugees does not accept local integration. In these cases, the state of first asylum must find a third state that accepts refugees.

The right of asylum and non-refoulement is regulated by the Albanian Constitution on asylum of 1998 and by the legislation on asylum, in compliance with international law. Albania also provides temporary protection in the event of a humanitarian crisis or mass influx.

Asylum applications are evaluated by the *Refugee Office*, which is part of the local government ministry. However, UNHCR has the right to hear *refugee status determination hearings* and to provide advice, at the request of the *Refugee Office*, in some individual cases.

Afterwards 2002, the administration began to reorganize the refugee status process, and a draft law was sent to the Council of Ministers on "the local integration and reunification of the families of people who have been granted asylum in Albania".

Refugees are given a document acknowledging their refugee status and therefore their right to remain in Albania. Most refugees live in collective centres run by UNHCR or government organizations that work with it.

Typically, those who have received temporary protection can choose to reside. In some cases, however, the *National Refugee Commission can*, if there are objective reasons, impose restrictions.

During the "Kosovo emergency", for example, the Albanian government decided to move the Kosovo Albanians to southern Albania, despite their willing to remain in the border area. In fact, the Commission considered that this solution was risky and inadequate, as the conditions necessary to guarantee their safety were lacking locally.

At the moment, there are border controls. It is the border police that receive asylum applications at the border, ensure non-refoulement and allow asylum seekers to enter the state even without the necessary documents. According to border police documents, asylum seekers have decreased over the years.

In the following paragraphs I will list the juridical laws towards migrants and refugees

#### **4 Sources for Refugees and Asylum Refugees**

##### *4.1 Main Sources:*

- *Constitution of the Republic of Albania*, 1998.
- *The Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 28 July 1951.
- *European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* on 3 September 1953.
- *Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*, ratified by law no. 7727, dated 30.6.1993.
- *European Convention "On the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment"*, ratified by law no. 8135, dated 31.07.1996.

##### *4.2. Legislation for Asylum and Migration in Albania:*

###### *- Legislation for Asylum and Migration in Albania:*

- a. Law no. 10060, dated 26.1.2009 "On some changes and additions to law no. 8432, dated 14.12.1998 "On asylum in the Republic of Albania", updated.
- b. Law no. 9098, dated 3.7.2013 "On the integration and family reunification of persons who have received asylum in the Republic of Albania".
- c. Law no. 121/2014 dated 18.9.2014, update in 1 February 2021, "On asylum in the Republic of Albania".
- d. Law no 108/2013, dated 13.11.2014 "For foreigners", amended.

- e. Law no. 8485, dated 12.05.1999 "Code of Administrative Procedures".
- f. Law no. 9131 dated 08.09.2003 "On the rules of ethics in public administration".
- e. Law no. 9887, dated 10.03.2008, "On the protection of personal data".
- f. Decision No. 362, dated 01.04.2009 of the Council of Ministers "On determining the criteria, procedures and documentation for the entry, stay and treatment of foreigners in the Republic of Albania"
- g. Decision no. 470, dated 06.05.2009 of the Council of Ministers "On the approval of the model, technical specifications and format of travel documents for foreigners".
- h. Decision no. 469, dated 06.05.2009 of the Council of Ministers "On determining the security elements and approving the form and model of the residence permit for foreign citizens".
- i. Decision no. 431, dated, for "Determining the criteria, procedures and documentation for the entry, stay and treatment of foreigners in the Republic of Albania".
- j. DCM no. 1102 dated 4.11.2009 "On the treatment and benefit of health services of persons who have been granted asylum and of persons who have applied for asylum in the Republic of Albania".
- k. DCM no. 1260 dated 23.12.2009 "On the approval of the list of safe third countries".
- l. "Instruction of the Minister of Public Order no. 1085, dated 12.6.2006 "On the procedures applied by the State Police for the selection of irregular foreigners at the border".
- m. Instruction of the Minister of Education no. 32 dated 26.10.2009 "On the registration and evaluation of students who have received asylum in the Republic of Albania".
- o. Order of the Minister of Interior no. 752, dated 9.12.2009 "On receiving information and verifying declarations from the country of origin of the Asylum Seeker".
- p. Regulation on the functioning of the National Reception Center for Asylum Seekers Babru, Nr. 1561/2, dated 16.5.2007.

#### *4. 3. What is Asylum and Migration in Albania*

Constitution of the Republic of Albania Article 40: "Foreigners have the right to housing according to the law"

*a. Beneficiaries of Asylum Status*

*b. Refugees* - n. 4, Law on Asylum (No. 1 Convention 1951): Persons under Temporary Protection - (n. 5 Law on Asylum) on humanitarian grounds

*About Refugees: who they are*

1. Fear based
2. Persecution (serious risk + lack of state protection)

3. Reason a. race,
  - b. faith,
  - c. nationality,
  - d. membership in a certain social group
  - e. political persuasion.
4. Outside the country of his citizenship
5. Without the protection of his country

*About Temporary Protection on Humanitarian Basis (n.5 / a):*

1. Fear based
2. Treatment (contrary to International Conventions and instruments to which the Republic of Albania is a party)
3. No special reasons are required
4. Outside the country of his citizenship
5. Without the protection of his country

*4.4. Who are the Authorities?*

Directorate for Asylum and Refugees  
National Commissioner for Refugees  
Border Police Bodies  
UNHCR  
Court

*4.5. Directorate for Migration & Refugees*

Register asylum applications.  
Conducts interviews.  
Collects documents for asylum applications.  
Competent for granting / revoking asylum (first instance).  
Implements measures for the protection / assistance of refugees  
National Commissioner for Refugees (Chairman of Department of Migration)

*4.6. National Commissioner for Refugees*

Take action / Court for unaccompanied & mentally handicapped minor children for guardians.  
Initiation for revocation of refugee status / supervises the registration of temporary protection.  
Decides on the status of persons part of mass flows (exclusive competence).  
Prima facie refugees.


*4.7. Police*

Ensures non-return of asylum seekers.  
Receive asylum applications (selection).  
Notifies the Directorate of Migration / UNHCR in case of detention of persons with refugee / asylum seeker.


*4.8. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).*

Contact any asylum seeker or refugee.  
Get information about asylum seekers.  
Examines the files of asylum seekers / refugees.  
Provides recommendations for Directorate of Migration  
Observes meetings to determine the status of asylum seekers.


## 5. Status determination procedure: article 21, 26, 27




*Table 1: My elaboration, 2021*




*Table 2: My elaboration, 2021*



*Table 3: My elaboration, 2021*



*Table 4: My elaboration, 2021*




*Table 5: My elaboration, 2021*

## 6. Obligations of asylum seekers / migrants / refugees

*They are the following ones:*

- compliance with the laws of the Republic of Albania.
- are not allowed to engage in activities that violate public order, etc.
- cannot act against the principles and goals set out in the conventions to which the Republic of Albania is a party.

## 7. The rights of Granted Persons



*Table 6: My elaboration, 2021*

The rights of asylum seekers	Responsible Authority
Non-refoulement	Police
Social Treatment	Dirac. Mig.
Translation	Dirac. Mig
Legal Representation	Dirac. Mig
Freedom of Movement	Dirac. Mig /Police
Guardian	National Commissioner / Court
Regular process	Dirac. Mig. / Police
Other rights as foreigners	

*Table 7: my rielaboration, 2021*

## 8. Development Trends

As far as the trends are concerned:

1991-1992: Accession to the Treaties on Human Rights

1999: Definition of refugee, non-return (Migration Law)

1999-2020: Full legal framework for the establishment of the asylum system (Law on Asylum; Law on Foreigners)

2001: Improving access and ensuring non-return (Law on Border Control, Selection Guideline)

2003: Law on Family Integration

2013: Approval of the National Asylum Plan

2020: New Selection Guide

## 9. Challenges for Future



In this paragraph I synthesize my proposal:

2001: Improving access and ensuring non-return (Law on Border Control, Selection Guideline)

2003: Law on Family Integration

2013: Approval of the National Asylum Plan

2020: New Selection Guide

Electronic refugee registration

Develop balanced and coherent asylum and migration policies

Return of persons who do not need international protection

## References

«Blood feuds still blight Albanian lives, report says», *Balkan Insight*, 3 April 2013 (<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/blood-feuds-still-blight-albanian-lives-report-says>)

«Common core document forming part of the reports of States parties — Albania [28 march 2012] », HRI/CORE/ALB/2012, UNHCR, 3 September 2012 ([http://www.ecoi.net/file\\_upload/3256\\_1366037023\\_2012-09-03-alb.pdf](http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/3256_1366037023_2012-09-03-alb.pdf))

«Country report on human rights practices — Albania», Department of USA, 2012 (<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2012/eur>.)

DALBY, Simon (1991), « Critical geopolitics. Discourse, Difference and Dissent », *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, n. 9.

Nuri, B., in Tragakes, E. (ed.) (2002), “Healthcare systems in transition: Albania”, Copenhagen, vol. 4, n. 6, ([http://www.euro.who.int/\\_\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0009/96426/E80089.pdf](http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/96426/E80089.pdf))

Stensaker, B. et al., De-institutionalization and reconstruction of higher education systems — The case of the western Balkan countries, *Higher Education Research and Policy*, 2014 (<http://www.herdata.org/research/de-institutionalization-and-reconstruction-of-higher-education-systems-the-case-of-the-westernbalkan-countries/69>)

Tanner, A. (ed.) (2004), *The Forgotten Minorities of Eastern Europe — The History and Today of Selected Ethnic Groups in Five Countries*, Helsinki East-West Books.

### **3. Climate Migration – Chronicle of Pre-Predicted Crisis?**

#### **What can we learn from national characteristics in the fields of climate, environment, culture and economic development in relating to outlining of climate migration in the Euro-Med region?**

Carmit Lubanov, Association of Environmental Justice in Israel (AEJI)

##### ***Abstract***

*The article presents a framework for a discussion on climatic migration against the background of social, economic and cultural aspects as a global phenomenon, its macro-regional expression in the geographical defined region of Euro-Med and examines state-level affinities in the above contexts.*

*Chapter I introduces the climate migration on the backdrop of risk societies and the multiplier threats posed by climate change.*

*Chapter II is an expansive reference to climatic migration against the background of cause and effect and the visibility of climate change in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, including briefly presenting Israel in its position in the countries of the southern Mediterranean, with continental continuity with Africa on the Egyptian border, and in the Eastern Mediterranean basin.*

*Chapter III presents variety of questions that arise against the background of the introduction and group discussion, with an emphasis on the nexus between social, economic and intercultural factors and focuses on two key questions analyzed in Chapter Four, i.e., the characteristics of the participating countries in Climate and Migration policy in the light of multiculturalism and socio-economic aspects - by review of international indices, acceptable by international institutions, in the field of environment, the level of climate risk for the country and more. The fifth chapter summarizes the findings and illuminates the continuation of research work, the promotion of policies and collaborations in the Euro-Med space in order to design a climate migration policy that can be implemented for the benefit of the environment, the receiving countries and the migrants. At the end is included a selective list of bibliography.*

##### **Key words**

Climate risk, risk societies, climate security, secured livelihood, multiplier threat, climate resilience, multiculturalism, indices, political recognition

##### **Content:**

Chapter		Page
	Abstract	49
	Key words	
	Acronym	
I	Introduction	51
Ia.	Climate migration – Looking back	
Ib.	Looking Ahead - Climate change narrative as Multiplier Threat relating socio-economic development and risk societies	
II.	Climate Migration – Chronicle of a pre-predicted crisis?	54
a.	Climate, Migration - Socio-economic and gender perspective	
b.	Climate of pressures – Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean Region	
c.	Migratory Pressures and Climate Refugees	
III	Research Framework and Objectives	57
IV	Methodology	58
V	Data analysis and Concluding Remarks	65
	Reference	
	Tables/graph:	
	Table 1	61
	Table 2	63
	Graph 1	64

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>AEJI</b>	Association of Environmental Justice in Israel
<b>ALF</b>	Anna Lindh Foundation
<b>CCF</b>	Climate Compatible Future
<b>CCL</b>	Climate Change Leadership
<b>CSOs</b>	Civic Society Organizations
<b>CRI</b>	Climate Risk Index
<b>EEA</b>	European Environment Agency
<b>EPI</b>	Environmental Performance Index
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organization
<b>GCM</b>	The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
<b>GHGs</b>	Greenhouse Gas Emissions
<b>GMDAC</b>	Global Migration Data Analysis Centre
<b>HDI</b>	Human Development Index
<b>IEA</b>	International Energy Agency
<b>ICCI</b>	International Cryosphere Climate Initiative
<b>ICCIC</b>	Israeli Climate Change Information Center

<b>IMO</b>	International Migration Organization
<b>IFP-EW</b>	Initiative for Peacebuilding – Early Warning Analysis to Action
<b>IPCC</b>	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
<b>IISD</b>	International Institution for Sustainable Development
<b>MFA</b>	Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
<b>MoEP</b>	Ministry of Environmental Protection
<b>MPI</b>	Multiculturalism Policy Index
<b>OECD</b>	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
<b>SDGs</b>	Sustainable Development Goals (by UN)
<b>UNEP</b>	United Nations Environment Programme
<b>UNFCCC</b>	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
<b>UNGA</b>	United Nations General Assembly
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
<b>U.S. DoD</b>	United States Department of Defense
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization
<b>WMO</b>	World Meteorological Organization

## **I. Introduction**

### *a. Climate Migration – Looking back:*

The Cross-Mediterranean and trans-Sahara, Middle East and to less extent South Asia migration crises of recent years, have been demonstrated both the complexity of the different forces has evolved to drive people out of their homeland, and out of their original livelihoods' region and the adverse consequences of forced migration on migrants, transit communities usually in North Africa and Mediterranean Islands and destination nations in North Mediterranean and South Europe. It has evidenced the need for urgent, comprehensive action by international political institutions. Without placing an equal cut on the two population groups along the migration axis, any action plan should be attentive to both communities of 'forced migration' and 'forced absorption'.

On the other hand, as we have been witnessing in last 2 decades, despite its potential to shape international migration profoundly, 'climate-induced migration' struggles to be unequivocally admitted into the policy frameworks of the migration response community. The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR, 2019) argues that “many of those who are displaced across borders as a result of climate change may not meet the refugee definition” – even though they need protection (UNHCR, n.d.). Consequently, “the immigration policies of most destination countries are not conducive to receiving large numbers of environmental migrants unless they enter through already existing admission categories” (Martin, 2010). The consequence is that

both the needs of climate migrants and communities along their way, transit locations or at destination are not yet being fully addressed.

The year of 2018 will be recorded as a year of change with the creation of a significant, meaningful milestone having the potential to cause a significant paradigm shift. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), signed in New York on Dec. 19th, 2018, seeks to bring in “all dimensions of international migration in a holistic and comprehensive manner”. It is an intergovernmental negotiated agreement which is legally non-binding but opens a window for a stronger anchoring climate-induced migration into the international migration discourse and agenda. Among 23 objectives of the GCM are:

- Aims to mitigate the adverse drivers and structural factors that hinder people from building and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their countries of origin;
- Intends to reduce the risks and vulnerabilities migrants face at different stages of migration by respecting, protecting and fulfilling their human rights and providing them with care and assistance;
- Seeks to address the legitimate concerns of states and communities, while recognizing that societies are undergoing demographic, economic, social and environmental changes at different scales that may have implications for and result from migration;
- Strives to create conducive conditions that enable all migrants to enrich our societies through their human, economic and social capacities, and thus facilitate their contributions to sustainable development at the local, national, regional and global levels.

Since the third quarter of 2018, following establishing a new forum by AEJI with African colleagues as a coalition of Civil Society Organizations (SCOs), non-state independent actors and academics from Africa, the Middle East and Europe have met regularly along 2018-19 to consider the magnitude of climate-induced migration, its consequences for migrants and host communities and how it is shaped by gender. The aim was to map and identify the scope and nature of the problem, in order to better understand the situation of climate induced migration and to devise appropriate responses through, among others, research, policy influence, program and project implementation across these three regions of Africa, Middle-East (East-South Mediterranean) and South Europe for the first time.

We were in contact with heads of GCM in order to drive climate-induced migration to the forefront of international agenda and local actions that will address the drivers of these migration in a sustainable way.

The learning, research and goal-setting process for ongoing activities in the field continues today, 3 years after the establishment of the Intercontinental Forum on African-Mediterranean-European Climate Migration. The current research group, which focuses on intercultural aspects of climate migration as part of the Anna Lindh Foundation Grant is another byproduct of this process. Three years later after the initiative was created in the GCM formation year, the challenge still lies ahead.

*b. Looking Ahead - Climate change narrative as Multiplier Threat relating socio-economic development and risk societies*

The impact of climate change on natural and human systems is now sufficiently documented and the need to act is widely acknowledged. In one of their recent reports, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) records widespread effects of a changing climate and extreme weather on water resources, human health, crop yield, livelihoods and

human settlement throughout the world (IPCC, 2014). In historical connivence with other driven forces, climate change will serve as a threat multiplier with wide impact on few key levels:

- 1) Environmental Security and Human social Security: Climate change is one of the most extensive global threats to peace and security in the 21st century. Climate-induced insecurities can trigger both intra- and inter-state tensions, conflicts and even wars. Weak States may be stressed to the point of collapse. Extremism and terrorism have increased in many developing societies with climate challenges as manifestly exemplified by Lake Chad region in Africa, as well as other regions in Sub-Sahara, North Africa, South Asia, due to the climate-induced social and economic deprivation. Resource scarcity is considered a contributing factor to many of these conflicts and instability. The increasingly violent crop farmers-pastoralists conflict arising from competition for food, fuel and fiber in the Sub Sahara region in which thousands of people are murdered does not at all gain to be a media item in the international press. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the Darfur experience in South Sudan, all had their roots in resource conflicts. That is, the mix of food insecurity, energy crisis, political instability and human displacements will be adversely affecting peace and security, particularly in developing countries, with the potential of driving populations through intragenerational migration cycles, into a long life of environmental refugees and its regenerated social and economic stresses.
- 2) Global inequality: Differences in levels of vulnerability and adaptive capacities around the world mean that the impacts of climate change are unevenly distributed, such that poor, resource-dependent nations are among the most severely affected and burdened. Developing countries also have the least capacity and resources to adapt or build resilience against disruptive and destructive impacts of climate change, and to strategize climate security adaptation.
- 3) International and Regional Security: In 2016, military experts convened by the Center for Climate and Security warned that climate change will “fuel international conflicts and mass migration” (Milman, 2016). In “hot zones” around the world, climate change will exacerbate regional and local tensions and accelerate instability by amplifying problems like water scarcity, food shortages and overpopulation (American Security Project, n.d.). In the Lake Chad region, population displacements, conflicts and other forms of insecurity have been linked to the shrinking body of water and its effects on resources and livelihoods of millions of families in the four countries bordering Lake Chad –Nigeria, Chad, Niger& Cameroon.
- 4) Human and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In the developing world, climate change is undermining gains in social development by compounding the drivers of poverty, increasing the cost of future interventions and putting the lives of billions of peoples at risk. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates, for example, that 122 million more people could enter extreme poverty by 2030. Malnutrition, malaria, diarrhea and heat stress are projected to jointly kill 250,000 more people annually by 2050 (WHO, 2017); while up to 250 million people in Africa alone will be exposed to increased water stress by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2007).

## **II. Climate Migration – A Chronicle of a pre-predicted Crisis?**

### *a. Climate, Migration - Socio-economic and gender perspective*

As early as 1990, the IPCC identified human migration as likely the single most significant impact of climate change (Brown, 2008). A growing body of academic and policy literature has already linked most ongoing and future human displacements to shoreline erosion, coastal flooding, storms, droughts, crop failures and other gradual and sudden climate-induced events and processes. In 2008, for example, the International Migration Organization (IMO) reports that 20 million people were displaced by extreme weather, compared to 4.6 million internally displaced by conflicts and violence during the same period. As many as the current estimate of international migrants, some 200 million people, will be attributable to climate change by 2050 (IMO, n.d.). That excludes about 140 million internally climate-displaced people, according to a recent World Bank estimate. More generous projections put the number of future climate refugees and internally displaced persons (including permanent and temporary migrants) at a billion by 2050.

Climate change forms a complex nexus with migration. On the one hand, climate-induced migration can be perceived as an adaptation strategy that is either *voluntary* or *forced* – because of accrued “losses and damages” that cannot be addressed through adaptation. In either case, “Migration can help reduce risk to lives, livelihoods and ecosystems, contribute to income diversification and enhance overall capacity of households and communities to cope with the adverse effects of environmental and climate change (IMO, n.d.).” On the other hand, the mass movement of people can put additional strain on the environment, stretch resources and increase vulnerabilities at the destination. This is likely to happen irrespective of whether migration is temporal or permanent; international or internal. This, therefore, warrants a reassessment of how climate-induced migration (migration in general, for that matter) is currently understood and the policy implications that it is likely to produce.

Both climate change and migration are inherently gendered. “Women commonly face higher risks and greater burdens from the impacts of climate change in situations of poverty, and the majority of the world’s poor are women. Women’s unequal participation in decision-making processes and labor markets compound inequalities and often prevent women from fully contributing to climate-related planning, policy-making and implementation (UNFCCC, n.d.).” Similarly, migration affects women differently from men, in part because of the gendered nature of underlying factors that determine the causes, courses and consequences of migration. Gender relationships, roles and hierarchies have been shown to produce different migration experiences and outcome for men and women at all stages of the migration process, from premigration, through the transition to arrival at destination. That is, “Gender is deeply embedded in determining who moves, how those moves take place, and the resultant future of migrant women and families” (Boyd, 2003).

The interplay between climate change, migration and gender have been largely dealt with separately, but a holistic view is now preferred. Migration patterns, for instance, depend on how gender considerations shape cultural expectation, policies and institutions; meaning that climate change would yield different migratory experiences and impacts for women and men (Hunter & David, 2009). A study by the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU\_EHS) found that gender inequality can reduce households’ abilities to build resilience against the adverse impacts of climate change. Moreover, where migration is the preferred climate change adaptation option, economically and socially marginalized groups within affected communities (the poor, the elderly, women and children) often have the hardest time deciding whether to stay or leave (IMO, n.d.).

Addressing climate change, migration and gender together offers a new perspective for policy and practice. This attitude needs to be better understood from a multi-regional, multi-

disciplinary perspective based on already known cases to understand how climate-migration-gender interactions feed and fuel the global migration crises of the last decade, with focusing in the Euro-Med region.

*b. Climate of pressures – Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean Region*

Israel faces distinct pressures from climatic effects projected to affect the Mediterranean Basin and the Middle East. In the last few decades, anthropogenic climate change has significantly impacted the Middle East: Since 1950 there has been an increase in aggregate temperatures, a decrease in the number of cold days, and an increase in the number of warm days (Zhang et al. 2005). In the future, the southern part of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East may be exposed to 2–3 months more combined tropical nights and hot days, while the northern part could experience increased heat wave amplitudes ranging from 6-10 degrees Celsius (Zittis et al. 2016).

Regional climate change models for the Eastern Mediterranean also predict a further increase in the frequency and duration of severe droughts. The observed wintertime Mediterranean drying over the last century corresponds to “the region’s sensitivity to a uniform global ocean warming and to modest changes in the ocean’s zonal and meridional sea surface temperature (SST) gradients” (Weinthal et al. 2015; Hoerling et al. 2012). Consequently, the IPCC has identified the Mediterranean region as a climate change “hot spot,” with most countries of the Eastern Mediterranean already experiencing temperature rises; accompanied by growing rates of desertification, increases in freshwater scarcity, forest fires, and increasing drought frequency (Solomon 2007; Loizidou et al. 2016; Hoerling et al. 2012).

Based on IPCC models, the warming trends of recent years are set to continue. Average temperatures in Israel are set to rise a further 1.5 °C within the next few years; reaching 5° C towards the end of the century compared to 1960-1990 levels. The largest form of climate change, however, corresponds to a decrease in precipitation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East caused by a decrease in storm track activity over the Eastern Mediterranean (Evans 2009). While precipitation is predicted to decrease by 20% by 2050, sea level rise in the Mediterranean is estimated to hit one meter by 2100, following 0.5 meters by 2050 (Evans 2009; MoEP 2010).

The frequency and length of extreme weather events, such as exceedingly wet or dry years has increased and related events like droughts, heat waves and floods are likely to escalate (Brown & Crawford 2009). Between the years of 2003/2004 to 2010/2011, Israel suffered 7 years of consecutive drought, surviving “the Mediterranean’s worst drought in 900 years,” which was consistent with global trends that have seen the ten warmest years on record all occur since the year 2000 (OECD 2011; NASA 2015). Natural climatic variability cannot account for the increasing frequency of wintertime droughts in the Mediterranean<sup>1</sup> (Hoerling et al. 2012).

In terms of regional hydrology, the combination of higher temperatures and lower levels of precipitation will reduce the flow of rivers and streams. In the Middle East, climate change will bring a stream of negative consequences, especially for agriculture, river flows and the rate at which groundwater aquifers replenish (Brown & Crawford 2009). Furthermore, increased rainstorms, erosion and runoff will affect the natural rates at which aquifers recharge, adding further water stress to the region. Israel’s National Report under the UNFCCC warned that

---

<sup>1</sup> Within the past 20 years, the region experienced 10 of its 12 driest winters since 1902 (Hoerling et al. 2012).



water supply may severely decrease, falling by 60% of 2000 levels by 2100, which has been reinforced by the Ministry of Environment in subsequent reports (Pe'er & Safriel 2000).

The Middle East's transboundary rivers provide about 60 % of its freshwater supplies, which the World Bank reports as the highest rate of dependence on international basins in the world (Hamdy 2005). To make matters worse, these transboundary rivers have asymmetrical upstream and downstream power relations, which further complicate access to and control over water resources (Lowi 1993). Under conditions of moderate temperature increase, the Euphrates River would carry 30% less water than at present and the end of the century could see the Jordan River shrinking by up to 80% (Brown & Crawford 2009). Additional impacts, such as reduced flows to Lake Kinneret and reduced recharge of groundwater aquifers, are likely to problematize the colossal effects of climate change in Israel and the Middle East (OECD 2013).

In sum, climate change is highly likely to influence Israel's water resources, while agriculture, biodiversity and public health are extremely vulnerable to changes in climatic conditions (ICCIC 2011). Due to the unequal distribution and scarcity of water in the Middle East, there is an underlying reason for its classification as a long-term security concern linked to climate change. Strategic policy needs to anticipate the widespread and interconnected impacts of climate change, including the threat of multi-decadal mega-drought. As illustrated, these impacts are already visible today and will further intensify in the days to come, with probable damages more severe in the Middle East than in other regions of the world. Policy measures necessitate formulation and implementation sooner rather than later.

c. *Migratory Pressures and Climate Refugees*

Since 2010 the impacts of climate change on external migration to Israel has touched the outskirts of national security discussions. The Israeli Climate Change Information Center (ICCIC) explicitly links climate change to the threat of "climate refugees" from Sub-Saharan Africa (ICCIC 2012; Weinthal et al. 2015). Such conclusions stem from the recent surge in African migrants and asylum seekers, with 60,000 refugees having crossed into Israel by way of Egypt since 2005 (Human Rights Watch 2014).<sup>2</sup> Drought and desertification across much of the Sahel have undermined agricultural and pastoral livelihoods, adding further pressures to well-established migratory routes between Libya, Nigeria, Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali to the Mediterranean coast, Europe and Israel. (Heinrigs 2010; Werz & Conley 2012; Femia & Werrell 2013).

In the Middle East, the most recent influx of refugees has originated from the ongoing conflict in Syria, with the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) listing 620,441 registered Syrian refugees in Jordan alone (WHO 2014). Additionally, large numbers of undocumented refugees from Libya and Yemen also reside in Jordan, adding to the costs of housing and public services, while placing further stress on local resources, which together heightens the level of domestic social conflict (Weinthal et al. 2015; Fagen 2009). According to the UNHCR,<sup>3</sup> migratory pressures and "the adverse effects that climate change may have on natural resources, may spark conflict with other communities, as an increasing number of people compete for a decreasing number of resources" (UNHCR 2015).

---

<sup>2</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2014>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e4a5096.html>

The ICCIC recommends “Israel to take steps to insulate itself from instability, such as strengthening its border barriers and defenses,” in tandem to the proposed building of “sea fences” along the Mediterranean and Red Seas, with added law enforcement along border zones (ICCIC 2013; Udasin 2012; Udasin 2014). These measures can enhance Israel’s geopolitical and economic security, as witnessed through the construction of a border fence across the Israel-Egyptian border that has effectively closed the migratory routes taken by African refugees to enter Israel (Fiske 2013). At the same time, however, the root causes of migration and their interconnections to climate change must go beyond the conventional security agenda and analysis.

### **III. Research Framework and Objectives**

The current research work that enable to conduct a learning process of climate change, migration and socio economy and intercultural nexus, from both perspective of climate induced migration' countries (Africa, South Med) and migration absorptive countries (North Med, Europe) that are affected (separately) by climate change, in a way that requires adaptation and preparation at the level of governance and community - raise wide range of questions that need to be considered, certainly when the focus is on the dynamic of driven forces and interrelatedness between the consequences of climate change, multiculturalism and socio-economic aspects.

For example: when considering 'forced migration' and 'forced absorption' what kind of resilience of affected populations in destination European countries should be targeted from social and intercultural perspective? When it is clear that demographic change affects the power relations between the components of the original population, the hierarchy of housing, education, employment, environment, energy poverty, and more and more.

On the other edge of the Environment-Economy-Society scale, what makes a specific country friendly to migrants in comparison to neighboring countries?

Having good experience of social absorption can be implemented in other Euro-Med countries? and what we can learn from the case of Syrian refugee absorption plan in Jordan for long term integration and economic development, together with the local population via training in the field of agriculture. A program that has implications for Climate strategy adaptation on a regional scale, and not only migrant issues.

Can we append to the discourse ‘forced solutions' in addition to 'forced migration' and 'forced absorption'? Will the assessing of the accumulative information, mapping the barriers and opportunities in social integration assist in framing regional policy and action plan for climate migration in specific countries, or in the Euro-Med region? Are there certain characteristics in the conduct of a country that can give us a better understanding of the conditions required in the process of formulating migration policies on a climatic background, and its implementation in a fair and considerate manner to migrants and local (veteran) residents. Is this even possible?!

Answering the entire list of questions above, requires a much longer time that goes beyond the time frame of the study in question as part of the current Anna Lindh foundation (ALF) project. The study will therefore focus on two concrete questions, which could advance us towards better understanding about the weight that country characteristics constitute in the macro story of “climate migration”.

Research questions:

1. Is there a linkage between environmental performance, climate risks and migration policy, on state level?

Do socio-economic and multicultural characteristics influence the country's climate and climate policy in the Euro-Med region?

2. What can we learn from the characteristics of a country in the fields of climate and environment, culture and economic development as a framework for outlining climate migration aimed for the Euro-Med region.

#### **IV. Methodology**

As stated above, the study focuses on two questions yet to be explored, based on previous familiarity with the field of climate migration, and will attempt to draw whether there is an affinity between the various parameters, which prudently reflect a state level assessment in each of the areas examined, within the limitation of sole parameter. The analysis of the findings will further help to build a country's 'identity card' in the field of climate migration that indicates for coping with climate risks, level of civic awareness of environmental and climate issues, resilience and adaptation to climate security against the background of characterization and economic development and the society's multicultural, as accepted in international comparison.

The initiated work process conducted here, is aimed to compose a new 'index' in the field of climate migration whose numerical expressions and value will constitute an algorithmic weighting of the contributive parameters in the various fields, where processing and reflection of society and government positions relating 'Climate Migration-Intercultural in a given year and country. The formulation work of the index is a future work to be done beyond the scope of this article preparation, in the frame of a designated working group on the subject of developing indicators for international climate policy. The gathering of updated information is used to create a necessary database and to present the new approach that is concerned with looking at climate migration in the prism of the absorptive countries, with hope to improve the social integration and coping with the huge human challenges that climate change commits us to cope with.

The parameters examined per participant country are commonly used in international comparative research and used by UN international institutions, groups of countries convened on economic or other cooperative umbrella, political structures, research institutes, international foundations, and more. The parameters presented in Table 1 are the most recent data published in each of performed parameter (usually 2019/2020).

The countries for which information is gathered and researched at a national level, are those whose representatives of two universities in Italy, and civil society organizations (CSOs), all have been taking part in the ALF research project: Albania, Israel, Malta, Tunisia. In addition, Portugal, based on prior acquaintance with policies practices considered friendly 'welcome migrants' police' and Greece, due to the significant role that its Islands play in the migration front, whether as a transit station or a prolonged stay in islands with limited carrying capacity in terms of natural environment and population.

This chapter includes therefore the presentation of the parameters, and brief information about what they reflect, methodologically aspects of the parameters, and what the values indicate about. The table includes the latest data and then graphics processing. In addition, an overview

of the findings and understandings that can be deduced from the gathered data, in the framework of the research objectives and the related questions.

The parameters are:

**Global compact of migration (GCM):** here the methodology is simple, and presents the situation after a long international process of formulating the international agreement by all parties, in which many countries took part, including those eventually declined to sign on it. The information presented is unequivocally: whether the country signed the Global Compact or refused to sign.

**The Human Development Index (HDI):** is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development including a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and having a decent standard of living. The HDI is the geometric mean of normalized indices for each of the three dimensions.

**Environmental Performance Index (EPI):** the 2020 Environmental Performance Index (EPI) provides a data-driven summary of the state of sustainability around the world. Using 32 performance indicators across 11 issue categories, the EPI ranks 180 countries on environmental health and ecosystem vitality. These indicators provide a gauge at a national scale of how close countries are to established environmental policy targets. The EPI offers a scorecard that highlights leaders and laggards in environmental performance and provides practical guidance for countries that aspire to move toward a sustainable future.

Also, the EPI provides a powerful policy tool in support of efforts to meet the targets of the UN Sustainable Development Goals and to move society toward a sustainable future. Overall EPI rankings indicate which countries are best addressing the environmental challenges that every nation faces. Going beyond the aggregate scores and drilling down into the data to analyze performance by issue category, policy objective, peer group, and country offers greater value for policymakers.

**Climate Risk Index (CRI):** the global Climate Risk Index (CRI) developed by Germanwatch analyses quantified impacts of extreme weather events— both in terms of the fatalities as well as the economic losses that occurred. CRI examines both absolute and relative impacts to create an average ranking of countries in four indicative categories, with a stronger emphasis on the relative indicators<sup>4</sup>. The countries ranking highest are the ones most impacted by extreme weather events and should consider the CRI as a warning sign that they are at risk of either frequent events, or rare but extraordinary catastrophes. The CRI analysis can be seen as contributing to explaining countries' exposure and vulnerability to climate-related risks based on the most reliable quantified data available. It is based on data reflecting the current and past climate variability and also on climate change to the extent that it has already left its footprint on climate variability over the last 20 years.

CRI indicates a level of exposure and vulnerability to extreme events, which countries should understand as warnings in order to be prepared for more frequent and/or more severe events in the future. The data presented in Table 1 are of CRI 2021 report, where data from 180 countries were analyzed.

---

<sup>4</sup>The index is based on data from the Munich Re NatCatSERVICE11. On the calculation of the index please see on [https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202021\\_1.pdf](https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202021_1.pdf)

The Key Results of the global CRI 2021 indicated that among the 10 countries most affected in 2019 are Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Niger, near lake of Chad and South Sudan – countries that are being source for migrants arriving in Europe. In South Sudan for example, 'abnormally severe flooding following heavy rainfalls lasting from June 2019 until the end of the year. These affected over 900,000 people; 620,000 of whom required immediate humanitarian assistance. The floods damaged 74,000 hectares of cultivated land, which amounts to a loss of over 70,000 metric tons of cereal' (D. Eckstein, V. Künzel and L., Schäfer, 2021).

### **Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI)<sup>5</sup>:**

It seems that the intercultural aspects in a multicultural society, as held in the Euro-Med region, the "jurisdiction borders" of the study, are less given research attention relating to the socio-cultural policy needed. There is no universally-accepted definition of a "multiculturalism policy", that hard to distinguish Multiculturalism policies from closely related policy fields, such as anti-discrimination policies, citizenship policies and integration policies. The index presented here, 'Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI)', which I became acquainted with the help of Prof. Yossi Dahan, an international expert in law, civil rights and social justice<sup>6</sup>, is targeting the need and the concept of a quantitative measure of the presence or absence of multiculturalism policies across time and across countries. The developers planned that MPI provides a useful tool for assessing the social effects of multiculturalism, and for determining how these policies are evolving over time. A target that is suitable in the case for examination of two long-term processes, which are affected and influence policy - climate change and migration, with the approach of ethnocultural diversity.

In this context, the evolvement of the MPI is interesting and reflects not only methodological shift towards a more accommodating approach to diversity, but the political need to integrate widespread adoption of accommodation policies for migrant groups, acceptance of territorial autonomy and language rights for national minorities, or the recognition of land claims and self-government rights for indigenous peoples, as each branch of this index represents.

To summarize the long history of political and intellectual debates relating to acceptable quantitative measures of the presence or absence of multiculturalism policies across time and across countries, the MPI became a useful tool for assessing the social effects of multiculturalism, and for determining how these policies are evolving over time.

The MPI is a scholarly research project that monitors the evolution of multiculturalism policies in 21 Western democracies. The original project is designed to provide information about multiculturalism policies in a standardized format that aids comparative research and contributes to the understanding of state-minority relations. The project provides an index for each of three types of minorities: relating to immigrant groups, historic national minorities, and relating to indigenous peoples. The Multiculturalism policy (MCP) Index for immigrant minorities is now available on annual basis, with scores for each MCP in each country from 1960 to 2020. The data identifies the precise year in which a country adopted and/or retrenched any particular MCP.

In practice, MCP Index measures the presence or absence of a range of multiculturalism policies (MCPs) at three points in time: 1980, 2000 and 2010, across 21 Western democracies, which unfortunately includes only 3 countries participate in our research.

---

<sup>5</sup> From MCI website: " This dataset was compiled by Dr. Daniel Westlake for his doctoral dissertation research at the University of British Columbia". Please see: <https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/home>

<sup>6</sup> For the sake of proper disclosure Prof. Dahan is a member of the Board of AEJI.

Therefore, in table2 are presented the results for Italy, Greece and Portugal, in the analysis of migration groups (the two others, not included in this research are indigenous peoples and historic national minorities). For each type of group, the developers produced a booklet that contains (a) definitions of these policies and rules for scoring individual countries; (b) a table which indicates how each country scored in relation to each policy in 1980, 2000 and 2010; and (c) a detailed chronology of policy evolution in each country which provides the evidence underpinning our scores.

The data in Table 1 is a summary of evaluating the multiculturalism policies related to migrant minorities, by using 8 indicators. For each indicator, policy documents, program guidelines, legislation, government news releases and secondary sources were examined to assess the extent to which a country has met or exceeded the standard outlined in the indicator. Like in Constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities

*Table 1: Multiculturalism Policies for Immigrant Minorities-Summary Scores*

	Total Score			
	1980	1990	2000	2010
Greece	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>2.5</u>
Italy	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1.5</u>	<u>1.5</u>
Portugal	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3.5</u>

### Migration Profile:

This “migration profile” per country participated in the research is from migrationdataportal<sup>7</sup> by the International Migration Organization (IMO), gathering and presenting comprehensive migration statistics about migration data globally.

The data presented in Table 2 refer to 2 parameters in each of the countries:

International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population at mid-year 2020, and the share of female migrants in the international migrant stock at mid-year 2020, both in percentage.

<sup>7</sup> IOM’s Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (GMDAC)



*Table 2: Comparison between countries in the Euro-Med region according to international indicators in the areas of climate risk, environmental performance, economic development, multiculturalism and migration*


Indicator	Parameter / Country	Albania	Malta	Israel	Italy	Tunisia	Portugal	Greece
	Signed Global Compact Of Migration (2018)	V	V	X	X	V	V	V
1	Human Development Index (HDI)	69 (0.795)	28 (0.895)	19 (0.919)	29 (0.892)	95 (0.740)	38 (0.864)	32 (0.888)
2	Environmental Performance Index (EPI)Yale – Global ranking (of 180 countries)	62 (49)	23 (70.7)	29 (65.8)	20 (71)	71 (46.7)	27 (67)	25 (69.1)
3	CRI Climate Risk index <sup>8</sup> – Score (2019)	118	67.33	108.83	43.5	118	48.33	45
	CRI – Rank	130	68	128	35	130	37	36
	CRI - losses per unit GDP in % - Rank	130	16	129	34	130	36	54
4	MPI - Multiculturalism Policies for Immigrant Minorities-Summary Scores from 2010	-----	-----	-----	1.5	-----	3.5	2.5
5	International migrant stock as a percentage of the total population at mid-year 2020 <sup>9</sup>	1.7	26	22.6	10.6	0.5	9.8	12.9
6	Share (%) of female migrants in the international migrant stock at mid-year 2020	49	42.4	54.6	53.6	47.7	52.1	52.1

<sup>8</sup> Climate risk index score -Lower score indicates high levels of climate risk (Germanwatch)

<sup>9</sup> <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp>



*Graph 1: Graphical display of the table 1 data - the comparison between the countries in the Euro-Med region according to international indicators in the areas of climate risk, environmental performance, economic development, multiculturalism policy.*



## **Data analysis and Concluding Remarks**

Although the migration crisis following the climate crisis is expected, as discussed in detail in the first two chapters of this article, the tension and interrelated impact between the various parameters presented here, each of which may be a component of a country's 21st century national identity, is much less obvious.

The parameters selected in the study, can be considered as a kind of 'policy design exercise' in driving discussion and research activities on climate governance and migration under one framework, representing a wide range of country characteristics such as government capabilities and civic awareness, recognition and preparation acts for coping with frequent extreme climate events, environmental performance, economic development and multicultural democracy, migration-oriented policies, including those of ethnic minorities.

The data as reflected in the various parameters were examined in the 6 countries participating in the research project, via academic institutions and CSOs, and despite the limited scope of the number of examinees, there is a sweeping fit of the trends between the parameters of the economic development index, environmental performance index and climate risk index (graph 1).

Despite the relatively limited number of countries included in the University of Queens' long-term study on measurement of multiculturalism policy, accommodation is also seen in this parameter among the 3 countries examined.

Given that the fit between the parameters per country is consistent, it can be assumed that the similarity in behavior indicates on a broader trend among countries in Euro-Med, and that there is a common infrastructure and perhaps even 'state identity' in the various issues grouped under coping and performing in climate, environment and economic development.

Recognition of this path, both given politically and budgetary realization, and further study of the indicators and the expansion of the Euro-Med number of countries, will assist in gaining understanding of the relative weight of each of these characteristics in the overall political identity regarding climate crises and migration, and sustain to formulate regional policy, with mainstreaming of civic involvement and socio-political education for the inclusion of multiculturalism as a framework for climate and immigration policy.

In terms of further research objectives, the findings of the initial work here will use to formulate a weighted index based on the indicators presented and additional information, that will allow long term monitoring and following after countries' performance in the field of climate migration policy in the targeted region of Euro-Med.

As far as the findings relating Israel, which stands at the forefront of technological innovation in the world, a location that enables to create better adjusted response to the climate crisis, although its vulnerable on the desert border on the front of regional warming, these characteristics, together with a high level of economic development per capita, explain the different behavior in the economic development index and climate risk.

The findings of the present study, as a preliminary study in the field, join the findings of previous AEJI studies in the field of climate resilience and were aimed at promoting readiness to cope with climate crisis situations at the local governance level.

It is to be expected that these trends will be strengthened in the future and that cooperation is essential for achieving climatic sustainability in the region.

The collaborations are true not only between countries in the Euro-Med area, as indicated by the results, but they between the various research bodies that focusing in development of the parameters in a prudently and independently manner, and it is requested to consult with them on the relevancy of other parameters integration and further development the methodological aspects.

Moreover, the collaborations are also reflected between academic research institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs) as conducted in this research group, funded by the Anna Lindh Foundation, and as it is appropriate to encourage and expand such collaborations and include diverse stakeholders as local authority representatives. Local Authorities are critical links in multicultural social integration and migrant absorption, as in economic development targeting others low-carbon economic goals to be implemented at municipal functions areas such as waste, transportation, long-term planning and public participation, where all segments of the population, including migrants, are considered. In addition, to national government authorities in the field of strategic development, international foundations and international political institutions and UN agencies.

## References:

American Security Project, *Climate Change and Global Security*,  
<https://www.americansecurityproject.org/climate-energy-and-security/new-climate-change-website-3-climate-change-and-global-security/>

Brown, O., and Crawford A., (2009), "Rising temperatures, rising tensions: climate change and the risk of violent conflict in the Middle East."

Brown, O., Hammill, A., and McLemam, R., (2007), "Climate change as the 'new' security threat: implications for Africa." *International affairs* 83.6: 1141-1154.

Climate Change and Disasters, UNCHR (2019),  
<https://www.unhcr.org/climate-change-and-disasters.html>

Climate Risk Index per country Germanwatch, (2021),  
[https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202021\\_1\\_1.pdf](https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202021_1_1.pdf)

Eckstein D., Künzel, V, Schäfer L., (2021). *Global Climate Risk Index 2021*, Who Suffers Most from Extreme Weather Events? Weather-Related Loss Events in 2019 and 2000-2019, Germanwatch.  
[https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202021\\_1\\_1.pdf](https://germanwatch.org/sites/germanwatch.org/files/Global%20Climate%20Risk%20Index%202021_1_1.pdf)

*Environmental Performance Index, 2021*,  
<https://epi.yale.edu/epi-results/2020/component/epi>

Evans, Jason P. "21st century climate change in the Middle East." *Climatic Change* 92.3 (2009): 417-432.

Femia, Francesco, and Caitlin Werrell (2013), "Climate change before and after the Arab awakening: the cases of Syria and Libya." *The Arab Spring and Climate Change*: 24-25.

Fiske, Gavriel (2013), "Netanyahu: Egypt border fence halted flow of migrants. *The Times of Israel*, 7 July.

FCCC, UN. "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 1992." *Available on the Internet: http://www.unfccc.de.*

Global Compact for Migration (2018), *Global Refugees Forum, UN*  
[https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180713\\_agreed\\_outcome\\_global\\_compact\\_for\\_migration.pdf](https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180713_agreed_outcome_global_compact_for_migration.pdf)

Global Migration Data Portal [https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock\\_abs\\_&t=2020](https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2020)

Gordon, J.A. (2017), "Mitigation of Climate Risk and Adaptation to Climate Security in Israel and the Middle East: Policy Measures toward Geopolitical Cooperation and Regional Transformation." Edited: C. Lubanov, *Association of Environmental Justice in Israel, AEJI New Series on Climate Change Strategy*.

[http://www.aeji.org.il/sites/default/files/2017\\_story\\_files/aeji\\_synthesis\\_report\\_climate\\_change\\_national\\_security\\_aug2017\\_final\\_v.pdf](http://www.aeji.org.il/sites/default/files/2017_story_files/aeji_synthesis_report_climate_change_national_security_aug2017_final_v.pdf)

Hamdy, A., (2005). "Making the Most of Scarcity: Accountability for Better Water Management Results in the Middle East and North Africa."

Heinrigs, P., (2010), "Security implications of climate change in the Sahel region: policy considerations."

*Human Rights Watch*, (2014).

International Cryosphere Climate Initiative (2017), "Climate Strategies." *ICCI*.

IPCC, Summary for Policy Makers (2014), "Climate Change, Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability". Part A: *Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, 1-32 pp, Cambridge University Press.

International Energy Agency (2015), "Energy and Climate Change: World Energy Outlook Special Report." *OECD/IEA*.

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2015), *Climate change 2014: mitigation of climate change*. Vol. 3. Cambridge University Press.

Israel Climate Change Information Centre (ICCIC). "Survey of existing knowledge: Identification of gaps and priorities for knowledge completion." *ICCIC*, 2012.

Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection (2016), "Targeting Climate Change in Israel and Beyond." *Israel Environment Bulletin Volume 42, January*.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (2017), "The Mideast Peace Process." *MFA*

Loizidou, M., et al (2016). "Climate change impacts and adaptation options in the Mediterranean basin." 1859-1861.

Lowi, M.R., (2011), "Bridging the divide: transboundary resource disputes and the case of West Bank water." *International Security 18.1* p.113-138.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2011), "Environmental Performance Reviews: Israel 2011 Highlights." *OECD*.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2013), "Israel: Climate Change Impacts on Water Systems." *Water and Climate Change Adaptation. OECD*.

Martin, S.F. (2010), Climate Change and International Migration  
[https://www.preventionweb.net/files/14679\\_MartinV3.pdf](https://www.preventionweb.net/files/14679_MartinV3.pdf)

Milman, O. (2016), Military experts say climate change poses 'significant risk' to security. *The Guardian*, 14 September.

<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/14/military-experts-climate-change-significant-security-risk>

Multiculturalism Policy Index, Queens University.

<https://www.queensu.ca/mcp/home>

National Research Council (2013), *Climate and social stress: implications for security analysis*. National Academies Press.

Nelson, G.C., et al. (2010), "Food Security, Farming, and Climate Change in 2050: Scenarios, Results, Policy Options." IFPRI, Washington, D.C.

Pe'er, G., and U. N. Safriel (2000), "Climate change: Israel national report under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Impact, vulnerability and adaptation." *Sede Boqer Campus of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev*.

Udasin, S., (2012), "Defending Israel's Borders from 'Climate Refugees'." *The Jerusalem Post*, 14 May.

Udasin, S., (2014), "Israel Surely in Front Line for Climate Refugees." *The Jerusalem Post*, 14 October.

Weinthal, E., Neda Z., and Sowers, J., (2015), "Securitizing water, climate, and migration in Israel, Jordan, and Syria." *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics* 15.3 p. 293-307.

Werz, M., and Conely L., (2012). "Climate change migration and conflict in Northwest Africa: rising dangers and policy options across the Arc of tension." *Center for American Progress*, <http://www.americanprogress.org> 2012/04.

WHO, Protecting health from climate change (2017),

<https://www.who.int/globalchange/mediacentre/news/climate-change-country-profiles/en/>

World Health Organization. "United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2013), "Assessment and management of conditions specifically related to stress: mhGAP intervention guide module (version 1.0).

UNFCCC, Subsidiary Body for Implementation, (2007), *Report on the African regional workshop on adaptation, 26th Session*, May.

<https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/sbi/eng/02.pdf>

Zhang, X., et al. (2005) "Trends in Middle East climate extreme indices from 1950 to 2003." *Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres* 110.D22.

Zittis, G., et al (2016), "Projected changes in heat wave characteristics in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East." *Regional environmental change* 16.7 p. 1863-1876.

## **SECOND SECTION**

### **The Push Factors and the Run towards Euro-Med Region**

#### 4. Climate Migration in Euromed Area: a case study bibliometric analysis

Mara Maretti, University “G d’Annunzio” of Chieti-Pescara, Alice Tontodimamma, University “G d’Annunzio” of Chieti-Pescara, Roberta Di Risio, University “G d’Annunzio” of Chieti-Pescara, Vanessa Russo, University “G d’Annunzio” of Chieti-Pescara

##### **Abstract**

*The impact of climate change on the displacement of populations represents a key issue of our contemporaneity in a multidisciplinary key. The effect that climate change has on human migration has always affected humans, but it has recently gained considerable importance not only as a public opinion matter, but also as a research issue.*

*Although the concept of climate migration still has fuzzy outlines, both in the sociological and in the legal sense, the analysis of case studies is flourishing in the literature. These analyses, which consider climatic factors as push factors, today represent the most effective tool for understanding the phenomenon.*

*In this framework, this paper is presented as a bibliometric analysis aimed at reconstructing the framework of international literature relating to case studies of climatic migration. The content analysis methods used to map the features of the different departure areas are the co-occurrence analysis and the topic analysis. The research has a particular focus on migration routes that cross the Mediterranean.*

**Keywords:** Case Study, Climate Migration, Mediterranean Region, Bibliometric Analysis

##### **Introduction and theoretical framework**

In the scientific literature, the analysis of the consequences of climate change on migration is growing rapidly (Maretti et al., 2019).

Despite this, the definition of climatic migrations is still rather smoky and controversial, just as a single clear defining vision of the phenomenon and the various causes that cause it is not yet assumed (Piguet & Laczko, 2014; Piguet, Pécoud, & Guchteneire, 2011).

To try to reconstruct the contours of the question, it is useful to start from a broader definition of environmental migration. Environmental migrants are people forced to leave their region of origin due to sudden or long-term changes in their living environment, changes that compromise their well-being or livelihood, i.e., activities mainly related to agriculture, forestry and breeding. Therefore, starting from the umbrella term “environmental migrant”, we can distinguish the environmental changes deriving from human activities (industrial settlements or oil extraction, deforestation, atmospheric pollution or earthquakes) from variations in the local ecosystem depending on climate changes that can determine: drought, loss of biodiversity, sea level rise, change in seasonal weather patterns (such as monsoons) and catastrophic atmospheric events such as cyclones, tornadoes, tropical storms etc.

All these significant environmental changes contribute to exacerbating the socio-economic vulnerabilities of some territories, negatively affecting the agriculture and aquaculture, low-income livestock sectors resulting in forced migration.



While the climate and environmental factors have always played an important role in defining global human displacement, there is general agreement between international public opinion and organizations such as the Organization for Migration that the acceleration of climate change is set to increase the number of migrants (Bintanja, van de Wal, & Oerlemans, 2005; Hastrup & Olwig, 2012). The phenomenon increasingly worries the international community and raises public awareness. The World Bank<sup>10</sup> has estimated that in 2018 three regions, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, will generate 143 million more climate migrants by 2050. It seems that about one-third of forced migrations (from 22.5 million to 24 million people) are caused by “sudden onset” weather events: floods, forest fires after drought and storms. Evidently in 2150, with the rise in temperature between +3 and +5 degrees, the phenomenon can only accelerate.

There are several positions that try to understand in depth what are the problematic conditions that determine a push to move from one’s own territory, or what are the elements of attraction that push human communities to reach that specific territory (push and pull factors) (Lee, 1966; Myers, 1999, 2002, 2005; O’Lear 1997).

In this scenario, based on current public opinion rather than on rigorous scientific research, we must consider that the causes of migratory displacements are multiple (Black, 2001, Lonegran, 1998; Morrissey, 2009) and include economic, demographic, social factors, environmental, climatic and political. It is often difficult to define which factors are dominant, and the role of climate change varies from case to case (Campbell & Barnett, 2010; Piguet, Kaenzig, & Guélat, 2018; Zickgraf, 2019).

Therefore, the debate among human rights experts about the terms “climate refugees” and “climate migrants” is still open. The first definition implies that the communities that move seek refuge to escape the problems related to climate change. This is useful in order to highlight the urgency of the phenomenon, but does not effectively delineate its boundaries and characteristics (Zetter, 2016). According to the 1951 United Nations Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the status of “refugee” can be assigned only to that individual who is persecuted and who is outside his own national borders and who does not avail himself of the protection of his own country. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), on the other hand, uses the term “environmental migrant” as those who for various reasons “are forced to leave their usual homes, or choose to do so, temporarily or permanently, and move within their country or abroad”.

This scenario raises social, political and ethical issues, both nationally and internationally, in the areas of destination of the displaced.

Faced with the uncertainty regarding the greater or lesser weight of climatic and environmental factors as activators of human displacements, it is useful, for understanding this phenomenon in-depth, to apply the case study method.

This paper presents a case study bibliometric meta-analysis aimed at: 1. identifying on which territories the scientific literature on climatic migration focuses mostly; 2. how different push factors intersect (environmental changes, conflicts, economic reasons) in some selected case studies; 3. which are the main starting areas, studied in the literature, concerning the Mediterranean area.

## **The bibliometric analysis**

Bibliometric analysis can be defined as the quantitative study of bibliographic material with the aim of examining the knowledge structure and the development of a given research field (for more details see Maretti et al., 2019).

---

<sup>10</sup> <http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29461>

Therefore, the bibliometric analysis is based on data retrieved from the Scopus database in April 2021. Scopus is a bibliographic database produced by Elsevier that indexes almost 20,000 journals in all scientific disciplines. The terms ‘climate migration’, ‘climate refugee’ and ‘environmental migration’ were used as search topics. This topic search means that the terms ‘climate migration’, ‘climate refugee’ and ‘environmental migration’ are identified in the title, the abstract and/or the keywords of the publications (as in the previous paper). Moreover, the word ‘or’ was inserted between each couple of terms, so that the retrieved documents contain at least one of the selected keywords. The time span set is from 1992 to 2021.

For each document, Scopus provides several details, including year of publication, authors, authors’ addresses, title, abstract, source journal, subject categories and references.


All these data were exported to BibTex.

The Bibliometrix R package (Aria & Cuccurullo, 2017) was used to perform the bibliometric analyses. Bibliometrix R package is a tool for quantitative research in scientometrics and bibliometrics and provides various routines for importing bibliographic data, performing bibliometric analysis and building data matrices for co-citation analysis, scientific collaboration analysis and co-word analysis.

In total, 520 documents were identified. However, a further inspection of this original database has led to the identification of 48 articles not related to environmental human migration, which have been removed from the analysis. Therefore, the final database consists of 472 articles.

Looking at the document types, the majority are articles (n = 321), chapters of books (n = 101) and reviews (n = 39). The total number of authors is equal to 101 authors, with an average number of authors per document equal to 1.94. The single-authored documents were written by 220 different authors.

Figure 1 shows the top ten authors. The most productive author is Mayer with 11 documents, followed by Boas and Nawrotzki with 9 documents; whereas in Figure 2 there are the top 20 countries: in the first place we find the United States with 127 documents, followed by Germany and United Kingdom with 69 and 63 documents respectively.



*Figure 1: Most Productive Authors*

The most productive countries on this issue are the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. These countries are also the main destinations of migratory flows (Figure 2).




Figure 2: Most Productive Countries

In total, the publications are published in 342 different sources. This high number indicates a wide variety of research themes, and the multidisciplinary character of climate migration. Table 1 below gives information of the top-10 most relevant sources on climate migration research:

Sources	Documents
Global Environmental Change	15
Population And Environment	15
Climate Change Management	10
Climatic Change	10
Climate Refugees: Beyond the Legal Impasse?	9
Organizational Perspectives on Environmental Migration	9
Regional Environmental Change	7
Advances In Global Change Research	6
Sustainability (Switzerland)	6
Disentangling Migration and Climate Change: Methodologies, Political Discourses and Human Rights	5

## **The co-word Co-word analysis**

The network graph in Figure 3 represents the adjacency matrix of a co-word analysis. It is an indirect graph composed of 316 nodes and 2,113 links, with a diameter 7 and the average of connections is 13,504.

The co-word analysis is a content analysis technique that seeks to identify the topics discussed in the literature and to detect relationships between these topics (Aria & Cuccurullo, 2017; He, 1999).

The units of analysis are keywords used by the author, and their relationship strength is calculated from keyword co-occurrences. Co-word analysis makes it possible to group different keywords into clusters by making apparent their relationship structure.


The graph of the co-occurrences is edited by Gephi and analysed by Bibliometrix.

The graph shows how the scientific literature on the subject of climate and environmental migration is highly interdisciplinary, ranging from legal sciences to sociology, from international political sciences to geography, as well as anthropology, economics, business sciences, physics and biology. The graph reveals the presence of some relevant keywords: Environment, Refugee, Adaptation, Justice, Right, Displacement.

The co-word analysis of keywords demonstrates that the principal thematic areas are mainly concerned with:

- (1) the question of granting refugee status to migrants who are recognized as victims of climate or environmental change. Questa tematica si inserisce in particolare in un gruppo di articoli che trattano di casi studio asiatici, con particolare riferimento al Bangladesh, l'India e il Pacifico. In tali territori sembra prevalere la problematica dell'erosione costale e degli eventi climatici avversi, ma anche delle situazioni di conflitto e in questi casi si verificano migrazioni internazionali (crossborder);
- (2) the concepts of vulnerability, as associated with the environmental and social characteristics of certain areas of the world relating to people whose livelihood depends on agriculture and subsistence farming, like South America and Africa;
- (3) climate justice, human rights and human security;
- (4) the concepts of adaptation management and governance, with particular reference to national and international policies for dealing with climate change and migratory flow.

Obviously, many of these themes are mentioned in numerous articles, but in many cases, there is a tendency for the argument to be developed while concentrating on one or another of these research areas.




*Figure 3: Co-word analysis through co-occurrences (Authors' keywords).*

### **The case study meta-analysis**

Considering the difficulty in defining the relationship between the different push factors and the complexity of the relationship between them, the in-depth analysis of the individual case studies becomes very important for understanding the role of climate change in migratory dynamics.

It is evident when we look at the Scopus database (Figure 4) that interest shown by scientific literature in the issue of climate-environmental migration underwent a great increase from 2008 onwards. Before this date only twenty-eight articles on the subject had been published; this figure rose to 18 in 2010, then to 41 in 2013, reaching a peak of 86 in 2020, and although the figure fell back in 2017 (as it had also in 2010, 2013 and 2017), it recovered to 86 in 2020, confirming the general sharp upward trend during the years 2008–2020.

With the beginning of the twenty-first century, there was an increase in the number of scientific articles written on an empirical basis, especially case studies, which made up almost fifty per cent of such publications between 2010 and 2020 (Figure 4). The volume of articles that included case studies peaked in 2015, with 59% of the entire scientific output as measured by Scopus, and also in 2016 (47%), 2018 (47%) and 2020 (51%).



*Figure 4: Case studies on total scientific production.*

With the aim of understanding on which areas of the globe the researchers have focused their attention, in this paper we manually classified each document as a theoretical, methodological or case study article. Our final dataset includes 204 case study articles published between 1998 and the 2021.

The most frequently studied country is Bangladesh: 28 articles, over a ten-year time period (2009–2021). Next, with thirteen articles, come Mexico with 13 articles and the Pacific Islands with 12 article (Table 1). The United States, India and China have also attracted the attention of researchers in recent years.

In this wide range of case studies, using different data sources and research methods, the questions to which researchers tried to find answers were usually: (a) how does environmental change affect the indigenous population? (b) are its effects among the main push factors to emigration? (c) does this emigration lead to intra- or international displacement? (Maretti et al., 2019)

*Table1: Case studies*


States	Number of Case Study	Years
Bangladesh	28	2009:1; 2010:2; 2011:1; 2013: 5; 2014:2; 2015:1; 2016:3; 2018:3; 2019:5; 2020:3; 2021:2
Mexico	13	2007:1; 2013:1; 2015:3; 2016:2; 2017:1; 2018:2; 2020:2; 2021:1
USA	10	2016:1; 2017:1; 2018:4; 2019:1; 2020:2; 2021:2
Tuvalu	6	2009:1; 2012:1; 2014:1; 2015:2; 2021:1
Alaska	4	2012:1; 2014:1; 2015:1; 2016:1

Canada	4	2013:2; 2015:1; 2017:1
Maldives	4	2009:1; 2014:1; 2019:1; 2021:1
Philippines	3	2016:1; 2018:1; 2021:1
Europe(as)	1	2017:1
Brazil	2	2020:1; 2021:1
Baltic cities	1	2020:1;
Sahel and Fulbe	3	2010:1; 2015:1; 2017:1
Burkina Faso	5	2011:1; 2016:2; 2017:1; 2020:1
Senegal	4	2016:1; 2017:1; 2019:2
Ghana	5	2013:2; 2015:1; 2016:1; 2017:1
Tunisia and the southern Mediterranean countries	4	2014:1; 2020:1; 2021:2
Sub-Saharan Africa	3	2013:1; 2020:2
South Africa	3	2020:3;
India	9	2010:2; 2011:1; 2014:1; 2015:1; 2016:2; 2019:1; 2020:1
China	7	1998:1; 2009:1; 2013:1; 2014:1; 2016:1; 2017:1; 2021:1
Vietnam	6	2015:1; 2016:2; 2018:1; 2019:1; 2020:1
Cambodia	5	2019:3; 2020:2
Nepal	2	2015:1; 2018:1
South Asia	2	2012:1; 2013:1

Central Asia	4	2018: 1; 2019:1; 2020:2;
High Asia	1	2019:1
Region Pacific and Pacific Islands	12	2013:2; 2015:1; 2016:2; 2018:3; 2020:3; 2021:1

For a more in-depth analysis we decided to perform a textual analysis on the abstracts, using the *quanteda* R package (Benoit et al., 2018).

A comparison between the vocabulary of case study and no-case study abstracts can be caught by looking at Figure 5, which shows “key terms” for the two categories. They are obtained by computing their keyness (Stubbs, 2010), a score for features that occur differentially across different categories.



*Figure 5: Abstract's corpus: word keyness for no-case study and case study abstract*

Taking into consideration the word cloud represented in Figure 5, it is possible to observe how the keywords most used in the case studies articles represent three categories: territorial aspects (rural, urban, region, land, place, local, coastal, water, internal etc.) social aspects and the characteristics of local populations (social, household, communities, perception, livelihood, population, vulnerability, adaptation, change, mobility etc.); impacts of climate change (drought, hazards); and terms that indicate empirical research (data, perception, results).

If instead we analyze the most frequent keywords of the other articles (not case studies) we can see how they are concentrated more in the following thematic areas: human rights, social justice and the recognition of refugee status (refugees, legal, protection, right, conflict, justice); international policies (global, policy, international, governance, security).



## The Topic Analysis

For a more in-depth analysis we decided to perform a topic analysis on the case-studies abstracts, given that automatic topic mining techniques have huge potential to bring to light the hidden topics that underlie textual content.

Topic modelling refers to a collection of methods and algorithms which aim to uncover the hidden thematic subjects in document collections using document-level co-occurrence information to group semantically related words within a single topic. Since topic models use document-level co-occurrence information to group semantically related words within a single topic, and the goal of these models is to maximize the probability of the observed data, these models could explain only the most obvious and superficial aspects within the corpus. Unsupervised topic models almost always produce topics that are inconsistent with the theoretical framework; in other words, the absence of supervision can reduce the system’s great potential by bringing to light topics that overlap or lack any great significance (Jagarlamudi et al., 2012; Watanabe & Zhou, 2020).

Therefore, computer scientists thought to develop various types of semi supervised topic models, such as seeded LDA. Seeded LDA is an LDA model that uses seed words as weak supervision; in particular, it is an LDA model fitted with word priors weighted by seed words (Watanabe & Zhou, 2020).

We created a Dictionary of Case studies Countries, with the Countries most studied in these case studies, such as Africa, Asia, Bangladesh and the Pacific Islands.

Then we used the Dictionary of Case Studies Countries in conjunction with Seeded LDA to identify countries’ topics that may contain the problem studied in each Country’s topic.




Figure 6: A: word keyness for no-case study and case study abstract

The model built in this way will bring out five topics: the “Africa Topic”, the “Asia Topic”, the “Bangladesh Topic”, the “Pacific Islands Topic” and “the Other Topic”, which refers to Topic of other countries.

With a mix method approach and considering the heterogeneity of the different case studies, it is possible to draw common lines of interpretation between the various cases examined.

Considering the African Case Studies, there emerges a tendency to associate climate and environmental change mainly with internal migrations. The population most affected by desertification and adverse climatic events live on agriculture and subsistence farming. Furthermore, the characterization of the African territory (in particular Sahel, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Ghana), more fragile from the point of view of environmental, economic and social balances, leads to particular difficulty in discerning the prevalence between the different push factors.

Another group of case studies, in which there are clear and unequivocal environmental and climatic push factors, concerns the analysis of migration from small Atlantic and Pacific islands suffering from coastal erosion. In this group of cases studied we can observe more cases of international migration, and the debate on the recognition of climate refugees is more developed (Birk, 2012; Pernetta, 1992; Stojanov et al., 2017).

Also, with regard to South Asia (Bangladesh in particular but also India, China etc.), the reference literature is more developed and the papers focus more attention on the recognition of environmental refugee status (Bernzen et al., 2019). This is also because in these countries, in addition to internal displacements, more international migrations occur. This area is particularly affected by environmental disasters, coastal erosion and climate hazards which lead to forced migration. Furthermore, in these areas, in particular in the case of Bangladesh, the copious literature also focuses on governance and planning tools for the management of environmental risks and migration.

## **Open Conclusion**

In short, the bibliometric analysis indicates a growing interest in the field of environmental migration and a greater awareness of the impact of climate change on human mobility. In a definitional framework with still uncertain contents, the most significant issues addressed by the literature, as emerges from the co-word analysis, are: the issue of granting refugee status to climate migrants; the concepts of vulnerability; climate justice, human rights and human security; the concepts of management and governance of adaptation with particular reference to national and international policies.

The recognition of the importance of climate and environmental change as a driver of human mobility and in consideration of the relationship between climate change and traditional economic and social push factors like conflicts, wars and persecutions, the climate migrations are becoming central in empirical research, focusing on specific case studies.

In order to better understand how climatic-environmental migrations are characterized, in particular in the intersection of migratory routes in the Mediterranean area, the research has attempted to analyze case studies presented in the literature. In particular, the literature on this issue focuses attention on the following questions: 1. What kind of environmental change characterizes the place of migration with a European destination? 2. How do these environmental and climate change factors determine conflict and economic impact? 3. What is the population's awareness of the effect of climate and environmental changes on migration drivers? 4. Does this migration lead to internal or international movements?

Considering the heterogeneity of the different case studies, it is possible to draw common lines of interpretation between the various cases examined.

In particular, the paper, through the topic analysis on case studies, attempted to answer some of the previous questions by considering some sensitive geographical areas by distinguishing the cases in which environmental change occurs as a consequence of a natural disaster (flood, earthquake, tsunami etc.) or of slower environmental changes. In the first case the migration is forced and sudden. The

main driver is clearly environmental and can depend on climate change. Many of the cases studied represent short-range migrations. In the second case (slower environmental changes), the relation between climate change and human mobility is not so clear. In these cases, the environmental changes also impact and determine social conflicts and economic consequences, mixing the push factors.

Three geographical areas of interest emerge from the case study analysis: Southeast Asia; Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa; and the Pacific islands.

In particular, we can consider some emblematic cases: Lake Chad in the Sahel, a vast area that extends from Mauritania to Eritrea, with a strong population growth, and Bangladesh. Considering the vast literature and the in-depth analysis, they seem to be more relevant to better understanding the impact of climate change on human activities and human mobility in case of slow environmental changes. In these territories, since mid-2013, desertification has forced over 2.3 million people to migrate, to reach North Africa, and then, eventually, Europe.

If the temperature reaches  $+3^{\circ}$  /  $+5^{\circ}$  by 2050, and perhaps  $+8^{\circ}$  at the end of the century, many areas of the Sahel will become even more inhospitable, intensifying the frequency of migrations.

According to a document from the African Institute for Development Policies, rising temperatures could cause agricultural production to drop from 13% in Burkina Faso to 50% in Sudan.

In these territories, since mid-2013, desertification has forced over 2.3 million people to migrate, to reach North Africa, and then, eventually, Europe.

If the temperature reaches  $+3^{\circ}$  /  $+5^{\circ}$  by 2050, and perhaps  $+8^{\circ}$  at the end of the century, many areas of the Sahel will become even more inhospitable, intensifying the frequency of migrations.

According to a document from the African Institute for Development Policies, rising temperatures could cause agricultural production to drop from 13% in Burkina Faso to 50% in Sudan.

The other important area of climate migration is Bangladesh, where it is estimated that by 2050 one in seven people will be displaced by climate change (in particular, due to floods and air pollution).

Certainly, climate change will contribute to exacerbating the socio-economic conditions of some people, negatively affecting the low-income sectors of agriculture and aquaculture.

One of the most relevant aspects emerging from the case studies is the analysis of national and local policies for climate adaptation. Nature-based solutions policies are implemented locally to address climate change adaptation, the protection and management of natural ecosystems and the conservation of biodiversity.

A positive example is Bangladesh (International Center for Climate Change and Development) where in the last three decades the government has been working on steering documents aimed at managing disasters and climate change, as well as on sustainable development.

Some examples of Nature-based solutions that we can cite are: the use of coastal mangroves to protect communities from storm surges and sea level rise; the use of forests in hilly regions to prevent landslides; and green spaces in urban areas that can reduce thermal stress and promote the well-being of the inhabitants.

However, the effective design, implementation and upscaling of Nature-based policies requires concrete national plans and adequate funding. Certainly, international cooperation policies could help weaker countries.

In sub-Saharan West Africa, a case study showed how the local population fights major agro-climatic risks (increased maximum and minimum temperatures; high rainfall variability; and extreme drought and floods) through micro-strategies of adaptation to climate change. Innovative adaptation practices that were identified in the study include: expanding irrigation systems, adjusting crop sowing times to adapt to local weather and climate forecasts, growing plants to establish more heat-tolerant crops and associated agroforestry. In dryland rain systems, the need for increased dependence on water stress tolerant crops, improved soil and water conservation techniques associated with extensive river

basin management and agroforestry has been recognized. To tackle climate change, such practices need immediate implementation on a larger scale.

## References

Aria, M., & Cuccurullo, C. (2017). Bibliometrix: An R-tool for comprehensive science mapping analysis. *Journal of Informetrics*, 11(4), 959–975.

Benoit, K., Watanabe, K., Wang, H., Nulty, P., Obeng, A., Müller, S., Matsuo, A. (2018). “quanteda: An R package for the quantitative analysis of textual data.” *Journal of Open Source Software*, 3(30), 774. doi: 10.21105/joss.00774, <https://quanteda.io>.

Bernzen, A., Jenkins, J. C., & Braun, B. (2019). Climate change-induced migration in coastal Bangladesh? A critical assessment of migration drivers in rural households under economic and environmental stress. *Geosciences*, 9(1), 51.

Bintanja, R., van de Wal, R. S., & Oerlemans, J. (2005). Modelled atmospheric temperatures and global sea levels over the past million years. *Nature*, 437(7055), 125–128.

Birk, T. (2012). Relocation of reef and atoll island communities as an adaptation to climate change: Learning from experience in Solomon Islands. In *Climate change and human mobility: Global Challenges to the social sciences* (pp. 81–109). Cambridge University Press.

Black, R. (2001). New Issues in Refugee Research. Working Paper No. 34. *Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality?* University of Sussex Working Paper 34. Geneva United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit.

Campbell, J., & Barnett, J. (2010). *Climate change and small island states: Power, knowledge and the South Pacific*. Routledge.

Hastrup, K., & Olwig, K. F. (2012). *Climate change and human mobility: Challenges to the social sciences*. Cambridge University Press.

He, Q. (1998). *Knowledge discovery through co-word analysis*. *Library Trends*, 48(1), 133–159.

Ionesco, D., Mognacheva, D., & Gemenne, F. (2017). *The Atlas of environmental migrations*. Routledge.

Jagarlamudi, J., Daumé III, H., & Udupa, R. (2012). Incorporating lexical priors into topic models. In *Proceedings of the 13th Conference of the European Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics* (pp. 204–213).

Lee, E. S. (1966). A Theory of Migration. *Demography*, 3(1), 47–57.

Lonergan, S. (1998). The role of environmental degradation in population displacement. The Global Environmental Change and Human Security (GECHS) Project. Environmental Change and Security Project Report, Issue 4: 5-15

Maretti M., Tontodimamma A., & Biermann P. (2019). Environmental and climate migrations: an overview of scientific literature using a bibliometric analysis. *International Review of Sociology*, 29(2), 142–58.

Morrissey, J. (2009). Environmental Change and Forced Migration: A State of the Art Review. *Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre*, Oxford Department of International Development, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, Oxford.

Myers, N. (1999). *Esodo ambientale. Popoli in fuga da terre difficili*. Edizioni Ambiente.

Myers, N. (2005). *Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue*. 13th Economic Forum, Prague, May 2005, 23-27.

Myers, N. (2002). Environmental Refugees: A Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century. *Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences*, 357(1420), 609–613. Retrieved June 28, 2021, from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3066769>

O’Lear, S. (1997). Migration and the environment: a review of recent literature. *Social science quarterly*, 78(2), 606–618.

Pernetta, J. C. (1992). Impacts of climate change and sea-level rise on small island states: National and international responses. *Global environmental change*, 2(1), 19–31.

Piguet, E., Pécout, A., & Guchteneire P. (2011). Migration and Climate Change: An Overview. *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 30, 1–23.

Piguet E., & Laczko, M. (2014). *People on the Move in a Changing Climate*. Springer.

Piguet, E., Kaenzig, R., & Guélat, J. (2018). The uneven geography of research on “environmental migration”. *Population and environment*, 39(4), 357–383.

Prasain, S. (2018). Climate change adaptation measure on agricultural communities of Dhye in Upper Mustang, Nepal. *Climatic change*, 148(1), 279–291.

Stojanov, R., Duží, B., Kelman, I., Němec, D., & Procházka, D. (2017). Local perceptions of climate change impacts and migration patterns in Malé, Maldives. *The Geographical Journal*, 183(4), 370–385.

Stubbs, M. (2010). Three Concepts of Keywords. In M. Bondi & M. Scott (Eds.), *Keyness in Texts* (pp. 1–42). John Benjamins.

Watanabe, K., & Zhou, Y. (2020). Theory-driven analysis of large corpora: Semisupervised topic classification of the UN speeches. *Social Science Computer Review*, 0894439320907027.

Zetter, R. (2016). *Mutamento ambientale e spostamento di popolazioni: i nuovi rifugiati?*, *Focus sulle migrazioni*. Tre convegni del Gruppo GUE/NGL.

Zickgraf, C. (2019). Climate change and migration crisis in Africa. In *The Oxford Handbook of migration crises* (pp. 347–366). Oxford University Press.

## 5. The other side of Illegal Migration

Mohamed Amine Kouki, Fharat Institute for Research and Democracy

### 1. Introduction

Tunisia is considered a transit area towards Europe for illegal immigration. We, as a research organization, have collected information on the reasons that make a person on boats of death into the unknown. We had conversations with colleagues, including members of the organization, and testimonies of some people who immigrated illegally.

#### *The aims of research:*

We aim from this research to describe the tragic reality of the phenomenon of irregular migration on families, and on the fabric of society that will - for the sake - of age - if this bleeding continues.

#### *The methodology:*

Comparative studies of the reality of irregular migration in the countries of SouthMED. Interview scientific with some young people who immigrated illegally (To know the reasons and motives)

#### *Results:*

A number of economic and social factors have contributed to the exacerbation of the phenomenon of clandestine immigration, including the following:

- The disparity in the economic level, which is clearly evident between the sending and receiving countries, is the result of the slow pace of development in these countries.
- The labor market, lack of job opportunities, which led to a high percentage of the unemployed.
- Unemployment that affects a large number of citizens, especially young people with a university degree
- The image of the social success shown by the immigrant upon his return to the homeland, as it is manifested in highlighting the aspects of luxury: gifts, a car ... which provokes the desire of others to emigrate.
- Geographical proximity that facilitates the migration of Tunisians and Africans to Europe, for example, especially Italy.
- Social suffering that is reflected in the harsh conditions that are represented in poverty, the standard of living and the cruelty of society, which leads to psychological problems and disturbances.

### 2. Tunisia after 2011: a general social outlook

From 2011, although Tunisia has abandoned the dictatorial phase, its democratic foundations remain fragile; its policy is made up of weak and divided parties and this has affected the worsening of economic indicators and the rise in unemployment. In fact, already in 2011, the Tunisian people had begun to protest the rampant unemployment and the lack of equity and social justice. This causes a feeling of distrust on the part of the population towards politicians, but above all towards the democratic government that had just entered.

Ten years after the end of Ben Ali government, Tunisia finds itself going through a fragile period of its political, social and economic life, characterized by the accentuation of previous and never resolved problems. In an increasingly divided political context, the Tunisian population shows a

growing feeling of skepticism towards the politicians who have held power in recent years, also due to increasingly difficult living conditions. Discontent has led to a growth in revolts and protests, even spontaneous ones: they are born from diversified groups of the population, moreover the vote of the Tunisian inhabitants is increasingly turning towards populist parties.

As for the internal situation, Tunisia's economic growth has always been very weak in the last 10 years, but has slowed down particularly in the last months of 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. According to the IMF (*International Monetary Fund*), during 2019 Tunisia had a 7% growth in GDP, while in 2020 it decreased to 4%. However, the forecasts do not give good news, in fact the Tunisian economic growth is destined to decline further, reaching below 3% until at least 2025. To cope with all this, the government has allocated additional economic resources to those foreseen, raising the public debt to 85%: this will translate for the majority of the population into a worsening of living conditions, with an increase of poverty within the country between 7.3% and 11.9% (Frettoli, 2021:22).

The poor economic growth of the country is certainly the main cause of the high unemployment rate which reaches 15.3%, which expresses alarmist levels among young people (34.8%). Furthermore, in 2019, the inflation rate reached around 7%, and despite having decreased compared to 2018, it remains the main element of risk for the country's economic growth and for the well-being of the population.

Another great scourge within Tunisia is corruption, already enormously present under the dictatorial regime of Ben Ali, which continues to increase and affects the development of the country. In a poll, 60% of the people involved said they did not trust the major media and journalists who could work under the influence of the most powerful people. Even the politicians themselves are accused not only of doing nothing against the problem, but even of encouraging it (Frettoli, 2021:23). Ten years after the end of the dictatorial regime, Tunisia again finds itself going through a fragile period of its political, social and economic life, characterized by the accentuation of previous and never resolved problems. In an increasingly divided political context, the Tunisian population shows a growing feeling of skepticism towards the politicians who have held power in recent years, also due to increasingly difficult living conditions. Discontent has led to a growth in revolts and protests, even spontaneous ones, born from diversified groups of the population, moreover the vote of the Tunisian inhabitants is increasingly turning towards populist parties (Savina, 2021).

As for the internal situation, Tunisia's economic growth has always been very weak in the last 10 years, but has slowed down particularly in the last months of 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. According to the IMF (*International Monetary Fund*), during 2019 Tunisia had a 7% growth in GDP, while in 2020 it decreased to 4%. However, the forecasts do not give good news, in fact the Tunisian economic growth is destined to decline further, reaching below 3% until at least 2025. To cope with all this, the government has allocated additional economic resources to those foreseen, raising the public debt to 85%: this will translate for the majority of the population into a worsening of living conditions, with an increase of poverty within the country between 7.3% and 11.9%.


The poor economic growth of the country is certainly the main cause of the high unemployment rate which reaches 15.3%, which reaches alarmist levels among young people (34.8%). Furthermore, in 2019 alone, the inflation rate reached around 7%, and despite having decreased

compared to 2018, it remains the main element of risk for the country's economic growth and for the well-being of the population.

Another great scourge within Tunisia is corruption, already enormously present under the dictatorial regime of Ben Ali, which continues to increase and affects the development of the country. In a poll, 60% of the people involved said they did not trust the major media and journalists who could work under the influence of the most powerful people. Even the politicians themselves are accused not only of doing nothing against the problem, but even of encouraging it (Savina, 2021).

### LE SFIDE DELLA TUNISIA

I principali indicatori economici e sociali a 10 anni dalla primavera araba



FONTE: FONDO MONETARIO INTERNAZIONALE, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, BANCA MONDIALE \* STIME 2020

ISPI ISTITUTO PER GLI STUDI DI POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE

Table 1: Institute for the Studies of International Politics, 2021

### 3. The Environmental Context in Tunisia

It is also very important to underline how climate change will be a conditioning element, in the near future, of the deterioration of the economic and social development of the country. Estimates indicate, compared to the early 2000s, an increase in annual temperatures of about 1 ° C (0.98-1.06 ° C) by 2030, while rainfall will have a decline of between 4% and 36% by 2030. 2050. The reduction in rainfall and the increase in temperature will have a negative impact on agriculture and



tourism, which are fundamental for the Tunisian country, and will intensify the already significant water stress to which Tunisia is currently subjected (IPCC, 2018).

Faced with this difficult, Tunisian citizen show a growing mistrust and discontent towards a government that is evidently unable to cope with these challenges, characterize society. All this leads to protests and demonstrations today, this time directed against the current political class and the continuous deterioration of the living conditions of the population (Savina, 2021).

We know that the rise in global temperature has a devastating impact in different parts of the world, thus creating not only physical changes in certain places but also posing difficult challenges in terms of human well-being and safety. The more involved areas in question are mainly developing countries in precarious socio-economic conditions, and what stands out is the different position compared to the “developed countries” which are the main carbon emitters. Therefore, on the one hand, we have the countries contributing most to climate change and on the other hand, we find the countries that are mainly affected by it.

This approach, therefore, entails climate injustice since the adaptability of some countries to environmental changes is directly proportional to the availability of resources.

Global climate change is a problem that overlaps with other pre-existing factors, such as political, cultural and economic factors, even acting as an exacerbating element, and by affecting vulnerable areas mainly agricultural and marginal. Specifically, all of this undermines human well-being and dignity in a variety of interconnected elements, creating a cycle of degraded environment, dwindling resources such as food and water, and increasing social disease. All this contribute to the creation of strong psychological pressures that further erode human well-being.

This difficulty in dealing with all this becomes a sort of economic weakness, limiting the self-sufficiency of fragile populations and which in turn will lead to a proliferation of "climate refugees" within a general context.

The migration of people forced to move due to unsustainable environmental conditions is not a new phenomenon. In fact, in the history of mankind, populations have always gone to other places because the changes in the surrounding environment made it impossible to continue living in its own territory. However, when the ability of adaption is exceeded, there is no other choice but to migrate temporarily or permanently.

In a 2011 article by the *United Nations University Institute for the Environment and Human Security*, a categorization of environmental refugees by distinguishing them into three main types:

- a) Environmental emergency migrants;
- b) Environmentally forced migrants;
- c) Environmentally motivated migrants.

*The environmental emergency migrants* are people who have been forced to move to save their live, mainly by sudden climatic event, such as hurricanes, tsunamis or earthquakes. In this case, the environmental factor plays a major role, and many of those affected decide to move to a country other than their country of origin.

*The environmentally forced migrants* are instead people who have to leave their home, but not suddenly unlike the first type. In some cases, people who are forced to move may not have the opportunity to return to the place of departure due to a high degradation of the land caused by rising water levels. In this case the economic factors play a relevant role and it is difficult to understand which of these environmental factors are prevailing in the foreground.

The last category, the *environmentally motivated migrants* are those who migrate anticipating the catastrophic effects that could manifest themselves from the constantly degrading environment in which they live. Migrating for them is not a forced decision or the only one available, but rather appears as a strategic choice always based on socio-economic factors.

According to a *Legambiente Report* which is based on various studies worldwide, by 2050 we will reach 200/250 million environmental refugees (1 for every 45 in the world), with an average of 6 million men and women forced year to leave their territories (a number that is equivalent to double the inhabitants of Rome)" (Legambiente Report, 2018: 45).

Although the phenomenon is growing widely, we still refer to climate refugees or refugees as if they were just a side effect, posing a danger to other countries. In reality, behind these numbers we find desperation, extreme conditions that perhaps the populations of the so-called "Developed Countries" will never find themselves in the situation of being able to understand.

As far as Tunisia is concerned, we will focus our attention not exclusively towards European countries, but also towards internal migratory flows in itself.

In relation to "internal" migratory flows, the difficult climatic conditions are an element that significantly contributed to the movement of families toward cities and urban. This causes an increase in urbanization, who's a series of consequences e at the level of "urban security", especially in the quality of life into the city and also on the absorption capacity of new migrants. Furthermore, the effects of climate change, the reduced amount of rain, a precarious agricultural situation, the growth of the population rate and the increase in social degradation, will lead to a risk of internal political crises and rivalry between neighboring states for the control of natural resources, such as water and energy sources.

### *3.1. The types of recent migrants*

In this difficult context, migration has grown exponentially, especially in recent years. Some segments of the population find themselves forced to move, not only due to pressures given by conflicts arising from an unjust and inefficient policy, but also due to poor food efficiency in some rural areas.

In fact, in relation of Tunisia, we speak of "emergency emigration" referring specifically to the movements of young people from rural areas to urban areas, even from other countries: they escape poverty, natural disasters caused by climate change, problematic conditions but not only; this particularly vulnerable part of the population chooses to move also in order to satisfy their needs and aspirations.

The FAO Report "Rural Migration in Tunisia" highlighted how "(...) most of the migrants are men, although especially among international migrants. The average age of migration is slightly higher for those who left after 2011 (25.8 years against 24.1 years for those who left before 2011) and especially for international migrants (28.2 years against 24.1 years of internal migrants in the country) " (FAO, 2019).

A part from external migration, it is also possible to distinguish the various types of internal migration on the basis of different characteristics.

a) *About young Tunisians*, they prefer to move from rural areas to urban areas, despite the poor working conditions in the city. But this is mainly true for young men, while girls tend mainly to move towards other rural areas (FAO, 2019)

b) *Regarding the type of migration based on duration*, we can indicate that for young men, temporary migration has slowly changed into a long-term one. Initially they were directed to neighboring regions, then deciding to change destination by choosing urban areas, in particular Tunis, for seasonal job opportunities in the construction sector.

c) *Short-term journeys*, on the other hand, are mainly chosen by women, which are then transformed into more stable migrations, especially for young ones who find work in the textile sector (always returning home for some periods).

A special remark, according to the FAO report, 60% of Tunisian young people who emigrated abroad (specifically to Italy) declare they want to return to their area of origin, while the percentage drops to 34%, for migrants who have moved within the same country. The reasons that would push young immigrants to return are many: nostalgia for their place of origin, lack of family affections, and even resuming agricultural activity

### *3.2. Trends of Migrations*

Migration has been important in Europe for thousands of years. With wars, wealth, and shifting populations, the continent has experienced mixed intervals of mass emigration and mass immigration in the past centuries. At the same time, people have also always been moving within Europe in large numbers.

One of the most important regions for this has been the Mediterranean. Southern Europe and North Africa have engaged in travel and trade for thousands of years, and today, the region is in the spotlight of migration.

People come to Europe for many reasons. The largest reason is family reunification (800,000 immigrated in 2016, +14% from 2008). Others come to the EU for work (860,000 immigrated in 2016, +9% from 2008). Education is another very important reason. 680,000 people immigrated in 2016 (+52% from 2008). Attracting students and highly skilled migrants is a priority for the EU. Immigration for other reasons was rather steady until 2015-2016, when a high number of permits for international protection and humanitarian reasons were issued, representing over 1 million permits in 2016 (+71% from 2008). Concerning international protection, most statuses granted are harmonized by EU law, with a small share of national statuses.

In recent years, migration has picked up all over the world, especially to and from Europe. The height of this was the 2015-2016 European refugee crisis, in which huge numbers of people from unstable and war-torn regions of the Middle East sought refuge in Europe. Since then, numbers have gone down, but immigration to Europe is not going away. With harsh conditions in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, people will continue to come to Europe in search of safety, stability, and employment. Due to its location, Mediterranean Europe was at the frontlines of the crisis.

Concerning the refugee crisis, the highest number of arrivals (1,000,000+) was recorded in 2015. More than 800,000 people came by sea from Turkey to Greece, and the majority of them continued to travel through Europe to reach Germany and Sweden. Since 2015, the number of refugees and migrants arriving in Greece has fallen dramatically. This is due to 2 reasons. First, the route of reaching Central Europe through the Balkans was largely closed. Furthermore, in 2016, the EU and Turkey signed an agreement to send migrants who do not apply for asylum or whose claim was rejected back to Turkey.

While the number of arrivals has dropped in Greece, the number of people arriving in Italy has

showed little change until 2018. High numbers of migrants entered Italy in 2016 (180,000) and 2017 (119,000). Many of these were sub-Saharan Africans, smuggled by traffickers from North Africa and rescued at sea. In February 2017, Italy and Libya struck a deal to collaborate to stop migrants from entering Italy through Libya. Since then, numbers have dropped sharply.

Following the closing of the eastern route (Turkey-Greece) and the central route (Libya-Italy), Spain has received the highest number of migrants and refugees in 2018. Around 57,000 have entered the country in 2018 so far, the majority of them by sea and almost 6000 by land to Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish enclaves in North Africa.

In Italy and Spain, arrivals from mostly African countries top the list. In Italy, the most common country of origin is Tunisia, followed by Eritrea, Sudan, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Spain received most of its migrants from Guinea, followed by Morocco and Mali, as well as the Ivory Coast, Syria and a number of other Sub-Saharan African countries.

#### **4. Migration between Tunisia and Italy: its specificity**

##### *4.1 Migration in Tunisia*

Emigration has long been part of Tunisian society, going back to the country's strong ties to Italy and France during colonial times. In the 1970s, France and Germany recruited many Tunisian workers to supplement low-paying labor shortages. At the time, many Tunisians emigrated to the two countries on work contracts. In the 1980s, Italy also became a common destination for Tunisian labor migrants. In the 1990s, European governments introduced new visa requirements for Tunisians and irregular migration grew greatly in importance.

Under the Ben Ali regime, European governments paid large amounts of money to the Tunisian government in order to curb irregular migration. Unauthorized departures were largely controlled and increased or decreased at strategic moments to enable the country to strike new deals with European policymakers, most notably with the Italian government.

Following the 2011 Tunisian Revolution, the country descended into a certain level of chaos regarding its border control. Many Tunisians fled to Italy at the time, with more than 23,000 Tunisians reaching the Italian coast in 2011. As border controls were restored, Tunisian arrivals in Italy decreased substantially between 2012 and 2016. The situation has changed since mid-2017, bringing Tunisia under the spotlight again.

Since the revolution, Tunisia has suffered from both socioeconomic instability and disappointment in unfulfilled promises that emerged during the Arab Spring uprising. Persistently high unemployment, inflation, and the perceived lack of economic prospects continue to drive people to look for alternatives elsewhere. This is especially true with low trust in the government's ability to improve conditions. Not only do young people feel economically alienated but they also remain largely disconnected from the political life. This fuels feelings of non-belonging to their local communities. An increasing number of Tunisians, faced with these conditions, have decided to seek better opportunities abroad.

Emigration is therefore an extremely important topic in the country, especially among Tunisia's young and educated population. In 2018 so far, 4,827 Tunisians have emigrated to Italy, making up 23% of Italian arrivals.

Political uncertainty has thus become the new normal in post-revolution Tunisia. Migration has the potential to quickly escalate and create problems for the political system. The weakness of the post-revolution government has led to it maintaining a low profile with regards to the delicate subject of migration.

At the same time, Tunisian emigrants are sometimes seen as individuals looking for opportunities that their homeland was not able to provide them, while simultaneously keeping strong ties to the country and staying involved in its development.

According to some reports, Tunisian lawmakers may see emigration economic and political safety valve, capable of easing domestic unemployment and political unrest, and as an economic advantage in the form of money sent back home (4.7% of the country's GDP) and labor-market assets brought home by those who return.

From the European political side, Tunisia has also been discussed extensively. With immigrant arrivals on the EU's Mediterranean coast seen as too high and redistribution among EU countries a large challenge, policymakers have looked beyond EU borders. Some have again raised the idea of shifting the processing of asylum seekers and irregular migrants outside EU borders, with some proposals describing the creation of "disembarkation platforms" in North Africa to deal with those intercepted while crossing the Mediterranean. One common country proposed to host these platforms is Tunisia.

This is, however, extremely unrealistic. The Tunisian government does not accept this idea and the country's legal framework is extremely lacking. At the same time, Tunisia's political and socioeconomic situation is not resilient enough for such a drastic measure to be taken.

One aspect to consider is Tunisia's role as a departure country for Sub-Saharan migrants coming to Europe. Following a 2017 deal between Italy and Libya, there has been a sharp drop in migrants coming to Europe through Libya. One could therefore consider if Tunisia has therefore shifted to replace Libya's position.

All current statistics do not support this, however: 90% of arrivals in Italy from Tunisia were Tunisians in 2017.

Irregular emigration has brought upon some large crises recently. In June of 2018, a boat packed with over 180 migrants sank off the Tunisian coast, near the island of Kerkennah, causing the tragic death of at least 100 people.

#### *4.2. Migration Tunisia-Italy*

Most of the studies dealing with Tunisian immigration is mainly focused on Italy, often chosen as the country of arrival, and not just of transition, by the population of Tunisia. The origins of this choice date back to the late 1960s: many Tunisians go to Sicily because foreign labor was required here, and the geographical proximity and the fact that Italy was considered a rich and developed country. Furthermore, it is necessary to focus on the restrictive laws that existed at that time in Europe: unlike many other European countries, Italy was a country where a visa was not necessary and travel was rather easy and accessible. As the years progressed, Tunisian migrants continued to arrive in Italy thanks to word of mouth; in addition, many were willing to host friends and relatives for a period of time necessary for them to find accommodation in the Bel Paese. For instance, alongside the seasonal labor migration, those Sicilian families by a more stable nature,

leave as favored by the countries of arrival, whilst family reunification remained one of the few ways to enter and stay regularly.

The Tunisians subsequently began to move from Sicily itself, in search of all those jobs that young Italians are no longer willing to do, especially in the labor, construction and agriculture sectors. But Tunisian community begins to be important in terms of size, as early as 1990, and has doubled at the end of 2013: it is a young population, whose average age is below 30 years. In 2011, the so-called "Arab Spring" took place in Tunisia. The Tunisian people succeeded in removing Ben Ali from power, but despite this result, the consequences were not long in coming. With the terror of the chaos created by the void left to the government, many Tunisians decide to immigrate illegally, and the Sicilian coast is the first to deal with this phenomenon; in that year, immigrants in Italy numbered more than 20,000

About the Deaths in the Mediterranean - the highest estimated number of dead and missing migrants in the Mediterranean (5,096) was recorded in 2016. Since then, the number of deaths has fallen. In terms of percentage, however, 2018 has been the most dangerous so far. 2% of migrants crossing the Mediterranean this year have died. At the same time, NGO ships that previously rescued migrants have mostly disappeared from the main migration routes to Italy.

Historically, Italy has never hosted many refugees and asylum seekers compared to other European countries. This changed after 2011, when the Arab Spring and the collapse of regimes in Tunisia and Libya led to a significant rise in the number of asylum seekers. As a peninsula in the middle of the Mediterranean, Italy represents a logical passage for people who intend to come to Europe, especially to reunite with relatives or find work in Northern/Central European countries.

Italy has played a large role in the current European migration crisis as well. The country received more than 335,000 irregular arrivals via the Mediterranean during 2015-16 refugee crisis. In 2017, more migrants began to come from sub-Saharan Africa as opposed to unstable countries in the Middle East, and Italy received 67% of the EU's migrant arrivals. However, since January this year, the number of arrivals in Italy has greatly reduced, with 22,500 arriving by until now in 2018. This is mainly due to cooperation with the Libyan coastguard.

All of these instances of immigration have presented Italy and the European Union new challenges in curbing asylum seeker and migrant journeys across the Mediterranean. EU regulations (the "Dublin Regulation") require that asylum seekers submit their application in the first Member State they reach. As a result, Italy has had to handle a large share of the asylum seekers as the European Union continues to struggle to redistribute immigrants among EU countries.

Immigration is greatly politicized and debated in Italy, and a large portion of the public has rather negative attitudes to immigration. The right-wing government has recently taken large steps to limit immigration.

Italy has closed its ports to rescue ships that are run by NGOs and work to save migrants crossing the Mediterranean. Laws have also been passed to narrow asylum rights. Lawmakers want to limit the practice of granting asylum on the basis of "humanitarian" needs, which was awarded to 25% of asylum seekers in 2017. At the same time, lawmakers are working to widen the range of criminal offences that lead to deportation.

Despite the challenges, immigration does play a role in Italian society, particularly concerning

demographics. The Italian population, which has experienced a low birthrate, is aging quickly. Migration has been essential in slowing this trend, as a number of studies have shown. In addition, a younger, more active immigrant population is essential for sustaining Italy’s welfare and pension system. Finding the proper balance between the country’s demographic need for migrants and negative cultural attitudes will be a key challenge for Italy in the future.


Emigration has also been a reality for Italy in recent years. The economy has been doing well only in short intervals since the 2008 crash. As a result, many Italian migrants look for jobs elsewhere in Europe, mainly Germany, France, and Switzerland.

Besides, a last note. To try to combat illegal immigration, the promotion of a series of policies based on cooperation between Italy and Tunisia begins. Even today, the Italy-Tunisia interregional program is part of the European Union's initiatives for cross-border cooperation.

The most recent 2014-2020 program, in particular, is based on three main objectives:

- 1) Development of SMEs and entrepreneurship through the strengthening of Economic Productive Clusters and the promotion and support of entrepreneurship;
- 2) Support for training, research, technological development and innovation with the promotion of research in key sectors such as technology, promotion of cooperation between companies and professional training operators and finally support for local cooperation in the field of education;
- 3) Protection of the environment and adaptation to climate change with joint actions for the protection of the environment and with the conservation and sustainable use of natural resources.

Furthermore, “The Italian Cooperation has been continuously present in Tunisia since its establishment at the end of the 1980s. In addition to previous commitments (for an amount of more than 300 million euros), in February 2017, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed which defines the programming for the period 2017-2020 and the related resources (165.5 million euros of which 100 in aid credit and 65.5 as a gift). Therefore, the Italian Cooperation program in Tunisia currently consists of a package of about fifty initiatives for a total of approximately 500 million euros” (AICS Tunisia, 2019).



*Figure 1: Aics, Tunisia, 2019*

### 4.3 Migratory Balance Tunisia-Italy

As regards the migratory balance, in 2019 legally residing Tunisian immigrants represented 2.8% of all non-EU persons present in Italy. Furthermore, analyzing the demographic characteristics of Tunisian citizens legally residing in Italy, we note an imbalance between men and women: the latter represent only 38.4% and men the remaining 61.6%; there is also an average age of 33 years, slightly below the average for non-EU citizens (34 years).

Compared to 2018, however, the Tunisian presence recorded a decrease (-4.6%) linked both to a question of entries and to a question of citizenship applications. Due to this decline, among the countries of various citizenships within Italian country, Turkey ranks fourteenth (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2019).

Paesi di cittadinanza	Uomini %	Donne %	Totale=100%	% Paese sul totale dei Paesi non comunitari	Variazione 2019/2018
	v.%	v.%	v.a.	v.%	v.%
Marocco	53,7%	46,3%	434.169	11,7%	-2,0%
Albania	51,0%	49,0%	428.332	11,5%	-0,5%
Cina	50,2%	49,8%	318.003	8,6%	2,9%
Ucraina	21,5%	78,5%	234.058	6,3%	-0,5%
India	58,8%	41,2%	162.893	4,4%	3,5%
Filippine	42,9%	57,1%	161.829	4,4%	0,1%
Bangladesh	72,3%	27,7%	145.707	3,9%	4,5%
Egitto	67,6%	32,4%	142.816	3,8%	1,5%
Pakistan	71,6%	28,4%	131.310	3,5%	4,9%
Moldova	33,4%	66,6%	125.285	3,4%	-1,8%
Nigeria	58,2%	41,8%	106.788	2,9%	2,7%
Senegal	73,6%	26,4%	106.256	2,9%	1,0%
Sri Lanka	53,1%	46,9%	105.990	2,9%	1,0%
Tunisia	61,6%	38,4%	103.249	2,8%	-4,6%
Perù	41,8%	58,2%	91.561	2,5%	-0,4%
Ecuador	42,8%	57,2%	76.201	2,0%	-1,1%
Altre provenienze	50,7%	49,3%	842.959	22,7%	-1,3%
<b>Totale Paesi non comunitari</b>	<b>51,7%</b>	<b>48,3%</b>	<b>3.717.406</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>0,1%</b>

*Table 2: Source: The Tunisian community in Italy - Annual report on the presence of migrants - Elaboration on Istat data – 2019*


The drop in applications for citizenship by Tunisians reaches -22.1% in 2019 compared to -23.8% of all non-EU immigrants considered as a whole. Half of all citizenships granted in 2018 are due to transmission (50.5%) while the remaining half is divided between residence (24.3%) and marriage with an Italian citizen (25.2%).

As regards residence permits, on the other hand, “EU residence permits for long-term residents” can be distinguished, which are therefore issued for an indefinite period; and "residence permits subject to renewal".

Long-term Tunisians staying in Italy make up a large percentage, around 74%, a much higher share than non-EU citizens (where the percentage is around 63%). However, the percentage grew between 2018 and 2019, with a variation of 0.7% only for Tunisian long-stayers.

Below, a table representing the residence permits by type and citizenship of reference, between 2018 and 2019: among the reasons that would lead to apply for residence permits, the family is certainly the main one; the second reason is the employment issue, with an incidence equal to 31%. The share of residence permits linked to a protection issue is also very significant (18.7%); the share for study reasons represents 1.8%, that for humanitarian and asylum reasons is 2% while the residence permit issued for other reasons such as religion and medical treatment is 2.1%.





*Figure 2: Source: The Tunisian community in Italy – Annual report on the presence of migrants - Based on Istat data – 2019*

## 5. A qualitative approach in front of young migrants: approaches and results

Some unaccompanied children face problematic reception conditions. Institutions lack capacity in France, Greece, Italy, and Spain. Children have faced ill-treatment in some Spanish facilities (Madrid and Melilla). Children receive insufficient mental care in Hungary and limited access to education in Greece, Germany, France, Hungary, and Spain.

Some countries struggle with the appointment of guardians. Furthermore, asylum applications and family reunifications are often subject to delays in many European countries.

## 6. Contradictions and Suggestions for Good Practices

### 6 a. Integration and redistribution of migrants in EU societies: to stay or not to stay, and EU borders

Various statistics show that integration needs improvement. Migrants consistently show lower employment rates than nationals, and the gap is widening. Nearly 50% of migrants in the EU face the risk of being in poverty or socially excluded, compared to 20% for EU nationals. Migrants have substantially lower educational attainment levels compared to EU nationals, with 46% having obtained only lower secondary education or below (compared to 27% for EU citizens). On average, around 28% migrants living in the EU were considered to be overburdened by housing costs (compared to only 11% for EU nationals). Another extremely important factor for integrations is societal acceptance, which is also a huge challenge.

Member states provide a range of support measures for labor integration of refugees: Language courses, orientation services, employment services/counseling, housing assistance, and assistance in obtaining recognition of professional qualifications. The EU also provides a supportive

framework, consisting of: the European Integration Website, the European Integration Network, the European Partnership for Integration, the EU Action Plan on Integration, and various funding instruments and partnerships.

EU countries say that irregular migrants who do not have a legitimate asylum claim will be returned to their country of origin. The European Commission estimated that there were 620,000 people staying in the EU illegally in 2017.

From 2008-2017, 7.4 million EU immigrants were found to be staying illegally in the EU. 5.3 million were ordered to leave, but only 2.3 million actually returned to their country of origin.

The EU is working on improving this figure through the following methods: Involving NGOs and international organizations in handling return; improving detention conditions and making use of alternatives to detention; implementing preparatory measures before returning a person; and adopting a flexible approach throughout the process.

The crisis in the Mediterranean put tremendous pressure on the EU's external borders, with unparalleled numbers of persons seeking to gain entry both legally, mostly by applying for asylum and other humanitarian statuses at an external border, and illegally, often making use of some form of facilitation (e.g., smugglers).

The EU has placed major efforts on reinforcing the external borders, most recently by expanding the scope and powers of Frontex (the EU border agency) and introducing changes to the Schengen Borders Code as well as by adopting regulation establishing the Entry Exit system, which will ensure systematic identification of overstayers, particularly concerning irregular migration.

Furthermore, it has struck key deals with countries in the EU neighborhood (especially the Middle East and North Africa) regarding immigration regulation and distribution.

Sharing the burden of asylum applications equally between the EU countries is a huge priority for the EU. In June 2018, EU leaders agreed that member states should distribute asylum seekers among themselves. However, this has not solved the issue because the redistribution will be only on a voluntary basis.

Everyone agrees Europe needs to urgently overhaul its asylum and immigration rules. However, no one can agree on what to do. Some countries want tougher external border controls, others want fairer distribution of new arrivals. Any solution will have to balance the concerns of "frontline" southern states with those of wealthier northern "destination" states, while dealing with the refusal of hardline central and eastern ones (such as Hungary and Poland) to accept any migrants at all.

#### *6b. Bad conditions in detention and reception centers*

In some countries, immigrants face obstacles in acquiring legal assistance and information. Inadequate conditions and inhumane treatment have been observed in Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Spain. High numbers of children have been detained in Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. Trafficking victims, another group of vulnerable people, have been detained in Spain. Victims of violence have been detained in Poland.

In France, Greece, Italy, and Spain (mainly in Ceuta and Melilla), some reception facilities remain overcrowded. Inadequate conditions have been observed in facilities in France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Spain. Incidents of violence were reported in, among other countries, Finland and the Netherlands. Protests against reception conditions took place in Greece and Italy. Also in Italy, the number of potential trafficking victims among arrivals increased by 600% in the past three years. In Finland, Germany, Italy, and Spain, conditions in reception facilities were sometimes

insufficient for vulnerable persons. Lastly, sexual and gender-based violence has been reported in Greece, France, and Italy.

#### *6c. EU Asylum policies and political trends*

The EU Common European Asylum System (CEAS) is a set of EU laws. They are intended to ensure that all EU member states protect the rights of asylum seekers and refugees. The CEAS sets out minimum standards and procedures for processing and deciding asylum applications, and for the treatment of both asylum seekers and those who are recognized as refugees.

Implementation of the CEAS varies throughout the European Union. A number of EU states still do not operate fair, effective systems of asylum decision-making and support, leading to a patchwork of 28 asylum systems producing uneven results.

The EU Member State through which an asylum seeker first enters the EU is responsible for the applicant's asylum claim. This is dictated by the "Dublin Regulation".

Asylum seekers have no legal duty to claim asylum in the first EU state they reach, and many moves on, seeking to join relatives or friends for support, or to reach a country with a functioning asylum system. However, EU member states can choose to return asylum seekers to their country of first entry to process their asylum claim, so long as that country has an effective asylum system.

EU countries in the north, the desired destination of many refugees, have sought to use this Dublin system to their advantage, at the expense of the south, where most refugees first arrive. Yet these efforts have been obstructed by failures of asylum systems in the south.

Over the last 10 years, migration has become one of the most important topics in the EU. Polling shows that EU citizens' top concern now is immigration. 72% of Europeans want the EU to do more when it comes to immigration. Many EU citizens are unhappy with immigration. Studies show that Europeans are more likely to be opposed to immigration than people from any other continent. In 2017, 54% of people had negative feelings about immigration into the EU (20% strongly negative). While this is a few percentage points down from 2014, it shows that many people are not satisfied with the current situation.

Reflecting this increase of importance, politics have also developed greatly in Europe. At the beginning of the refugee crisis in 2015, some European states, led by Germany, saw the strategy of seeking to block refugees moving across borders as unrealistic and harmful. Countries worked together to allow migrants to move onwards to the places they wished to reach. This allowed reception countries to focus their resources on supporting asylum seekers and considering claims.

By early 2016, support for this policy began to decrease, with increased hostility towards migrants entering the political discourse. Certain countries along the migrant route began to close their borders. The situation further deteriorated when the EU's decision to transfer 160,000 asylum seekers from Greece and Italy to other European member states was met with widespread resistance. In the end, a small percentage of the needed transfers actually took place.

In response to the failure to adequately process asylum claims, the EU set up "hotspots" in Greece and Italy. Hotspots identify, register, and fingerprint incoming migrants, and redirect them either towards asylum or return procedures. In practice, many hotspots are overcrowded and understaffed with little external oversight.

Anti-immigration sentiment has risen greatly across Europe in the past few years. This has given rise to many far-right, populist, and anti-establishment parties all over Europe.

In Italy, the anti-establishment Five Star Movement and right-wing League have formed a coalition government. Their joint programme for government includes plans for mass deportations for undocumented migrants, in line with The League's strong anti-immigration stance.

In Austria, the similarly right-wing, populist Freedom party is sharing power. There, many steps have been taken to decrease immigration, including decreasing funding for refugees and making asylum more difficult to achieve.

In Germany, the far-right, anti-immigration Alternative for Germany (AfD) entered the federal parliament for the first time in 2017. The party has kept immigration firmly at the top of the political agenda. Many parties have shifted to a more conservative stance on immigration. After a series of electoral setbacks, the chancellor has said she will not stand again.

In Sweden, the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats made significant gains in the 2018 general election, reaching 18% of the vote. The party opposes multiculturalism and wants strict immigration controls.

In France, the far-right National Front party under Marine Le Pen gained 33% of the vote in the 2017 French elections. Since then, the party has suffered various losses.

In Hungary, the Fidesz party under Viktor Orban has long presented itself as the defender of Hungary and Europe against Muslim migrants. They won 50% of the vote in the 2018 parliamentary elections. The second-biggest Hungarian party is Jobbik, a far-right, anti-immigration party.

In Slovenia, the anti-immigrant Slovenian Democratic Party became the country's largest party with 25% of the vote in the 2018 election. The anti-establishment center-left LMS party came second with 12.7%.

In Poland, the conservative Law and Justice party secured a strong win in 2015 elections. It is a strong critic of the EU's handling of the migrant crisis, and some policies have alarmed the EU concerning the state of democracy.

## References

AICS in Tunisi (2019), Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo.

Cuercia, P (2017), *"Migrazioni e sicurezza internazionale: Questioni di sicurezza migratoria dei flussi dall'Africa subsahariana al Mediterraneo centrale"*, CeNASS.

Frettoli F. (2021) *"In Tunisia non è ancora primavera"*, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale.

Gubbiotti M., Finelli T., Peruzzi E. (2012), Eds, *"Profughi Ambientali: Cambiamento climatico e migrazioni forzate"*, Legambiente Onlus.

Hannachi A. (2012) , *"Breve storia dell'immigrazione tunisina in Italia"*, Dossier Statistico Immigrazione.

Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali (2019) *"La comunità tunisina in Italia"*, Rapporto annuale sulla presenza dei migranti.

Savina M. (2021), *"Le proteste in Tunisia e il rischio di una transazione fallita"*, OSMED.

## **6. From the hospitality culture to the culture of environmental sustainability: from Riace to Camini**

Maria Francesca D'Agostino, Dispes, University of Calabria

### ***Abstract***

*My paper - in a draft version - deals with welcoming politics In Italy, and specifically with the good practices in Camini, a small village in Calabria. It can be considered as a social model, going on the more famous case of Riace.*

Key Words: welcoming practices; refugees; environmental transformation.

### **1. Introduction**

Since the early 1990s, asylum policies have undergone enormous transformations. Complex dynamics of multilevel governance have replanned the action of states in a new framework of transnational cooperation and interaction whose aim has been: "giving life to a stronger and more equitable response to situations involving large movements of refugees".

In the case of the European Union, the funds for Development Cooperation Policies have been in particular used to subcontract the management of its borders and reception practices to third countries which, in turn, received financial technological and logistics supports (Koff 2014). In a social context characterized by the continuous outbreak of new conflicts, externalization policies show very different results from those actions. On the one hand, the negotiations have often been carried out within fragile countries, where refugees settled in the camps that the EU finances exposed to the blackmailing action of human trafficking gangs operating by the disclosure of new, longer and more dangerous routes (ARCI 2018). At the same time, on the other hand, the strong demographic decline and labor stratification in European societies structurally make the demand for migrant labor in their hardest sectors of production. In this duplicity, new irregular flows are thus activated, with thousands of people to be confined on the margins of the European societies of arrival: here, more and more easily, we observe serious pockets of exclusion and intense racial conflicts.

In Italy, these new social problems - which are actually connected to the malfunctioning regimes of European border - explain the recurrent search for autonomous approaches to migration. These new social forms are widely expressed in the literature concerned with "the subjectivity of migrants", where many authors point out the ability that migrants, local decision-makers, actors from the various social movements, people from the third sector have to interact with each other in order, thus outlining some governance scenarios in opposition to those that national and European institutions accept (Caponio 2006; Brighenti 2009). We refer to more severe approaches, by tightening controls to push people to move elsewhere and, at the same time, to a great variety of different solutions, carried out by cities and territories in order to promote autonomy and stabilization paths in favor of migrants and refugees, considered as an important opportunity for social and territorial regeneration. Specifically in some marginal areas of the country, the presence of a vast underutilized environmental, cultural and real estate heritage has favored the development of forms of hospitality and social cooperation, trying to react to the situation of abandonment where these territories are: so, bringing out prospects of welfare and work cooperatives in relation to the usual racial confinements.

The aim in this work is to investigate the forms and meanings underlying these alternative reception models in the light of the main results obtained from a research carried out in Calabria in the decade

2009-2019 and, afterwards, during the current 2021. Our underlying hypothesis highlights more fluid scenarios, more fluid than those represented by those (albeit with good reasons) tending to interpret the governance of asylum and reception policies as a specific articulation of a broader governmental device for the hierarchization of citizenship and the depoliticization of migration (Mellino 2019). Without ignoring the important contribution from these more critical approaches, this article takes in consideration the comparison with them: but at the same time, it shifts its own attention towards a variety of choices, strategies and interventions, allowing us to see a great democratic laboratory of ecological transition and social innovation in the most successful policies and local practices of welcoming. A laboratory from where it's possible to rethink the link between migration, environment and development in a systemic and relational key, throughout the recognition of the important role that arrival communities can have in defining new patterns of protection and environmental solutions.

## **2. Protecting the environment by the integration of refugees**

In relation to the numbers received in much smaller and more fragile states, Italy still has a reduced presence of migrants and refugees, with about 105,000 people in reception by the 15th July 2020. The statistical surveys carried out on the subject show, however, how the issue of refugees is experienced by Italian public opinion in an increasingly hostile and alarmed way, so much so that in the 60% of cases it overlaps with that of international insecurity and terrorism (Pew Research Center, 2016). At the same time, these representations find approval in the institutional sphere (Gargiulo, 2018), where migration phenomena are on the whole governed throughout repressive policies, in adherence to the selected objectives by the current regimes of global mobility (Faist, 2013; Guild, 2018).

In Italy, a rapid development in this sense took place with the launch of the extraordinary program "Emergency North Africa" (ENA). At that moment the Italian State began to manage the difficulties generated by the rapid increase in flows through a large first reception of centers (now called CAS), allowing Prefectures to enter into direct agreements with cooperatives, associations or individuals. However, this situation has consolidated without an adequate reflection on the serious consequences deriving from the adoption of brief procedures for the selection of the managing bodies of the centers; procedures which, in some contexts, have generated a monopoly in the hands of a few subjects, almost motivated from speculative purposes. It's well known the complete lack of integration services in the CAS. Health care and psychological assistance, on the other hand, are in some cases in delay or, in many cases, absent. It is precisely through this model of emergency governance that the crisis of the right to asylum and its ability to act as a limit to sovereignty has worsened in Italy. At the same time, the many international and local reactions to this cycle of events restore the sense of a conflictual situation that sees individual citizens, local administrators, ecclesiastical representatives and the highest institutions take on their shoulders the challenges of hospitality. Especially in metropolitan cities and small towns in Southern Italy, where the willingness of many citizens and their administrators to overcome approaches oriented by exclusive emergency needs and they give priority to choices aimed at transforming migration into a powerful mobilization factor of innovation and local development (D'Agostino, 2017b).

As the most recent literature points out, many squatting centers and shared living practices are moving in this direction (Cattaneo and Martizez 2014; Oliveri 2016; Mudu and Chattopadhyay 2017), linking the refugee issue to movements and social networks of a greater significance, unified by the desire to overturn the actual cycle of multiple crises, in more sustainable ways of living and forecasting the future development of towns, cities and other territories.

At the same time, tensions between local authorities and the national government are multiplying since the immigration laws has assigned the responsibility for integration to this level of welcoming - while since in 2001 the reform of Title V of the Constitution places the responsibility for integration on them in relation to the housing offer and to the construction of social policies (Ferrera, 2012; Sicora, 2016). Above all the municipalities of the Italian inner areas have been using these opportunities to deal with the growing number of migrants settled here: they can enjoy lower living and housing costs, whilst the central state's effort is in elaborating a policy of territorial dispersal of forced migrants towards the inland areas, in order to "lighten" the burden of the constant arrival of new inhabitants in the cities.

From these different factors emerge the wide range of social experiments started in the most marginal areas: these experiments have had the goal of creating safe places where to heal the invisible wounds left by torture and persecution, and by shaping activities aimed at creating better relationships and more convincing local development perspectives.

In Piedmont, Tuscany, Friuli Venezia Giulia and, above all, in the autonomous province of Trento, many CAS are now dissociated from the depersonalizing mechanisms that should have characterized them. In various temporary structures, it was even decided to reinvest the revenues obtained from hospitality to create more advanced models of solidarity economy, which in most cases relaunched the role of new forms of agriculture and so-called ethical supply chains to guarantee respect for the rights of migrant workers, product quality and the environment. In fact, these are social enterprises that welcome refugees, and in this context, refugees have developed further projects to enhance and preserve the agri-food excellence of the territories in which they operate. It is through this crossroads of activities, meetings and relationships that thousands of migrants, operators and volunteers have given a different form to more advanced perspectives of inclusion: it is an expression of the awareness how the full realization of the rights' universalism arrives thanks to the personalization of the interventions and the care of the places.

### **3. Alternative welcoming. The implementation of the Riace model in Camini**

The first alternative reception experiments started in Calabria from a spontaneous movement of solidarity on the part of the local populations.

Among the best known is that of the municipality of Riace, where 220 Kurdish exiles landed in 1998. Here, the promoters of a place, later called the "Città Futura" (association dedicated to the Sicilian priest Don Giuseppe Puglisi, killed by the mafia), worked to obtain the assignment of the empty houses for the emigrants in order to invent a new model of reception, in discontinuity with the Italian approach, characterized by evident signs oscillating between "paternalism" and "control" (Petrovic, 2016).

A vast network for widespread hospitality is thus organized. The Riace Village, aimed at providing accommodation both to refugees and, progressively, to the many tourists and researchers who, slowly, start approaching Riace to understand that reality and support it. Through this process, the restoration of abandoned houses in the historic center and in underused or disused public assets (such as the amphitheater in the town hall square and Palazzo Pinnarò, actually an intercultural aggregation center), is strongly encouraged. In the following years, "Città Futura" dedicated itself to transforming the reception of migrants into a job opportunity for them as well as for local young people, by promoting the establishment of various cooperatives. Together with SPRAR, they gave work to about 100 people, including foreigners and the disabled people. Among these: "Il Borgo e il Cielo" addressed to manage the new weaving, ceramic, glass and jam workshops, "Ecoriace" and "L'Aquilone", all entrusted with separate waste collection.

At first, this path has used a loan granted by Banca Etica in 2011, whose resources are from the National Asylum Program (PNA), and then funds from the SPRAR, to which the municipality of Riace adheres from 2002 to 2018, developing various projects of reception managed together with “Città Futura” and other associations (for instance: “Oltre Lampedusa”, “Welcome”, “Girasole”, “Riace Accoglie”, “Los Migrantes”, “Civil Protection SS Medici Riace”). In 2004, Domenico Lucano (among the founding members of Città Futura), as mayor of Riace, have been reconfirmed for two more periods (in 2009 and 2014), whose in 2016 was included by the American magazine "Fortune" among the 50 most influential leaders in the world (Barillà, 2018).

In his public interventions and discussions, Lucano explains that Riace's experience is characterized by an idea of hospitality conceived as a political fact oriented towards healthier social relations and sustainable forms of development that aim to solve problems of old and new residents, *“without any opportunistic logic, placing the dignity of the person at the center of everything”*. To concretize this "utopia of normality", as Lucano said, the refugees were welcomed in the historic center of Riace, where some handicraft workshops were reopened aimed at the recovery of ancient crafts (such as the processing of broom fiber, natural dyeing or wool spinning), also through the study and enhancement of the old knowledge of the farming world (D'Agostino, 2013). These interventions have played a fundamental role in giving strength to a completely new community, developing an approach closer to the needs of the territory and its traditions, according to a framework giving centrality to social proximity rather than to nationalistic ideals uprooted from real life.

The resources (35 euros daily) - allocated by the central government for reception - were used to activate hundreds of work grants, also linked to the inhabitants of the country, who carried out tutoring activities alongside migrants. In order to promote the autonomy of expenses for refugees and to make up for the delays of the Ministry of the Interior in the disbursement of SPRAR funds - a special local currency was coined: this local currency can be used by asylum seekers for their purchases in affiliated commercial establishments, of both Riace and neighboring countries. This currency, in addition to instruments of social exchanges based on trust, served to emphasize an alternative culture, diverse from the "hospitality business", allowing refugees themselves to decide how to use the sums destined for them and to support local markets.

Throughout these dynamics of self-organization and regulation from below, the city of Riace has managed to reverse the process of depopulation into a continuously rising demographic curve over a period of 16 years. The resident population has in fact increased from about 1600 inhabitants in 2001 to over 2300 inhabitants in 2017. Among the new residents, many Italians have come back to the municipality of origin from Northern Italy; then, several migrants have chosen to reside permanently in Riace. This demographic inversion has thus made new basic public services available, including a nursery and a clinic, and to preserve existing ones (such as a primary school). The movement of solidarity tourists, visitors, volunteers and researchers from all over the world, also for the organization of events, cultural and film festivals (Riace in Festival) have, in turn, contributed to keeping commercial activities alive and reviving the life of the territory.

However, in 2016, after an inspection by the Prefecture of Reggio Calabria, which found "criticalities for administrative and organizational aspects", the Ministry of the Interior blocked the disbursement of funds, no longer recognizing bonuses and job grants of the last three years. In 2018 Lucano was then arrested on charges of aiding "illegal immigration", through the promotion of "false marriages", and for alleged irregularities committed in the direct entrusting of waste collection to the country's social cooperatives. At the same time, the SPRAR project was rejected by the Ministry of the Interior which had not accepted payment methods for bonuses and work grants with the Riace's alternative



currency, disputing the extension of reception times beyond the set deadlines. Therefore, the transfer of host refugees elsewhere has been “decreed” and the closure of an integration experience considered a virtuous model all over the world, with more than 700 migrants hosted in 2017 alone and more than 6000 since 2004.

### 3. 1. *Towards Camini*

Over the years, the “Riace model” has inspired numerous Calabrian municipalities.

In 2010, also thanks to the support of the mayor of Riace, the municipality of Camini started a welcome project in collaboration with the Eurocoop Servizi social cooperative. Initially, the project hosted 11 asylum seekers from the Ivory Coast, following the riots arising from the "Arab Spring". Citizens, mostly elderly, are hospitable and newcomers also interact well with the local community. Also, in synergy with the municipality of Riace, in July 2013, Camini collaborated in the “SPRAR expansion” project. Migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Horn of Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe begin to arrive in Camini. Since April 2016, the SPRAR project has been joined by the Resettlement Program (which assists refugees from Eritrea or Syria in resettling in a third country) prepared by the Ministry of the Interior: 57 Syrians are thus welcomed, making up one of the largest communities in Italy. The ancient village of 300 inhabitants is experiencing a "rebirth", due to the positive effects on a territorial, social, economic and urban level.

The name of the integrated reception project is "Jungi Mundu" (a local language which means “To Unify the World”) and there are various activities undertaken to support the socio-economic integration of guests and those who are in similar situations of vulnerability and isolation. In 2018, the beneficiaries of the reception were about 118, including asylum seekers, refugees and holders of protection. The presence among migrants of a significant share of young people and children (more than 30), in a clear minority among the local population, has helped to avoid the closure of the educational services of a country now in depopulation, and to also create a childhood workshop. There has also been a resumption of commercial establishments and, thanks to the increase in workforce and the demand for housing in which to host refugees and asylum seekers, the renovation of the historic center has been promoted, following the traditional architectural style and creating opportunities for new specializations in the construction field.

Some houses in the center have been opened for solidarity tourism, which represents an additional economic resource for the local community. With the "Camini d'Avorio" project, extra virgin olive oil was produced (more than 1000 liters by ear), recovering abandoned land and made available by the owners, in exchange for a share of the product. The name given to the project derives from the majority involvement of Ivorian's migrants in the different stages of oil production. The proceeds from the sales served to remunerate the workers.

In 2016 the "Città Futura" association joined the Eurocoop initiative by producing the extra virgin olive oil "Olio degli Sbarchi". The activity is repeated also the following year, with a large production (about 100 quintals). To these activities, we add the creation of some artisan workshops for cooking, wood, painting, tailoring, wrought iron, ceramics and soap - using the oil produced on site, but also the essence of bergamot, another typical product, or the laurel oil, to create another version of soap, from Aleppo, entrusted by the Syrian refugees.

It is also important to remember that Camini is the only Italian office where it is possible to carry out volunteering activities through *Projects Abroad*, a non-governmental organization based in London, which manages the arrival of international volunteers (for at least two weeks and up to 3 months)

throughout the year, to carry out different activities, defined through a program agreed with the local reference organization. The Eurocoop cooperative manages the hospitality of international volunteers, which yields 70,000 euros per year, in accommodations in the historic center; it then deals with construction, agriculture, manages a bar and two restaurants, produces in addition to oil, products in oil and pickles, initially for self-consumption but is intended for solidarity trade. More than 40 operators are employed, mostly women. There are also many visitors (including scholars and political activists): they buy the products, stay and consume them in the village, they propose new projects, linking Camini with other villages, as Rosarno, to build an ethical supply chain is by extending the rights to everyone:

*In recent months we have provided tools such as jackets and lights to put on bikes - says Francesco Piobbichi, operator of Mediterranean Hope - and we realized that more was needed. The accidents unfortunately occurred, with some dead and many injured. This is why we asked a virtuous experience like that of Camini to help us and we count on distributing it to all the migrants who cycle along the roads of the Piana for the next season. It is a small gesture, of course, which, however, can make a difference for these people to whom we continue not to guarantee rights and decent living and working conditions. It is no coincidence that we have chosen a reality that, differently, promotes a decent work as an instrument of emancipation of refugee and migrant people: it is by extending the rights to everyone that we can restart and build an ethical supply chain in Calabria and beyond.*

Opportunity	Strengths
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- National second reception system (SAI) oriented towards territorial dispersion.</li> <li>- National strategies for the recovery of villages and the development of inland areas (SNAI).</li> <li>- Three-year regional plan for the reception of refugees in internal areas;</li> <li>- Plans for the social reuse of assets, seized from the mafia.</li> <li>- Southern working by also the growth in the number of new young residents.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Presence of a variety of underutilized real estate assets to be improved.</li> <li>- Presence of ancient crafts and "sustainable" agri-food traditions.</li> <li>- Development of niche markets and new networks of the "solidarity economy".</li> <li>- Presence of solidarity and responsible tourists, as well as international volunteers.</li> </ul>
Threats	Points of Weakness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Possible ethnic conflicts and expressions of xenophobia.</li> <li>- Tightening of migration policies.</li> <li>- Possible degrowth of population.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Population aging and low generational turnover.</li> <li>- Reduced number of businesses and enterprises.</li> <li>- Loss of basic social and health services.</li> <li>- Fragility of the institutional capacity.</li> <li>- Difficulty in regularizing "residence permits".</li> </ul>

*Table 1: The municipality of Camini and the "Doorsal of the Hospitality", D'Agostino 2021.*

#### 4. Conclusions: linking asylum and climate governance

At the basis of the current Italian asylum system, we visibly find depoliticizing mechanisms that place refugees within a paternalistic horizon of intervention, limited in time and devoid of any planning dimension. In this same framework, they are also converging subjectivities that operate on the basis of a new frame, by claiming the transition from an approach centered on the categorization of interventions to one centered on people, the care of places, the building of new green communities. Their short-term objectives are concerned with the implementations of the levels of health services, mobility, education even in marginal areas by the integration of migrants and refugees, while in the medium and long term we find a strong push towards activities aimed at enhancing the cultural and natural heritage of the territory, as well as to the development of ethical and shorter production chains. Riace and Camini in Calabria, their principles can be capable to transform hospitality into a large research and experimentation laboratory from where to learn forms, tools and new hypotheses for a more balanced nexus between migrations, economy, environment and society.

These innovative experiences are the most innovative today and they are still searching for better living conditions in marginal areas, in order to obtain the same citizenship rights enjoyed by those who already live in the more developed urban areas.

However, it is interesting to mark how over the years many experiences have matured a broader and more general request: namely as "provincializing Europe" (Chakrabarty 2005). The processes of exclusion and the environmental devastation, shown by the growth of forced migrations, can be read as an inseparable part of Western Accumulation System, as Sassen recalls (Sassen 2016), which spread itself through expulsion, war and plunder of environmental resources.

In a wide variety of arenas, even different from traditionally political ones, asylum seekers and refugees have been fortunately removed from the paternalistic gaze of the past (Zetter 1991), becoming an emblematic expression of inequalities involving the entire social body. The elaboration and acceptance of this new framework has given birth again to disused and forgotten spaces, otherwise destined for decay or speculation. The welcoming is an epochal test for the public policies of the future, which expresses the need to shift the debate about "environmental migrations" towards a deeper analysis of participatory democracy's models, models based on the "entry" of national and international citizens in the midst of active social networks, along territories able to support them.

#### References

Avallone, G. (2016), "Dalla città ostile alla città bene comune. I migranti di fronte alla crisi dell'abitare in Italia", *Archivio di studi urbani e regionali*, vol. 115, pp. 51-74.

Ambrosini M. (2016), *Chiusure gridate, aperture implicite, diritti in bilico*. In D'Agostino, M., Corrado, A., Caruso, F.S. (eds), *Migrazioni e Confini. Politiche, Diritti e Nuove Forme di Partecipazione* (pp. 11-23). Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino.

Ambrosini, M. (2013), "Le politiche locali per gli immigrati in Italia e in Europa: i risultati di una ricerca", Elia, A., Fantozzi, P. (eds), *Tra globale e locale. Esperienze e percorsi di ricerca sulle migrazioni*. Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, pp. 149-159.

Anci, Caritas Italiana, Cittalia, Fondazione Migrantes e dal Servizio Centrale dello SPRAR, (2017), *Quarto rapporto sulla protezione internazionale* – 2017. <http://www.anci.it/Contenuti/Allegati/Rapporto%20protezione%20internazionale%202017.pdf>

Cannavò, S. (2018), *Mutualismo. Ritorno al futuro per la sinistra*, Roma, Alegre.

Caruso, F.S. (2016), “Tra agricoltura californiana e migrazioni mediterranee: cause ed effetti delle rivolte del bracciantato migrante di Rosarno e Castel Volturno”, D’Agostino, M., Corrado, A., Caruso, F.S. (eds), *Migrazioni e Confini. Politiche, Diritti e Nuove Forme di Partecipazione* (pp. 57-68), Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino.

Cesareo, V. e Bichi, R (2010), *Per un'integrazione possibile. Periferie urbane e processi migratori*. FrancoAngeli, Milano.

Cittalia, Anci, Comune di Padova, (2013). *La popolazione in forte disagio abitativo in Italia. La condizione dei richiedenti asilo, dei rifugiati e dei Rom*. [http://www.cittalia.it/images/file/disagio\\_abitativo.pdf](http://www.cittalia.it/images/file/disagio_abitativo.pdf)

Corrado A., D’agostino M. (2018), “Migrations in multiple crises. New development patterns for rural and inner areas in Calabria (Italy)?”, S. Kordel, I. Jelen, T. Weidinger (eds), *Current immigration processes to European peripheries: status quo, implications and development strategies*. Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing House.

Corrado, A., D’Agostino M., (2016), I migranti nelle aree interne. Il caso della Calabria. *Agriregionieuropa*, n. 45, Giugno 2016. <http://agiregionieuropa.univpm.it/it/content/article/31/45/i-migranti-nelle-aree-interne-il-caso-della-calabria>

D’Agostino M. (2017a), “L’abitare dei rifugiati in Calabria. Pratiche e politiche, oltre l’emergenza”. In *Fuori Luogo*, vol. 2, pp. 544-568.

D’Agostino M. (2017b). “Beyond the perimeter of depoliticization. The evolution of the global governance of refugees and its territorialisation in Calabria”, *Partecipazione e conflitto*.

Davis, M. (1999), *Geografie della paura*. Milano, Feltrinelli.

Galdini, R. (2017), Emergenza abitativa e pratiche informali. Il caso di Roma. *Sociologia urbana e rurale*, 112: 73-82.

Grazioli, M. (2017), From citizens to citadins? Rethinking right to the city inside housing squats in Rome, Italy. *Citizenship Studies*, vol. 21 (4), pp. 393-408.

Harvey, D. (2013), *Città ribelli*, Il Saggiatore, Milano.

King, R. (2012), Theories and typologies of migration: An overview and a primer. *Willy Brandt series of working papers in international migration and ethnic relations*. Malmö institute for studies of migration, diversity and welfare, Malmö University.

Lunaria. (2017), *Accoglienza. La propaganda e le proteste del rifiuto, le scelte istituzionali sbagliate*: [https://www.lunaria.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/0FOCUS1\\_DEFINITIVO\\_13marzo.pdf](https://www.lunaria.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/0FOCUS1_DEFINITIVO_13marzo.pdf)

Mantovan, C. (2013), “Cohesion without participation: immigration and migrants' associations in Italy”. *Patterns of Prejudice*, vol. 47, 3, pp. 253-268.

Mantovan, C. (2007), *Immigrazione e cittadinanza. Auto-organizzazione e partecipazione dei migranti in Italia*. Milano, FrancoAngeli.

Marchetti, C. Pinelli, B. (2017), *Confini d’Europa. Modelli di controllo e inclusioni informali*, Raffaello Cortina, Milano.

MEDU (Medici per i Diritti Umani), 2018. *I dannati della terra. Rapporto sulle condizioni di vita e di lavoro dei braccianti stranieri nella Piana di Gioia Tauro*: [http://www.mediciperidirittiumani.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/i\\_dannati\\_della\\_terra\\_2018\\_web.pdf](http://www.mediciperidirittiumani.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/i_dannati_della_terra_2018_web.pdf)

Membretti A., Klofer I., Viazzo P. P. (eds), (2017), *Per forza o per scelta. L'immigrazione straniera nelle Alpi e negli Appennini*, Roma, Aracne.

Moini, G. (2012). *Teoria critica della partecipazione. Un approccio sociologico*, Milano, Franco Angeli.

MSF (2018), *Fuori campo. Richiedenti asilo e rifugiati in Italia: insediamenti informali e marginalità sociale*. <http://fuoricampo.medicisenzafrontiere.it/Fuoricampo.pdf>

Ong, A. (2005), *Da rifugiati a cittadini*, Milano, Raffaello Cortina.

Pastore, F., Ponzo, I. (2012), *Concordia Discors. Convivenza e conflitto nei quartieri di immigrazione*. Roma, Carocci.

Prujuit, H. (2012), "Le occupazioni in Europa", *Partecipazione e Conflitto*, 1, pp. 19-44.

Ponzo, I. (2013), *Il disagio abitativo degli immigrati le risposte housing-sociale*. [http://fieri.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Rapporto-finale-Il-disagio-abitativo-degli-immigrati\\_le-risposte-housing-sociale.pdf](http://fieri.it/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Rapporto-finale-Il-disagio-abitativo-degli-immigrati_le-risposte-housing-sociale.pdf)

Zamponi, L. (2017), *Practices of Solidarity: Direct Social Action, Politicisation and Refugee Solidarity Activism in Italy*. *Mondi Migranti*, 3, pp. 97-117

## **Comment to 6. “From the hospitality culture to the culture of environmental sustainability: from Riace to Camini” Welcoming of Migrants in Calabria among SPRAR, SIPROIMI, SAI (2015-2021)**

Gilda Catalano, Dispes, University of Calabria

### **1. Introduction. The welcoming systems SPRAR, SIPROIMI, SAI in Italy**

The Welcoming Practices in Calabria are actually concerned with a vivid debate, especially by observing its diverse territorial transformations in the last six years: from SPRAR to SIPROIMI, until to the newest SAI, still a model at an implementation stage.

In this Comment, we add some information about the Welcoming System in Italy, with a special focus on Calabria.

In this first paragraph, we introduce the newest system of Welcoming, SAI: approved in November 2020 and entered in force in March 2021. In the following two paragraphs, we observe the situation of Calabrian welcoming in the short passage from SPRAR to SIPROIMI system, lasting only two years (2018-2020), and finally the partial results by these changes between the period 2020-2021.

Over the years, in Italy, the legislation governing the reception of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants in Italy has changed several times.

In December 2020, the Decree Law n. 130 (approved two months earlier by the Second Government of Giuseppe Conte) was converted into law. It contains "*Urgent provisions on immigration, international and complementary protection*" and it partially reforms the so-called Security Decree, approved about two years earlier by the first Government of Conte. This dl 130/2020, like the previous "Safety Decree", mainly refers to the dl. lgs. 142/2015.

In this last Decree, we can distinguish these diverse phases of welcoming:

*a. The first one is called: first aid and identification.* Foreign citizens, rescued at sea or irregularly entered the national territory are taken to government centers near the areas of disembarkation or the main entries into the country for initial health assistance, photo-signaling and pre-identification. These types of centers have the so-called *hotspot approach*, implemented in 2015 because of the commitments made by the Italian Government together with the European Commission. In these centers there is also the first exchange of information on asylum procedures: here the *asylum seekers* differ from so-called economic migrants, who will be sent to the detention *Centers for Repatriation* (CPR) or left in the territory, often in condition of irregular stay (see: about the Hotspot Approach, the many Reports of the Parliamentary Inquiry Commission on the reception system).

Those people who apply for asylum in Italy are transferred to the *First Reception Centers* (CPA), having a first level of reception facilities: here a certain time is required to carry out the identification operations and to start the procedure for examining the asylum requests. In these centers, the health conditions of the guests must also be ascertained, in order to verify any vulnerable situations before entering in the second phase of reception. People who have not expressed to seek asylum are instead transferred to the CPR, throughout the executive order of expulsion from the country.

*b. There is a second reception.* This step consists of the *Reception and Integration System* (SAI). The program, introduced in November 2020 replaces the *Protection System for holders of International*

*Protection and for Unaccompanied Foreign Minors (SIPROIMI)*, established with the Security Decree in 2018: SIPROIMI - lasted only two years (2018-2020) - replaced the *Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR*, which stayed in force from 2002 to 2018).

Actually, with the updated SAI, Italy seems to return to the ordinary principles that had inspired the SPRAR. SAI consists of a type of reception, considered as more concerned with an integration approach, above all in relation to SIPROIMI. Both asylum seekers and protection holders (that is: those who have already received the asylum request and recognized the right to international protection - can access this system).

*b1. The newest SAI is developed on two levels of services:* the first level is for asylum seekers, and it is based on material, legal, health and linguistic assistance; the second-level services are reserved for protection holders and also have functions of integration and career guidance. Unlike the first reception, managed centrally, SAI is coordinated by the *Central Service of the State*, whose management is assigned by the *Minister of the Interior* to the *National Association of Italian Municipalities (ANCI)*, together with the operational support of the *Cittalia Foundation*. The responsible ownership of the projects is assigned to local authorities, which voluntarily activate and implement reception and integration projects.

*c. Support for integration paths after the second reception.* The Legislative Decree 130/2020 introduces *for the first time* further diverse social integration paths after the second reception. At the end of the SAI period, in fact, local administrations can launch other initiatives with the aim of favoring the individual autonomy of citizens, that is, of those people already beneficiaries of the SAI, with a particular regard to: a better language training, career guidelines, essential public services and, also, the knowledge of the basic rights and duties enshrined in the Italian Constitution.

*d. The extraordinary reception system.* If the available places in the first and second reception systems are exhausted, the prefectures can provide for the establishment of *Extraordinary Reception Centers (CAS)*: they can entrust to private entities through the procedures for awarding public contracts. Within these centers, asylum seekers are welcomed, limited to the time necessary for transfer to the SAI facilities.

Despite being an extraordinary system, the use of CAS (established by Legislative Decree 142/2015) has become the majority over the years. In fact, in spite of the 2020's Reform, the transfer from the first reception to the SAI is influenced by the availability of places: the Security Decree had already provided for the obligatory passage of asylum seekers in the CAS.

*We can add some considerations about the above mentioned points from "a" to "d".*

The 2020 Reform designed a reception system, having characteristics much more similar to issues had before SIPROIMI system (2018), and before the approval of the *Security Decrees* wanted by the Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini.

In some way, the actual return of the previous system means: a. the chance of accessing the second reception also for asylum seekers, not only for the already holders of protection, and b. the opportunity for the asylum seekers to pass from the extraordinary system to the SAI. This chance tests the measure of the change of political address, in comparison to the past. Furthermore, the old Security Decree had made the CAS as a compulsory passage for asylum seekers: a moment that formally has been abolished by the new reform. At any rate, the division of SAI into two levels precludes asylum seekers from certain integration services.

Unfortunately, the second reception - although oriented towards a greater integration and inclusion of people - continues to be largely underutilized by local administrations and underpowered in relation to migrants' needs. With the two levels, asylum seekers who are welcomed in CAS - because

there are no places available in SAI - may not enjoy the same services as those seekers welcomed in SAI.

It would be necessary to better understand how the last specifications in law will be structured, specifically showing the assignments for the management of the centers. In fact, the application of the new system reform which was also approved in November 2020 and activated in March 2021 is still not completely clear for local municipalities.

## 2. Diverse Welcoming Data in Calabria

By the end of 2019, according to *Demo Istat*, Calabria counts 108.494 foreigners, corresponding about the 5,5 % of its total.

As far as the data of nationality, the highest percentage is represented by Romanians, of whom they are almost 1/3, followed by Moroccans, Bulgarians and Ukrainians. In relation to residence permits, almost 52% of people not belonging to UE have not a long period permit.

In this scenario, the foreign population has increased in the last eight years: almost 49% is actually composed of women.

As far as their demographic distribution in Calabria, the most part of this population lives in the district of Cosenza and Reggio Calabria; and in the following order in Catanzaro, Crotone and Vibo Valentia districts.

Districts	Male	Female	Total	% Population on Total Residents
Catanzaro	9.571	9.569	19.140	5,3%
Cosenza	16.997	18.562	35.559	5,0%
Crotone	8.306	4.483	12.789	7,3%
Reggio di Calabria	16.540	16.330	32.870	6,0%
Vibo Valentia	3.918	4.218	8.136	5,1%
Total	55.332	53.162	108.494	5,5

*Table 1: Data DemoIstat, 2019*

They work basically as low qualified working people in agriculture, in seasonal tourism, in old-caring and domestic helps. Fortunately, among the total of 108,494 registered, there are a small part of 14.367 units working in an independent way in the services and commercial activities (data from CGIL, 2019).

Besides, a high difference among foreigners living in urban and rural area is well known. In rural areas, the prevailing jobs can have a “dark” aspect: informal jobs, criminal exploitation, and low unemployment are considered quite common in many areas of the Region. For instance, in agriculture, a large part of the basic working class is composed of migrants: it is 28% of total, an increase of three times in the last ten years - according to CGIL data. It is possible to say that: *caporalato*, human trafficking, exploitation, illegality stay on the one hand; whilst informality and survival strategies are on the other one.

There is also a sanitary emergence, in living conditions - specifically in the agriculture sector. As MEDU says (Medicines for Human Rights) by observing the situation along the last five/six years: MEDU has verified that at least the 21% of people occupied in agriculture is without a contract, whilst the most part has a lower income from what it is registered.



	2008			2015		
	Occupied in Agriculture	% Foreigners Workers	% Italian Workers	Occupied in Agriculture	% Foreigners Workers	% Italian Workers
<b>Calabria</b>	50.200	5,6	94,4	56.400	12,6	87,4
<b>Italy</b>	826.200	0,5	99,5	41.100	4	96

*Table 2: Ri-elaboration by previous CGIL data, 2008-2015*

As table 2 shows, the official results from CGIL are a bit diverse from our latest data, which we have collected by the Ministry of Agriculture and by INPS.

In 2017, in Italy, INPS registered a total of 110,543 workers in line with those registered in the previous year, whose 77% were Italian, 9% non-EU and 14% EU. Besides, the official data from ISTAT and Ministry of the Interior say that the number of foreign workers in the Calabrian agricultural sector is about 34,700 units, of which 70% are EU.

In 2020, a light decrease seems to be: about Italian workers (-1%) and a more marked decrease in EU workers (-7%) in favor of non-EU workers, increased by 1,500 units (*cf.:* we deal with this aspect in the *Unical Final Report*).

So, data can be a bit diverse, not only because of indicators used by every national agency, but also for the difficulty to move into a complex world, where formal and informal aspects live together.

### 2.1. Territorial System of welcoming: from SPRAR to SIPROIMI in 2015-2020

Many aspects need to be highlighted, if we have an overview about the territorial system of welcoming.

As far as the territories, the presence of ex-CARA (Isola di Capo Rizzuto, the second in Europe for wideness) and the presence of informal settlements of *Territorial Commissions for the International Protection* in Crotona e in Reggio Calabria have reinforced the increase of informal settlements.

When the route towards Balcani was interrupted, Calabria has registered an increased number of migrants among the national system of welcoming, reaching the 10 positions among the twenty Italian Regions.

Its first network of demanding asylums was in PNA (Riace, Badolato, Cosenza, Acquaformosa, e Crotona); the second one with SPRAR (called SIPROIMI between 2018-2020 and now SAI).

As shown in table 3, between 2018-2020, 123 have been the projects of welcoming in Calabria whose 99 ordinaries, 14 for minors not accompanied, and 3 for FAMI (Fund Asylum for Migration and Integration 2014-2020, established by UE n. 516/2014), 7 for mental distress and disabilities: by a total of 3537 places.

District	PROJECTS SPRAR/SIPROIMI IN CALABRIA			
	Ordinary	MNA (Minor not accompanied)	Mental distress and disabilities	Total
<b>Catanzaro</b>	16	4	1	21
<b>Cosenza</b>	39	6 (+1 FAMI)	1	47
<b>Crotona</b>	9	1	0	10
<b>Reggio Calabria</b>	27	2 (+2 FAMI)	5	36
<b>Vibo Valentia</b>	8	1	0	9
<b>Total</b>	99	14 (3 FAMI)	7	123

*Table 3: Regional Sources, our elaboration, 2020*

The involvement of local institutions in a second turn system of welcoming has been structured by provincial coordination and by the signature of an Agreement between the *Anci Calabria* and *the Prefettura* on 21 October 2017 in order to facilitate the welcoming by the SPRAR, and to overcome the extraordinary welcoming by the CAS (Graphic 1).

The SPRAR has been a symbol of the *welcoming* in Locride Area, the land of Riace and its mayor Domenico Lucano. Differently, SIPROIMI is the effect of the first “Salvini decree”. The main cause is the so-called “Security Decree” which excluded asylum seekers from the SPRAR, reserving places only for those who have received international protection: that is, only those people recognized as refugees.

REGION	TOTAL (Additional places)	Mental distress or physical disabilities	Minors not accompanied	N. of Local Authorities Leader of Project	Number of Projects
<b>ABRUZZO</b>	642	0	0	12	<b>12</b>
<b>BASILICATA</b>	590	10	72	18	<b>20</b>
<b>CALABRIA</b>	3.525	85	390	106	<b>115</b>
<b>CAMPANIA</b>	2.654	0	165	78	<b>80</b>
<b>EMILIA</b>	2.681	13	487	22	<b>32</b>
<b>ROMAGNA</b>					
<b>FRIULI</b>	388	20	9	10	<b>11</b>
<b>VENEZIA</b>					
<b>GIULIA</b>					
<b>LAZIO</b>	4.334	36	79	44	<b>50</b>
<b>LIGURIA</b>	687	0	57	13	<b>14</b>
<b>LOMBARDIA</b>	1.980	13	235	49	<b>55</b>
<b>MARCHE</b>	1.179	13	25	19	<b>23</b>
<b>MOLISE</b>	652	0	73	23	<b>24</b>
<b>PIEMONTE</b>	1.437	16	86	32	<b>34</b>
<b>PUGLIA</b>	2.949	159	307	87	<b>103</b>
<b>SARDEGNA</b>	277	0	12	12	<b>12</b>
<b>SICILIA</b>	4.734	234	692	83	<b>113</b>
<b>TOSCANA</b>	1.283	52	75	25	<b>30</b>
<b>TRENTINO</b>	149	0	17	1	<b>2</b>
<b>ALTO ADIGE</b>					
<b>UMBRIA</b>	454	11	43	12	<b>16</b>
<b>VALLE</b>	25	0	0	1	<b>1</b>
<b>D'AOSTA</b>					
<b>VENETO</b>	693	0	41	17	<b>21</b>
<b>TOTALI</b>	31.313	662	2.865	664	<b>768</b>

*Table 4: Beneficiaries for Region, our elaboration 2020*

<b>PROJECTS</b>	<b>768</b>	<b>603</b> <b>115</b> <b>50</b>	Ordinaries Minor not accompanied People by mental disease and disabilities
<b>Local communities' leader of Projects</b>	<b>664</b>	<b>582</b> <b>19</b> <b>17</b> <b>5</b> <b>41</b>	Boroughs Provinces Unions of Boroughs Mountain Communities Other Institutions (territorial and social Institutions, Consortium among boroughs, health societies) <i>MORE than 1.100 boroughs involved in total</i>


<b>Granted Places</b>	<b>31.313</b>	<b>27.786</b>	Ordinaries
		<b>2.865</b>	minor not accompanied
		<b>662</b>	people by mental disease and disabilities

*Table 5: Beneficiaries of Projects in Italy, 2018-2020*

In the period 2018-2020, they are a bit decreased because of its transformation into SIPROIMI System; such as in Gioiosa Ionica, where the SPRAR for adults managed by the association *Network of Solidarity Municipalities* (Recosol) was set up for 75 people but currently hosts just 27 people. The same for Caulonia and Benestare where the *Pathos Cooperative* operates, which is part of the Goel Consortium.

In the SPRAR for adults in Caulonia there are 49 people, out of 75 places. Its manager warns: "At the end of November 2020 we were only 25, because the others have finished the course or started the training internship. If other people are not arriving there will no longer be the conditions to stay open".

Similar worries are expressed for two (ex)SPRAR for minors managed in Benestare. Each should host 12 young people, whilst now there are only 8. Its manager replies: "We cannot deny that the Sprar model worked and then it was destroyed (...). We must bring back the asylum seekers. At least they do this, to restore a minimum of dignity to these people, now abandoned in the CAS in non-human conditions or ended up on the street".



*Figure 1: Carrying Capacity of CAS in Calabria 2018-2019. Our Elaboration on logarithmic scale.*

Even worse the situation of the (ex) SPRAR for adults in Africo, managed by the *Exodus Foundation* by a house within the diocese of Locri-Gerace. Scheduled for 30 seats, actually it has only 12 guests. The chief executive Aspesi says: "It is necessary to re-open the Sprar for asylum seekers who now are in CAS where there is no chance of integration".

As far as the SPRAR of Monasterace managed by the *Abicoop Cooperative* (which takes part in the Goel Consortium) is doing a little better because it deals with families. Now out of 25 places, 13 are occupied by a Syrian family of 4 persons and an Afghan family of 9 persons, who arrived in June 2020.

It is possible to affirm that in 2018-2020, this situation also has weakened the beautiful experience of the village of Camini, another Riace (3 kilometers away) - as mentioned in D'Agostino's article. We remember it is a village of just over 300 inhabitants which is reborn thanks to the arrival of immigrants: the kindergarten, the elementary school, the tobacconist reopened.

Rosario Zurzolo, president of the *Jungi Mundu* cooperative, explains: "*The Sprar is for 118 people but currently there are 75*": and half of them are families coming from Turkey and Lebanon with the missions organized by the Ministry of the Interior. "*In recent years we have succeeded in integrating with a good welcome. But now we are a bit in trouble*".

### **3. The recent results of territorial transformation SIPROIMI-SAI in 2020. Open remarks.**

Actually, in Italy: 60 active projects are on the overall 30,049 beneficiaries, and 1,800 municipalities involved.

In January 2021, 768 projects were funded (573 ordinary, 145 for unaccompanied minors, 42 for people with mental diseases or disabilities) entrusted to 650 local project owners (562 municipalities, 16 Provinces, 26 Unions of Municipalities including the *Mountain Communities* and the *Mountain Unions of Municipalities*) and 46 other bodies including *Consortium Social Companies, Territorial Areas, Associated Municipalities, District Communities, Consortia, Health Districts, Health Society*. All this involves a total of over 1,800 municipalities (see, Tab.4 and 5).

Thus, 30,049 places are funded (25,057 ordinary, 4,369 for unaccompanied minors, 623 for people with mental illness or disability).

6,772 women are welcomed in the SIPROIMI protection system until January 2021: they are about 16.5% compared to over 80% of the presence of men. On the one hand, it confirms the historically attested predominance of the male component, although after 2018 there was an increase in the female component, whilst in the period 2010- 2014 the presence of women among the beneficiaries has decreased steadily every year (from 24.0 to 12.2%).

Actually, in relation to the gender composition of people by country of origin in reception, the last data of the presence of women say: from Nigeria - with 3,102 women - is the first country for the number of women received: almost 1 beneficiary out of 2 received in the network (45.8%).

Such a high number and an increase in presences (in 2015 they were 29.3%, in 2016 32.5% and in 2017 41.5%), is often related to conditions of fragility and vulnerability, as well as situations of victimization linked to the phenomenon of exploitation and trafficking or to episodes of violence suffered during the migration journey.

The young women from Nigeria are followed by 619 Syrian women (9.1% of the total number) - who, unlike the former, arrive mainly through protected channels and in the family, Somali (5.7%), Ivorian (5, 0%), and Cameroonians (3.5%).

If we look at age: the male population accommodated in the SIPROIMI system is mainly composed of young adults between 18 and 25 years of age (56.4%) followed by those belonging to the 26-30 age years (15.9%), the female population welcomed appears younger, being 18-25 years old, whilst it is almost the same weight as minors (the former represent 32.8% of the beneficiaries, while the latter 29.1%).

Before being transformed into SAI, the last words by operators and beneficiaries of SIPROIMI projects tell about their aid activities for the most vulnerable people - especially during the COVID phase. As the mayor of Prato and Anci Delegate for Immigration and Integration Policies, tells: "*Siproimi, with its 800 projects in around 1800 Municipalities, has withstood the wave of Coronavirus pandemic well, especially in the most affected regions*"; he adds: "*We have acted as a barrier, preventing the health emergency from becoming a social emergency as well. Now we hope that we can continue to work in this direction with increasingly simplified paths for the municipalities. We must take responsibility - added the mayor - to implement policies to reduce the too many inequalities and we must continue to work for the management of controlled migration paths, managed with integration paths*".

These words test the will for the migrants' support for local welfare systems: in its two years, it has been an integral part of the wider national welfare system.

However, many other viewpoints mark how SIPROIMI system has not had enough time to improve, not only for reception policies. But above all for the low policies and actions of integration/enhancement of the beneficiaries accepted.

## References

Accorinti M. (2015), *Centri di accoglienza: varietà tipologica e dibattito collegato*, in "La Rivista delle Politiche Sociali", vol. 11, n. 2-3, pp. 179-200.

Allievi S. (2018), *5 cose che tutti dovremmo sapere sull'immigrazione (e una da fare)*, Bari-Roma, Editori Laterza.

Ambrosini M. (2007), *Il mercato del lavoro immigrato*, in M. Regini (a cura di), *La sociologia economica contemporanea*, Roma-Bari, Editori Laterza.

Ambrosini M. (2011), *Immigration in Italy: Between Economic Acceptance and Political Rejection*, in "Journal of International Migration & Integration", vol. 14, n. 1, pp. 1-20.

Amnesty International (2017), *Libya's dark web of collusion: Abuses against Europe-bound refugees and migrants*.

Battaglia R. (2019), *Accoglienza migranti: i quattro fallimenti del decreto sicurezza*, [www.valori.it](http://www.valori.it), 31 July.

Busso S., Gargiulo E. e Mannocchi M. (2013), *Multi Welfare. Le trasformazioni dei welfare territoriali nella società dell'immigrazione*, FIERI Research Report.

Calavita K. (2005), *Immigrants at the Margins. Law, Race and Exclusion in Southern Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Commissione Nazionale per il Diritto d'Asilo (2019) – Ministero dell'Interno, *Riepilogo dati anni 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019*.

Consiglio per la Ricerca in Agricoltura e l'Analisi dell'Economia Agraria, (2019) *Il contributo dei lavoratori stranieri all'agricoltura italiana*". ISTAT, *Elenco dei codici e delle denominazioni delle unità territoriali al 01/01/2018*; on the url: <https://www.istat.it/it/archivio/6789>.

Osservatorio Placido Rizzotto" della FLAI CGIL, (2016) "Agromafie e caporalato. Terzo rapporto",

Ediesse, Roma.

Osservatorio sulle aziende e gli operai agricoli dipendenti, 2009-2018. URL:  
<https://www.inps.it/webidentity/banchedatistatistiche/azagritav1/index01.jsp>.

Perini L., Salvati L, Ceccarelli T, Sorrenti S , Zitti M, (2008), “La Desertificazione in Italia. Processi, indicatori, vulnerabilità del territorio”, Roma ; Bonnanno Ed.

Research Report (2018) *Vittime di tratta e richiedenti/titolari di protezione internazionale* al seguente link:  
<http://www.cittalia.it/index.php/immigrazione/item/5628-no-tratta-cittalia-pubblica-il-rapporto-su-vittime-di-tratta-e-richiedenti-titolari-di-protezione-internazionale>

*Strategia nazionale per le Aree interne: definizione, obiettivi, strumenti e governance*, Materiali UVAL, n. 31 anno 2014; url: <http://www.programmazioneeconomica.gov.it/2019/05/23/strategia-nazionale-delle-aree-interne/>

## 7. Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Malta and Portugal

Mark Causon, Genista Research Foundation Malta  
Ana Onofre, Sonhos de Igual dades

### ***Abstract***

*Entrepreneurship is usually associated with initiative, innovation, the possibility of doing things new and/or in a different way, as well as the ability to take risks. It is assumed, therefore, that entrepreneurial people are ready to act, and entrepreneurship is enhanced when favorable conditions and the necessary support exist.*

*Entrepreneurship is considered one of the main mechanisms promoting the development of the economy, innovation and well-being. As a dynamic process of vision and creation, it identifies new opportunities and new solutions on the part of the entrepreneur, with the objective of meeting people's needs, thus contributing to the progress of the economy.*

*Entrepreneurship is often assumed as a means of labor integration of the immigrant population in the host country. Immigrants undertake above all to avoid unemployment, make the most of their skills and resources, increase income and create jobs, whether in the family or in the community in which they live.*

*Therefore, through our article we shall explore the opportunities, the problems and identify solutions on how through entrepreneurship we can assist in the integration of foreigners in a host country through the analysis of 2 countries namely Portugal and Malta.*

### **Immigrant entrepreneurship**

When politicians, economists and entrepreneurship organizations are working on establishing guidelines and specifications for the setting up of entrepreneurship opportunities, especially when it comes to grants and other forms of assistance, they focus on the pretext that entrepreneurship is focused and usually associated with initiative, innovation, the possibility of doing things new and/or in a different way, as well as the ability to take risks. It is assumed, therefore, that entrepreneurial people are ready to act, and entrepreneurship is enhanced when favorable conditions and the necessary support exist. Entrepreneurship is considered as one of the main mechanisms promoting the development of the economy, innovation and well-being in society and without entrepreneurship a country grinds to an economic slowdown creating various social problems which are derived from economic slowdowns. Entrepreneurship is a dynamic process of vision and creation, it identifies new opportunities and new solutions on the part of the entrepreneur, with the objective of meeting people's needs, thus contributing to the progress of the economy.

In most societies' entrepreneurship is often assumed as a means of labor integration of the immigrant population in the host country mostly as employed workers and, in most cases, support available for the setting up of entrepreneurship opportunities do not take into account the hurdles which prohibit immigrants themselves from being the entrepreneur due to various constraints. It is well established that immigrants undertake many measures to avoid unemployment, make the most of their skills and

resources, increase income and create jobs, whether in the family or in the community in which they live. Hence Immigrant entrepreneurship is an asset, not only for taking advantage of immigrants' resources and skills, but also for the dynamism it creates in the host countries' economy. Consequently, the impact of immigrant entrepreneurship is also evident in the entrepreneurs' countries of origin, fostering trade between countries and the internationalization of companies.

Immigrant entrepreneurship improves the integration of the immigrant population, boosts the host country's economy, creates jobs helping to fight unemployment, and brings new ideas and projects to the host country's business landscape, resulting in more innovation and new opportunities for the host country.

Therefore, we believe that having schemes directly taking into consideration immigrant entrepreneurship needs and their constraints in starting up their own business is an urgent need which will ameliorate the conditions of migrants, upscale their integration into society and give new opportunities which will reduce the burden of economic costs of host countries. Through this article we shall focus on 2 Mediterranean countries host to a large number of immigrants namely Malta and Portugal.

### *Case study Portugal*

In recent years taking into consideration the migration flows

- Portugal immigration statistics for 2015 was **837,257.00**, a **9.76% increase** from 2010.
- Portugal immigration statistics for 2010 was **762,825.00**, a **1.08% decline** from 2005.
- Portugal immigration statistics for 2005 was **771,184.00**, a **18.38% increase** from 2000.
- Portugal immigration statistics for 2000 was **651,472.00**, a **22.27% increase** from 1995.

Data Source: World Bank

MLA Citation: <a href='https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/PRT/portugal/immigration-statistics'>Portugal Immigration Statistics 1960-2021</a>. [www.macrotrends.net](https://www.macrotrends.net)

After years of high emigration numbers 2005 to 2015, it looks as though Portugal is finally seeing an uptick in migrant residents again. For the first time in the country's history, the number of foreigners residing in Portugal has exceeded 500,000. With 580,000 foreign citizens admitted in 2019, up from 490,000 at the end of 2018. These numbers reflect immigrants who are entering through legal channels. It is to be noted that the Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF) issued 135,000 new residence permits – an increase of 100,000 from 2015. But Portugal's foreign population remains relatively low compared to the rest of the European Union; it's one of ten EU countries where foreign residents make up less than 5 percent of the total inhabitants. The largest percentage of immigrants' hail from Brazil, Cape Verde, Romania, and Ukraine. Residents coming from Nepal and France grew the most between 2008 and 2018, with migrants from India, Spain, China, and Britain all nearly doubling within the same period.

### *Incentivizing Expats and Foreigners in Portugal*

Portugal's declining population is not a new phenomenon. There have been three major periods in the nation's history where migration numbers went negative: from 1961 to 1973, when Portugal fought against independence movements in their colonies abroad; from 1982 to 1992; and then again from 2011 to 2016. This most recent set correlates to the financial crisis, when citizens – particularly those who were younger and holders of university degrees – went abroad in a bid to seek employment and better financial opportunities. It is estimated that more than 600,000 Portuguese citizens emigrated from their home country during that time.



Now that Portugal's economy has stabilized, the socialist-led government aims to combat its aging population and low birth rate. Unfortunately, and despite best attempts, officials have yet to determine how to successfully entice their own expats to return home. In July 2019, a 10 million euro programme, called *Regressar*, and was initiated.

The purpose of the Programa Regressar is to support emigrants, as well as their descendants and other relatives, so that they have the best conditions to return to Portugal and make the most of the opportunities that currently exist in our country. The Programa Regressar involves all governmental areas and includes specific measures such as tax benefits for those returning, financial assistance for emigrants or relatives of emigrants who come to work in Portugal and a credit line to support business investment and the creation of new business ventures in Portugal, among others.

In order to ensure the implementation of the Programa Regressar in articulation with the governmental areas responsible for their implementation, communicate it among the Portuguese Diaspora, simplify the procedural steps of the return processes and clarify doubts, a project structure was created referred to as the Ponto de Contacto para o Regresso do Emigrante

<https://www.programaregressar.gov.pt/en/>

After three months and only 71 applicants, however, Portugal's government was forced to rethink the programme's requirements, consequently changing the deadline – but not the financial incentives – for return. Portuguese expats targeted by this campaign were not lured in, and instead seemed to strengthen their resolve in living abroad. Despite a lack of interest in *Regressar*, the government does seem to understand how to make Portuguese residency more attractive to foreigners. The Authorization of Residence for Investment Activity, or golden visa scheme, has attracted 7,960 investors but has also driven up the price of real estate in Lisbon, making it difficult for locals to afford housing and increasing the cost of living overall. Because of this, the government has pivoted the focus of the programme, encouraging investors to capitalize on “low density regions and activities leading to job creation and regeneration of urban areas and cultural heritage”. Income tax breaks for pensioners who live in Portugal for at least 183 days per year are also being provided, leading to potential savings of up to 30,000 euros per year. Meanwhile, workers across a number of professions can apply for a “non-habitual resident” category, where they are able to pay a low flat tax of 20 percent on their earnings.

### ***Portugal Analyses Migrant Processes***

It is unclear if the Portuguese government will be able to handle greater inflows of immigrants.

The government wants to overhaul this office's structure to expedite existing processes, and make bureaucracy more efficient. The Organisation made an announcement about its goals to streamline its offices, stating “Without prejudice to a determined action in combating human trafficking networks or in the prevention of terrorism, we must reconfigure the way in which public services deal with the phenomenon, adopting a more humanistic and less bureaucratic approach, in line with the with the aim of regular and orderly attraction of labor for the performance of functions in different sectors of activity...To this end, the Government will establish a very clear organic separation between the police functions and the administrative functions relating to the authorization and documentation of immigrants”.

The immigrant population demonstrates higher entrepreneurship rates than national citizens. (In Portugal). However, when it comes to being an entrepreneur, there are several obstacles that face those who want to be an entrepreneur, namely: financial burden (41%), economic crisis (31%), unemployment (15%), personal disillusionment/loss of self-esteem (14% ), legal consequences and lawsuits (13%), being forced to take full responsibility (13%), disappointment and loss of family (9%), loss of reputation with friends, colleagues and business partners (6%) , not being given a second chance (6%) and others (4%)

To these fears there are still others for the immigrant population that affect the development of their businesses. The two most mentioned obstacles to immigrant entrepreneurship are the lack of knowledge of the mechanisms necessary for the creation and management of a business and access to finance, but also the difficulties of communication, ignorance of applicable legislation and mistrust on the part of third parties.

### **Case study Malta**

- *Malta immigration statistics for 2015 was 41,442.00, a 25.26% increase from 2010.*
- *Malta immigration statistics for 2010 was 33,084.00, a 34.71% increase from 2005.*
- *Malta immigration statistics for 2005 was 24,560.00, a 14.12% increase from 2000.*
- *Malta immigration statistics for 2000 was 21,521.00, a 21.31% increase from 1995.*

*Data Source: World Bank*

*MLA Citation: <a href='https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/MLT/malta/immigration-statistics'>Malta Immigration Statistics 1960-2021</a>. [www.macrotrends.net](https://www.macrotrends.net)*

Of the total population of 475,701 persons in 2019, 98,918, or 21.0%, are non-Maltese nationals. Most of the foreign community in Malta, predominantly active or retired British nationals and their dependents. However, Malta immigration in 2021 according to latest statistics in Malta there are 31,513 EU nationals employed in Malta and 38,406 third country nationals working in Malta that is 14% of the population, while foreigners account to 98,918 (21%). Taking into consideration the Maltese population with around 8,000 refugees.

Self-employment rates have been relatively constant over the past decade in Malta. However, the proportion of youth involved in self-employment has been on a decline. The lowest rate in the past decade was recorded in 2017 with only 2.1% of working youth being self-employed, down from 5.4% in 2012. Conversely, the proportion of self-employed women was at its highest in the past decade with 7.6% of working women in 2017, up from 6.0% in 2012. This increase in women's self-employment has decreased the gender gap in entrepreneurship, and although men were still more than twice as likely to be self-employed as women in 2017. The availability of entrepreneurship support initiatives has been increasing in recent years, largely due to the number of new youth entrepreneurship support initiatives that were launched as part of the National Youth Policy: Towards 2020 – including an increased availability of entrepreneurship education – and several family-friendly measures aimed at encouraging more women to join the labor market. There is room to strengthen inclusive entrepreneurship support in policy, particularly targeting groups such as older people, the unemployed, and people with disabilities and migrants. The government in Malta has put many incentives into play, in order to attract talent and foreign companies to the island. This includes a range of tax incentives, the company formation Malta process and general costs involved. The process of opening a company in Malta is usually straightforward, but there are many steps involved. Due to this, it is usually recommended to speak to a professional to register a company. Furthermore, they can guide you with finding the best tax model for your business. Some other benefits of doing business in Malta include a low share capital required when establishing a new company, low social securities, no language barriers, ease of business travel and sane income taxes. That being said, the largest benefit for foreign companies are the tax benefits. In some cases, businesses can benefit from an effective tax rate as low as 5%.

### ***Policy available***

Therefore, Inclusive entrepreneurship policies aim to offer all people an equal opportunity to create a sustainable business, whatever their social group. This is an important requirement for achieving the goal of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth set out in the Europe 2020 strategy. It is also a means to respond to new economic challenges, to create jobs and to fight social and financial exclusion. Among the key targets of inclusive entrepreneurship policies and programmes are women, youth, older people, the unemployed, migrants and people with disabilities, who all continue to face challenges in the labor market and are under-represented or disadvantaged in entrepreneurship activities. ‘The Missing Entrepreneurs’ series of publications of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union discuss how public policies and programmes can support inclusive entrepreneurship. This includes refining regulatory and welfare institutions, facilitating access to finance, building entrepreneurship skills through training, coaching and mentoring, strengthening entrepreneurial culture and networks for target groups, and putting strategies and actions together for inclusive entrepreneurship in a co-ordinated and targeted way. Governments are increasingly recognizing the challenge of inclusive entrepreneurship, but there is still much to do to spread good practice.

### ***Conclusions***

As a conclusion note we highlight the fact that Governments must implement measures to encourage immigrant entrepreneurship, enabling them to create and manage their business, creating useful tools that are easily accessible to potential immigrant entrepreneurs.

Most businesses implemented by immigrant communities start out as small businesses, primarily with the aim of creating their own jobs. This premise immediately raises the question of how is it possible to compete with large companies already implemented in the market. We know that unfortunately 80% of small businesses end up closing in the first four years.

Therefore, it is necessary to create strategies to increase the probability of success and reduce risk, a factor undoubtedly associated with entrepreneurship.

In measures to increase the probability of success we must optimize competitive advantages.

So, you have to take advantage of a small business. Any small business should look for a competitive advantage that distinguishes itself from competitors, namely cost and specialization. Targeting the business to a market niche can be a great competitive advantage, thus increasing the probability of success in the business. Another good practice is experimentation. Unfortunately, there is no sure barometer about the viability of the business or not, so investment risks have to be reduced. It often happens that the entrepreneur confuses his personal taste for the business (service or product) with its acceptance in the market. Thus, one way to evaluate this product or service is to experiment with customers/potential customers in order to have a perception of the potential customer's reaction and reduce the investment risk. Another important aspect is to distinguish a good idea from the ability to implement the business. For the business to be viable and successful, entrepreneurial skills and management knowledge are crucial. Another fundamental aspect is that the entrepreneur has a set of external resources essential for the execution of his project, so he must invest in cooperation as an important instrument for the viability of his business.

To summarize for effective migrant entrepreneurship, we need to address the following:

- Launch of schemes to address the migrant community through the setting up of an incubation centre
- Offering free advice on business operations
- Assist in the formulation of a business plan
- Provide adequate business training

- Monitor start-ups through mentoring
- Provide soft small grants to enable to start-up to be initiated
- Provide accountancy services which will be monitoring the cash flow and operations

## **Bibliography**

### **Articles on web**

*Data Source: World Bank*

*MLA Citation:* <a href='https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/PRT/portugal/immigration-statistics'>Portugal Immigration Statistics 1960-2021</a>. [www.macrotrends.net](https://www.macrotrends.net)

*Data Source: World Bank*

*MLA Citation:* <a href='https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/MLT/malta/immigration-statistics'>Malta Imm

## 8. Migrant Labor and Agri-Food-Environmental Transformations in Southern Italy

Alessandra Corrado, Università della Calabria

--Draft article--

### *Abstract*

*Migrant workers are essential to the functioning and transformation of agri-food systems. However, their rights are often denied due to the regulation of migration and asylum and the organization of production relations in agribusiness. The Covid-19 pandemic has made this paradox evident. The article presents an analysis of the role of migration in relation to the restructuring of agri-food systems, which builds on a critical understanding of environmental migration and empirical work from the perspectives of social-ecology and political ecology. We argue that social relations, regulatory processes and forms of agency contribute to the definition of "migration environments". Agri-food restructuring offers the opportunity to appreciate the dynamics of interaction between migration, environment and the contexts of socio-productive relations. Data were collected through an ongoing research in three regions of Southern Italy, Apulia, Calabria and Sicily, where case studies were selected and interviews with different actors were conducted. In Italy, migrant workers represent one third of the workforce in the agri-food system, but their number and contribution is underestimated by statistics, due to irregular employment and unregistered work. Migrant workers experience particularly vulnerable conditions in Southern Italy, due to the characteristics of the production system and local socio-economic relations. In order to improve the conditions of migrant workers, several sustainable and ethical agri-food projects have been promoted. The projects involve different actors, have different organization and specific objectives and motivations.*

### **Introduction**

In the last decade, especially, in the context of the climate crisis, policy interest has been particularly focused on the impact of environmental and climate change on migration. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development promoted by the United Nations (2015) confirmed this focus, making migration a central theme that cuts across the objectives identified. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), on the other hand, has also highlighted the impact of migration and refugee movements on the environment and the active (and not passive) role that migration can have in mitigating and combating climate and environmental change, and for sustainable development (Laczko, Aghazarm 2009). In fact, the relationship between migration and environmental change has been studied for a longer time and the extensive scientific literature proves it. Moreover, the focus on climate change alone risks obscuring the other dramatic dynamics of change that affect the environment and are also related to changes in livelihood strategies, population movements and migration over the past 20-30 years. These changes are the product of neo-liberal development policies, but paradoxically also of regulation from the perspective of environmental protection and the fight against climate change, promoted by international organizations. The conceptualization of the figure of the environmental migrant or refugee as a standard element of climate change discourse, even as a field of geopolitical security as a 'threat', based on the thesis that climate change-induced migration can result in the outbreak of conflicts where resources are scarce. The environmental

climate migrant, from a humanitarian perspective, is then configured as a 'victim' or 'vulnerable' to climate change, but in this debate he or she is not only given protection but also the agency to adapt to change. Discourses about the climate change migrant as threat or victim tend to be racialized, even considering the geographical focus (Baldwin 2013).

The analysis of migration and environment (and climate change) relationships and the same conceptualization of environmental (and climate change) migration or refugee lack an historical and critical perspective able to consider the interplay of different dynamics, the role of politics and different actors, in relation to environmental resources.

This article presents an analysis of the role of migration in relation to the restructuring of agri-food systems, which builds on a critical understanding of environmental migration and empirical work from the perspectives of social-ecology and political ecology. We argue that social relations, regulatory processes and forms of agency contribute to the definition of "migration environments". Agri-food restructuring offers the opportunity to appreciate the dynamics of interaction between migration, environment (and agri-food as part of it) and the contexts of socio-productive relations.

Migrant workers are essential to the functioning and transformation of agri-food systems. However, their rights are often denied due to the regulation of migration and asylum and the organization of power relations in agri-business. The Covid-19 pandemic has made this paradox even more evident (Palumbo and Corrado 2020; Pedreño 2020).

Migrant workers experience particularly vulnerable conditions in Southern Italy (especially highlighted during the pandemic), due to a structural vulnerability, emerging from the political, economic, social and environmental conditions and institutions, at local as well as at national and supranational level, such as the agricultural labour market, migration and asylum policies and the and the National Health System, and to a systemic vulnerability, related to the interconnections between territorial elements suffering damage with other elements and systems (Tagliacozzo et al. 2020).

Data were collected through an empirical research, in 2020-2021 in three regions of Southern Italy, Apulia, Calabria and Sicily, where case studies were selected, and direct observation and 20 interviews with different actors were conducted. In Italy, migrant workers represent one third of the workforce in the agri-food system, but their number and contribution is underestimated by statistics, due to irregular employment and unregistered work.

In order to improve the conditions of migrant workers, in the framework of the corporate-environmental food regime (Friedmann 2005; McMichael 2010), several sustainable and ethical agri-food projects have been promoted. These projects involve different actors, have different organization and specific objectives and motivations.

The article is organized in three parts. The first part deals with the analysis of the relationship between migration, mobility and the environment. The second part analyses migration in relation to agri-food transformations. In the third part, reference is made to a number of case studies: these are projects and initiatives of sustainable and ethical agri-food chains, promoted to guarantee respect for workers' rights together with agri-food quality. In the conclusions we will discuss the elements emerged from the case studies analysis.

### **Migration, mobilities and environmental changes**

In a social-ecological perspective, posing in dialogue social ecology and political ecology, we can understand the interdependencies between environment and migration, developing during the history and in relation to transformations. In fact, throughout history, since the capitalist Modernity, migrations have been intertwined to the geo-cultural formation and ordering of social classes or social

groups in relation to gender, race and the appropriation and use of natural resources, through the organization of mobility regimes, by States and Empires in the world-economy, according to productive and social needs (Arrighi and Silver 1999; Sassen 1999; Wallerstein 1974).

Capitalism is an ecological project, that means a world-ecology, constantly producing nature (as human and non-human nature) at the service of accumulation. Capitalism is historically founded on mobility, since the search for cheap goods, that are labour, food, nature, energy, and new frontiers of production (for their valorization) are part of its essence (Moore, Patel 2017).

The global mobility of populations determined by border movements and the management of spatial human mobility allows us to understand the drivers of human migrations and their valorization as (cheap) labour, as part of the socio-ecological relations reproduced by the world-ecology (Moore; Molinero, Avallone, 2016, 2020).

Migrants are not vulnerable per se, but are dispossessed of their means of reproduction/production and expelled from their habitats, by private or public-private initiatives, investments and speculations (Sassen 2014, 2016), and then produced as weakened labour through state and international laws and policies, controlling and selecting to the possibilities of mobility and legal entry into States.

Both migration and environment are also co-produced in the context of socio-economic transformations in the neoliberal globalization of the *environmental-corporate food regime*, in which the systems of agri-food production, distribution and consumption are globally dominated by transnational corporations and framed by the progressive incorporation of environmental sustainability and food quality into business strategies and political agendas of the global agri-food governance, following a growing social mobilisation and rural resistance practices against the homologating and polluting effects of the industrial agriculture model (McMichael 2012; Friedmann, 2005).

In the context of neoliberal restructuring, land grabbing at the convergence of three interrelated global crises – energy-food-financial crises – has been produced (especially in the Global south) as a combination of processes which frequently include financial speculation and private equity investment, rising energy prices, food insecurity, conversion of lands for renewable biofuels production, land deals in the name of food and energy security (Borras, Franco, 2012; Scoones et al. 2013).

However green grabbing and extractivism are produced by the process of spatial fix and new enclosure formation as well as by regulation of global public goods, such as food safety, proper working conditions and environmental and land use sustainability, also involving corporations and private actors as key governance actors within the supply chains. Transnational corporations have developed and implemented private business-to-business (B2B) standards such as GlobalGAP in order to exert a large degree of governance power over global agricultural supply chains. Agrifood process standards are voluntary in theory, but de facto mandatory given monopsonist retailer control over access to international markets. Private standards are a causal mechanism that indirectly facilitates the enclosure of land and the dispossession of small and medium scale farmers within value chains (Murhead 2020).

Migration is part of a process of co-production with (agrifood-)environment at origin as well at arrival.

Public and private standards as well as different forms of regulations on sustainability and food quality also are applied to (migrant) working conditions in the agri-food system, so contributing to the definition of migration environments, that is to the forms of migrant labourers' socio-economic inclusion and reproduction.

## **Migrant labour in agri-food restructuring**

Since the end of the 1980s, the contraction of family labour has been matched by an increase in non-family labour in agriculture, but also by an 'anthropological revolution' due to the growing role of the foreign labourers. Migrant labor in agriculture and more generally within the food system has grown in Italy, as well as in other countries in the south (Corrado et al. 2016) but also in the centre-north of Europe (Rye, Scott, 2018; Palumbo, Corrado 2020) and globally (Molinero Gerbeau 2020), in parallel with a more general transformation of the agrifood system. The growth in the importance of foreign labor has entailed processes of differentiation and segmentation of agricultural labor, which should be analyzed in relation, on the one hand, to the reorganization of production and the labor market and, on the other hand, to the policies regulating migration and labor mobility in the European Union, under the banner of flexibility, selection and outsourcing.

In 2011, the share of foreign labor in the agricultural sector in the EU as a whole amounted to more than 4% of the total work performed in this sector: 1.6% were workers from other EU Member States and 2.7% were workers from non-EU countries. Since 2011, both intra-EU and non-EU migrant agricultural workers have increased rapidly. Meanwhile, in EU countries, between 2011 and 2017, more than 1.3 million agricultural workers left the sector in their home countries; almost all of them did so to migrate to other Member States. This exit from the sector was partially offset by the entry of migrant workers, both from within and outside the EU: the number of intra-EU migrants working in the EU agricultural sector increased over the same period by 26% and the number of non-EU agricultural workers by 31% (totalling 585,000 and 837,000 workers, respectively). In most Member States the share of migrant labor in agriculture is lower than in other sectors, with the exception of Spain, Italy and Denmark (Natale et al. 2019).

Migrants employed as wage workers in Italian agriculture have progressively come to represent, in official statistics, more than one third of the total number of employees (CREA 2019). At the national level, as in other contexts (e.g., Spain), there has been a fragmentation or ethno-stratification of work, with diverse national groups prevailing in some tasks or production segments, replaced by others over time (Caruso, Corrado 2015; Pedreño 2005).

Despite a progressive process of emersion during the 2010s, estimates of undeclared work or of grey work, i.e., work that is contracted but characterized by diversified forms of irregularity (concerning low wages, long hours, unpaid social security contributions), remain high, especially in the southern regions. This component of the workforce suffers from exploitation and abuse, which are linked to the particular condition as migrants, influenced by factors of mobility, recruitment, dependency and blackmail, especially due to the link between residence permit and employment contract, for third-country nationals.

Many migrant workers often experience precarious living conditions in informal camps, also known as rural ghettos, which are overcrowded, without sanitation, electricity, drinking water or heating in the winter months. These ghettos are isolated and far from population centres, with no public transport services. They are functional for the recruitment of labor by irregular gangmasters (caporali) and the flexible operation of production processes that benefit from the proximity and availability of a cheap labor force, according to what is defined as a dormitory labor regime (Brovia, Piro; Lo Cascio, Piro 207; Sanò 2018).

The restructuring of value chains in the context of neoliberal globalization - in the environmental-corporate food regime - has taken place, on the one hand, by confronting the growing demand for environmental and social sustainability from social movements and consumers, and, on the other, by leveraging the definition of a private type of regulation, based on voluntary certification systems, standards and codes of conduct. The 'supermarket revolution', i.e., the process of concentrating power in large retail groups, has benefited from these dynamics. However, alongside businesses and



corporations, civil society groups, social movements, non-governmental organizations and trade unions have also taken on a growing role in defining alternative models of private (i.e., non-public) governance within the agri-food system in relation to environmental and/or social sustainability. This process has translated the 'constraints' arising from the demand for sustainability by social movements and consumers into both profit 'opportunities' and competitiveness levers for companies and emancipative grassroots initiatives (McMichael, Friedmann 2007).

In 2017, at the level of the European Union - together with the United States and China, one of the three largest markets in the world - the ten largest food chains (four German, four French and two British) accounted for almost 50% of food retail sales. In some European countries, however, market concentration is even higher. Discounters in particular are expanding rapidly, through aggressive marketing and their own product lines. International purchasing centres exercise oligopolistic power in the market, imposing prices and purchasing conditions on farmers, producing an unfair distribution of risks, costs and profits along supply chains, including through unfair practices. (Heinrich Böll Foundation et al. 2017).

This dominance in retail sales gives supermarkets enormous power to shape agri-food production and regulate trade globally, setting and enforcing quality standards for tens of thousands of products grown and processed within geographically fragmented, stratified and highly specialized supply chains. This business model determines low prices, diversified products throughout the year, a just-in-time, efficient and effective order and stock management policy (Burch, Lawrence, 2005), i.e., customized and responsive to demand, to reduce waste or surplus, through a complex and computerized logistics, to satisfy consumer tastes. But all this is done by putting constant pressure on suppliers, who are forced to contain costs and bear most of the risks associated with agricultural production.

In Italy, too, supermarket chains have gradually established themselves as the main distribution channel. Although there is less concentration in the large-scale retail sector than in other European countries, the pressure exerted by the central purchasing bodies of the large supermarket chains on agricultural producers, who are on average smaller in Italy than, for example, in northern European countries, should not be ignored.

Since the 1970s, and then more strongly since the 1990s, farmers' movements and alternative agri-food networks have responded to the transformations described above. They have contributed to building new practices and forms of socio-technical innovation around consumption and agri-food production. They have also given a new visibility to actors, the peasants, who were all too soon condemned to disappearance, and have elaborated a radical agro-ecological political proposal, food sovereignty, to subvert the neo-liberal order at the global level.


Large agribusinesses have responded to these movements by trying to "make these demands their own" within the neoliberal transformation dynamics and the logic of capital accumulation. Thus, words such as "sustainability" and "quality" have progressively been translated into standards to make production and economic exploitation compatible with the preservation of environmental resources and human health, while at the same time becoming instruments of competition on the international market, of commodification or patrimonialisation of the rural space.

Over time private and public regulations to guarantee the quality and healthiness of foodstuffs and of processing and marketing processes have become a mechanism for selecting and excluding many small businesses, which are unable to adapt to the standards imposed in order to access markets.

Italy is the leading country in Europe in terms of the number of certified quality products; is also one of the world's leading organic farmers in terms of product exports, cultivated areas, workforce and the number of people employed. However, at the same time, Italy is experiencing, on the one hand,

the progressive conventionalization and incorporation of organic and 'quality' agriculture within the value chains and competitive market dynamics, and, on the other hand, increasingly evident overlaps of this 'post-productive' agriculture with the dominant intensive and industrial model. The rhetorical construction of 'Made in Italy' as a synonym of quality, i.e., of healthiness, craftsmanship and tradition, identity of places, and its definition as a distinctive feature of Italian agriculture, therefore contrasts with the real dynamics of exploitation, both of farmers and employees, and of expropriation of value (Corrado et al. 2018).

Private and public regulations to guarantee the quality and sustainability of agri-food have progressively been applied to migrant labor conditions too, also contributing to the development of nested markets differentiated. The Italian case is very emblematic of these processes.




Source: Molinero 2020.

Table 1: Agricultural labour force in Italy

Year	Total of agricultural labour force (ISTAT)	ISTAT		CREA	
		Migrant agricultural labour force	% of total labour force in agriculture	Migrant agricultural labour force	% of total labour force in agriculture
1991	1,614,000	–	–	5,634	0,30%
1996	1,402,000	–	–	62,083	4%
2008	895,000	53,700	6,00%	174,000	19%
2011	850,430	103,192	12,10%	281,577	33%
2015	842,840	132,754	15,75%	405,673	48%
2016	884,000	146,924	16,60%	146,924*	16,60%*

\*ISTAT data. Source: Corrado et al. 2018



Source: Corrado et al. 2018

### **Institutional interventions against exploitation of migrant workers in agriculture**

In Italy, the institutional response to the exploitation of migrant workers in agriculture has been characterized by a repressive approach, focusing in particular on prosecuting *caporali*, irregular gangmasters who are seen as the main actors responsible for exploitation in agriculture. Notably, in 2011, Article 603bis of the Criminal Code introduced the crime of “unlawful gang-mastering and labour exploitation”. However, this provision proved to be difficult to implement.

In 2016 Law No. 199 on combating undeclared work and labour exploitation in agriculture is to some extent an important step forward. This law amended Article 603bis of the Criminal Code, targeting both abusive gang-masters and employers who take advantage of workers’ neediness and insecurity. The amendment also provided for mandatory arrest in flagrante delicto and mandatory confiscation of proceeds and property, and introduced corporate criminal liability.

Law 199/2016 also established that victims of labour exploitation can have access to Article 18 of Consolidated Act on immigration (Legislative Decree No. 286/98), which provides victims of violence or severe exploitation with a long-term programme of assistance and social integration, as well as (in the case of non-EU migrants) with a residence permit for social protection, regardless of their cooperation with the competent authorities (through the so-called “social track”). However, Article 18 has often been implemented inadequately.

Law 199/2016 on combating labour exploitation also amended the regulation concerning the Network of Quality Agricultural Work (*Rete del Lavoro agricolo di Qualità*), which was established by Legislative Decree No. 91/2014 in order to register companies that respect fair labour and employment conditions in the agricultural sector. Law 199/2016 provides for the network’s articulation into ‘territorial sections’ (local branches) aimed at developing active labour market policies and promoting actions to address labour intermediation. However, the development of these territorial sections has been slow due to the low level of cooperation among the institutional bodies involved and from the businesses. Despite the new attention paid to labour exploitation, in recent years the number of inspections in the agricultural sector has dropped (Corrado et al. 2018).

At the local level, the spotlight on exploitation has resulted mainly in the implementation of emergency humanitarian policies rather than in the development of structural policies concerning such issues as recruitment, transportation, and housing.

At the national level an Operational table for the definition of a new strategy to fight against illegal gang mastering (*caporalato*) and labour exploitation in agriculture (*Tavolo caporalato*) has been promoted. It is chaired by the Minister of Labour and Social Policies, and brings together all the institutional bodies involved at national and territorial level, the social partners and the main non-profit organisations. It 2020 released a three-year plan to combat labour exploitation in agriculture and illegal gang mastering (*caporalato*) (2020-2022).

In the wake of the Covid-19 crisis, in May 2020 as part of the so-called Relaunch Decree for a post-pandemic economic recovery (Law-Decree n. 34/2020 converted in Law n. 77/2020), a scheme aimed at facilitating the emergence of irregular employment relationships, involving both foreign workers and Italian citizens, and applying only to the agri-food, care, and domestic work sectors, was adopted (Article 103). It established a regularization of undocumented migrants (the ninth since 1986) for addressing labor shortages (as in agrifood) and health emergency.

In particular, the scheme established two application channels (with a deadline of 15 August 2020).

	Applicants	Type of residence permit
First channel	Employers can apply to conclude a fixed-term employment contract for foreign nationals or declare the existence of an irregular employment relationship with Italian citizens or foreign nationals present in Italy before 8 March 2020, and not having left the country since that date.	Residence permit for work reasons.
Second channel	Foreign citizens with a residence permit that expired since 31 October 2019, and able to prove they worked in one of the eligible sectors before that date and who had been present in Italy since before 8 March 2020, can apply.	A six-month temporary permit to look for a job in the eligible sectors, that can be converted into a residence permit for work reasons.

Since the beginning it has been clear that significant inadequacies would affect the regularization scheme’s impact, resulting in a limited number of regularized migrants, especially migrant farmworkers.

Indeed, in line with previous schemes, the first channel of the plan mainly relied on an employer-driven approach, providing a limited space of action for the workers. The limits of this approach are particularly evident for cases characterizing the agri-food sector, where irregular recruitment is connected to the exploitation of workers in a situation of vulnerability.

With regard to the second channel, a temporary residence permit to look for work is a relative novelty for the Italian legal system which, since 2002, has closely linked residence permits to the existence of a labor contract and channeled foreign workers into an inadequate entry mechanism. However, prerequisites for this second path significantly limited its scope, leaving out numerous migrants in situations of irregularity and precariousness.

Lastly, by applying only to the agri-food and domestic/care sectors, the plan overlooked sectors such as logistics, construction, tourism, and food services, all of which have high rates of undeclared work, including by migrants in irregular and exploitative conditions. This decision clearly highlighted the utilitarian and emergency logic behind this regularization.

According to official data, there have been 220,528 applications for both channels of regularization (Mistry of Interior 2020), which is only a fraction of the 690,000 estimated undocumented migrants that live in Italy (ISMU 2020).

	Applications		
	Applications by sector	% Of the total	
<b>First channel</b>		207,542	
	Agri-food sector	30.694	15%
	Domestic and care work sector	176.848	85%
<b>Second channel</b>	12,986	Predominantly in agri-food sector	-

It is likely that a significant proportion of agri-food seasonal workers were not able to take advantage of regularization due to the extreme temporary nature of their employment status. Interestingly, 64% of applications in domestic and care work concern male foreign nationals. Given the high percentage of women in this sector, the latter datum suggests that there have been abusive practices such as sale

of “false” contracts to allow people to access regularization, against payment of sums of up to 4,000 euros.

The inadequacies of this regularization programme have been further exacerbated by severe delays and bureaucratic obstacles in the processing of the applications. Indeed, in May 2021 only 12.7% of the applications were examined. This, in turn, has resulted in the issuing of only 5% of residence permits: with regard to the first channel, at the end of 2020, only 1,480 residence permits had been issued (0.71% of the total), while in the case of the second path, 8,887 residence permits had been issued (68% of the total).

Although migrant workers are allowed to work while waiting for the processing of their applications, this condition of uncertainty leaves them in a limbo that increases their situation of vulnerability. Moreover, such conditions of uncertainty may affect migrants’ access to vaccination plans. Indeed, access to healthcare is often problematic for migrants, especially for those who are in a condition of irregularity (Corrado, Palumbo 2021).

In order to avoid frustrating efforts for this regularization, it has been necessary to increase the number of staff in charge of processing applications.

In 2020-2021 the program Su.Pr.Eme (Sud Protagonista nel superamento delle Emergenze in ambito di grave sfruttamento e di gravi marginalità degli stranieri regolarmente presenti nelle cinque regioni *meno sviluppate* - The South as a protagonist in overcoming emergencies of serious exploitation and marginalization of foreigners regularly present in the five least developed regions) has been developed by the Minister of Labour and Social Policies under the AMIF-Emergency Fund of the European Commission. In a few rural areas of Southern Italy regions (Calabria, Puglia, Basilicata, Campania, Sicilia), it has provided migrant workers in informal settlements with water, food, health and legal assistance through outreaching services, and temporary housing in container camps. However, these interventions rely, once again, on an emergency-based approach that overlooks the interplay of factors producing migrant workers’ situations of vulnerability, and the dynamics of their ghettoisation and exploitation.

The Ispettorato Nazionale del Lavoro – INL (National Labour Inspectorate) and IOM are partners in the programme. IOM has gained experience on the issues of trafficking and labour exploitation of migrants. IOM is a partner of International Recruitment Integrity System - IRIS, an international consortium of state and private stakeholders aimed at combating illegal recruitment practices and exploitation of foreign workers. In Italy, it supported the development of an ethical tobacco supply chain in the southern province of Caserta, in collaboration with the Philip Morris International in Italy and local stakeholders, including the NGO Ex Canapificio in Caserta and Caritas Benevento (Terra Munda project).

The collaboration between IOM and INL is carried out within the framework of the SUPREME and ALT Caporalato!

In particular, INL and IOM have signed a cooperation protocol that promotes: 1) joint interventions of INL inspection staff and qualified and highly specialised cultural mediators for the examination of crimes of labour exploitation and related crimes of trafficking for the purpose of labour exploitation, reduction and maintenance in slavery and forced labour; 2) the development of common operational procedures to guarantee better operativeness and effectiveness to the mechanism of protection and referral of victims of labour exploitation; 3) mutual training and updating of labour inspectors and cultural mediators; 4) the exchange of information on activities and good practices developed at national and international level; 5) the promotion of joint communication campaigns to inform migrant workers on the rights and duties deriving from the employment relationship and on the

mechanisms to protect the victims of exploitation and to raise the awareness of all the actors of the labour market and, in general, of civil society on the issue of labour exploitation.

Migrant workers are supported to access the assistance and integration programme (art. 18 Consolidated Immigration Act) or to obtain a residence permit for victims of labour exploitation (art. 22, co. 12 quater Consolidated Immigration Act).

Another connected institutional project, P.I.U.Su.Pr.Eme (*Percorsi Individualizzati di Uscita dallo Sfruttamento* - Individualised Exit Pathways from Exploitation) developed by the Minister of Labour and Social Policies and funded by the European social Fund, aims at promoting fair recruitment, employment and living conditions for migrant workers and supporting paths of social and labour inclusion and autonomy.

While this constitutes a significant step forward, it is also essential to address the imbalance of power in agrifood chains (for example, finalizing the transposition of EU Directive 633/2019 on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships into national legislation), and to profoundly change current migration and asylum policies (for instance, creating legal and safe entry routes and removing the link between the residence permit and the labour contract).

Furthermore, it is necessary to face administrative practices preventing migrants' access to rights. For example, one of the main obstacles for migrant workers living in informal settlements in accessing rights - such as applying for the renewal of their residence permit or a residence permit for work purposes - is the difficulty in enrolling at municipal registry offices, because they cannot prove that they live in the informal settlements.

## Case studies

Several projects and initiatives to combat the exploitation of migrant workers in agriculture and to promote socially, economically and environmentally sustainable agri-food systems have been promoted by or have seen the involvement of different private and no profit actors, especially in southern Italian regions.

These experiences have different characteristics, by virtue of the actors involved, the logic and models of production, the reference markets, the use of public policies and the collaborative partnerships built.

Some of these processes emerge from below, starting with the mobilisations involving migrant workers against the system of exploitation and through the innovative initiative of cooperation between different actors: small producers and processors, consumers and activists, together with migrant and indigenous workers.

In January 2010 violent clashes between African orange pickers and local inhabitants occurred in Rosarno, the main agro-town of the Plain of Gioia Tauro (Reggio Calabria), in Calabria. The clashes represented a tangible manifestation of the social tensions generated by the convergence of the broader economic crisis of that period with the longer-term crisis of local agriculture. The plain of Rosarno-Gioia Tauro - specialized in the production of clementines, oranges and other citrus fruits - has since the 1990s attracted growing numbers of migrant farm workers and progressively emerged as a key leg in the seasonal migratory circuit undertaken by African migrant farm workers across Italian agricultural areas to follow the harvests. Over time, migrants from Eastern European countries have generally taken up more qualified jobs in the citrus fruit sector (e.g. in the warehouses and processing plants). In contrast, the bulk of the seasonal workforce employed as "just-in-time" labourers in the harvest phase continues to be provided by African workers. Interestingly, over recent years, the area has witnessed a growing "refugeeization" of the African component of the migrant

agricultural workforce – i.e., an increase in the numbers of asylum seekers and refugees within this segment of the workforce (Corrado, D’Agostino 2018; Dines, Rigo 2015).

At dawn on 30 July 2011, around forty labourers - mostly of Tunisian nationality, one of the most numerous in the area along with Sudanese and Ghanaians - who had been asked to harvest a smaller and more complex tomato, playing down the piecework wage, refused to work and returned to the Masseria Boncuri tent city to organise what is still known today as the largest and longest-lasting strike of migrant labourers in southern Italy. The work by the Finis Terrae Cooperative and other organisations operating in the reception camp settled for the seasonal workers, such as the Brigade di Solidarietà Attiva (Active Solidarity Brigades), supported an osmosis among the workers who, after various assemblies and calls to gather groups of compatriots, organised the first pickets and roadblocks, attracting the attention of the national media, and undermining part of the regional tomato supply chain.

Through the Nardò strike and the series of mobilisations that ensued, a legislative process was set in motion, leading first to the approval by the government of Decree-Law No. 138 of 13 August 2011 converted in Law No. 148 /2011, which made the *corporalato* (irregular gang mastering) a criminal offence and no longer a mere administrative offence. This provision was amended and improved years later with Law No. 199/2016, which extended criminal prosecution also against employers who violate workers' rights and take advantage of their state of need, even if they do not use (irregular gangmasters (*corporali*) to recruit labour. However, these results did not change much the situation in Nardò from a labour and contractualisation point of view, where the numbers of seasonal workers continued to increase.

These mobilisations, but also the numerous tragic events (murders, deaths from car accidents during transport to the camps in overcrowded vehicles, from investments while cycling on poorly lit roads, from fires in rural ghettos, from exploitative working conditions, e.g. during hot summer hours), cases of sexual violence against female migrant workers, of enslavement, have gradually attracted the attention of the international media, human rights organisations, as well as trade unions and critical consumers.

Large-scale retailers based in the United Kingdom and Norway raised and financed the intervention of Ethical Trade Initiative (ETI) in Apulia, and especially in Foggia, following press enquiries on the exploitation of migrant labour in the processing of tomatoes for foreign distribution through private labels and the concerns of sensitive consumers (IEH et al. 2015). Around 60% of the industrial tomatoes of all central and southern Italy are grown near Foggia.

Multi-stakeholder standards are the result of a negotiation process between companies and civil society organisations and sometimes the state. Promoted with the support of the UK government and the involvement of trade unions, businesses and non-governmental organisations, ETI addresses the conditions of poverty and vulnerability of workers and producers of internationally traded consumer goods. Eti's 'Base Code and Principles of Implementation' is based on the labour standards of the International Labour Organization.

Starting in 2013, meetings were organised with trade unions, regional and national institutions, and producers' organizations (IEH, Eti, 2013). The British government and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) were also involved.

In this report we analyze the cases of SOS Rosarno, Sfruttazero, No CAP, and the supply chain agreement between Coldiretti and Princes Industria Alimentare (PIA)



### *SOS Rosarno*

SOS Rosarno, was launched in the Plain of Gioia Tauro, in Calabria, in 2011, following the initiative of two activist associations, Africalabria and Equosud, one year after the African workers' revolt. The aim of the initiative - turned into an association formally constituted by producers, activists and workers - is to counter the exploitation of agricultural workers and small producers in the orange production chain. SOS Rosarno has thus promoted an alternative supply chain of organic oranges produced by small farmers, harvested by regularly employed migrant workers, and distributed through the GAS (Solidarity Purchasing Groups), that are food chains alternative to supermarkets.

At its outset, SOS Rosarno essentially revolved around an alternative organization of citrus fruit production aimed at enabling farmers to receive a fairer income from the sale of their products and workers to enjoy regular employment, a wage in line with the levels stipulated by the local labour contract, and fairer working conditions than those normally experienced in local agriculture. To be able to achieve its objectives, its promoters engaged in setting up an alternative food network – independent from mainstream retailer-driven chains – based on the establishment of direct links between the producers involved in the project and the burgeoning world of GASs and critical consumers active in numerous Italian Centre-North urban centres.

SOS Rosarno began with the involvement of four small- and micro-scale citrus fruit growers, some of which were members of a local organic farmers' cooperative (*I Frutti del Sole*), and four African farm workers. A group of four Italian activists started to act as coordinators of the project on a voluntary basis, engaging in the work of weaving the social networks that would support the farming project. In its second year of experimentation, the project was expanded to involve three other small-scale producers and employed six workers, of which only four had a higher degree of continuity. Over time, the progressive growth of the association's alternative agri-food network has enabled the expansion of the farming project, for the production of a larger array of products (i.e., olive oil, and citrus fruit-based jams and juices). Despite annual variations, in 2019 the project involved around fifteen micro-, small- and medium-scale land owners or producers and generates work for six to seven workers per year, to whom it has guaranteed growing levels of employment continuity during the citrus fruit harvesting season.

In a major development of the project, in late December 2015, a group of core members of the association – including, among others, the four local activists previously acting as the project's coordinators and the six African members of the association – set up the social cooperative *Mani e Terra* (Hands and Land). The latter has in the following years gradually taken over the management of the original agricultural project. Importantly, in 2016, the cooperative also rented out a five hectare-plot of land to undertake its own project of collective agro-ecological farming with the stated twin objectives of generating employment outside the season of citrus fruit production – so ensuring employment all year round – and promoting a sustainable diversification of local agriculture to move in the direction of re-building local food sovereignty by cultivating vegetables and also wheat with traditional varieties for pasta production. What is more, in 2018, the cooperative, in partnership with a local network of social cooperatives (Macramé), engaged in setting up a biodiversity park for educational purposes on a plot of land confiscated from the local mafia.

From an economic point of view, while the cooperative experienced initial difficulties that led some of its original promoters to leave, through the continuous expansion of its activities it has over time managed to guarantee growing levels of employment continuity to six of its members throughout the year. Meanwhile, it has opened its ranks to three additional African members who have joined its collective endeavour. At a closer analysis, the cooperative was the expression and embodiment of a wider set of heterogeneous and differentiated “neo-rurals” that can only be scrutinised by an exploration of the life trajectories, practical experience and perspectives of its different

constituencies. Its Italian constituency was mainly constituted by activists who had been coordinating the project since 2011, largely on a voluntary basis. These were all united by previous experience of internal migration, often occurring in the pursuit of their university degrees, that had led them to live for a protracted period in Northern and Central Italy's main towns. Some of them were middle-aged return migrants who had returned to their original rural setting in the late 90s or early 2000s and then pursued their own employment trajectories in different fields – music and social work. Others, relatively younger than the former, had decided to move back to their place of origin only at the offset of the SOS Rosarno project. Some of them were highly politicized and active within radical social movements. Others had a continuous involvement as volunteers in educational and social projects. In either case, they had made a choice to live in the rural setting in ways different from the dominant ones. Only one of them had a relatively longer term experience of farming, having managed and worked his family's small plot of land since its return to the village in the mid-1990s. Others had no previous farming experience but they had an aspiration to live off agriculture as new peasants. Thus, for some, the cooperative is seen as a way to realise a political aspiration and the choice to be a new peasant within a collective endeavour, for others it is an opportunity to live off the project and the work with an experience of self-management chosen as responding to their own aspiration.

The migrant workers, coming from Western Africa and on the whole relatively younger than the Italian members, have different residence permits – either as labor migrants or humanitarian permits – and different biographies. They haven't had experience in agriculture before working as a farm worker in Rosarno or other areas of Italy. None of them had Rosarno as the target destination of their migration to Italy. In contrast, they had ended up in the area due to a lack of alternative employment opportunities. For all of them, employment in the context of the SOS Rosarno project had signified access to a regular contract and a wage in line with legally stipulated levels, which in turn enabled them to afford decent living conditions and guaranteed access to housing and social security measures (such as seasonal unemployment benefits). In this sense, their participation in the project has enabled a process of partial emancipation from the conditions of exploitation and extreme precarity that remain the norm for African agricultural workers in the area. Yet, for all of them, the inability of the project to guarantee employment continuity in a context of high counter-seasonal under-employment translates into a situation of relative economic stress that implies important sacrifices (cf. Iocco and Siegmann 2017). Some of the initial African members of SOS Rosarno left the project in the following years and, with the support of the other members of the association, undertook a career as cultural mediator (often working in rural areas) continuing their life and migratory projects – as well as pursuing in other ways the social and political engagement that led them to embrace SOS Rosarno in the first place. The other Africans who entered later, probably less politicized than the others at the beginning, engaged in the experimentation of the collective gardens, then joined the cooperative and played an important role in the further development of the project.

It is important to underline that for many of these African members the participation in these farming and political projects was a challenging process – not always a smooth and straightforward one. Most of them obviously developed an interest in the association's farming project because they saw in it a possibility to earn a decent wage and an opportunity to pursue their own emancipation from the difficult working and living conditions previously experienced. Yet, at least for some of them, the involvement in the association and the cooperative is also motivated by the desire to build a concrete example that more dignified working and living conditions are possible for migrant farm workers. Eventually, they decided to settle down in Rosarno and this choice implied a break with their prior migratory project – initially projected elsewhere. When they started to work on a more constant basis, they gained the possibility to get a work-related residence permit and/or renew it with relatively less anxiety than before. At the same time, they recovered the possibility to travel and visit their families in Africa. However, the greater continuity in employment thanks to the cooperative does not mean an end to precarity for all of its members – be they Italian or African. None of the Africans has had the

possibility to seriously think about family reunion; lives remain split and settled in Rosarno and participation in the project is still substantially temporary – albeit probably seen as a longer term option than before.

### *Sfruttazero*

The Sfruttazero project is jointly promoted by the associations Diritti a Sud from Nardò and Solidaria from Bari, in the Apulia Region. It works for the production and sale of tomato sauce from agroecological crops. Its aim is to transform the tomato sauce from a symbol of (migrant) labour exploitation by the "caporalato" system in the Apulian countryside into a collective and solidarity-based work activity.

Sfruttazero was set up – as Netzanet, which means 'freedom' in Tigrinya - in 2014 in the urban area of Bari by the association Solidaria, involving a group of migrants and political refugees and young local militants and precarious workers who since 2008 have supported the struggles and claims of migrants in the Centre of reception for refugees and asylum seekers (CARA) and the Center identification and expulsion (CIE) of Bari, through paths and practices of social inclusion, mutualism and solidarity and of re-appropriation of abandoned public buildings for the right to housing, the "Socrate Occupato" and Villa Roth. After a long dispute for the right to housing, in 2018 the municipality of Bari decided to assign the Villa Roth building to a self-managed community of about 40 people, including foreigners and Italians, and to grant residence at Villa Roth to homeless or migrant people who need it to obtain a residence permit.

After a year of work and the first, embryonic, production of tomato sauce under the Sfruttazero name, financed through a large crowdfunding campaign, the project was enriched by other similar organisations in the area, with which Solidaria forged relationships as part of the solidarity and militant initiatives set up in the Puglia region to combat the exploitation of labourers, namely the association Fuori dal Ghetto in Venosa (which later became a similar but autonomous project, namely Funky Tomato) and the association Diritti A Sud in Nardò.

In 2014, the association Diritti a Sud (Rights in the South) was formed by local and migrant activists that came together with the intention of carrying out concrete activities to support and sustain migrant labourers, working on paths of political, social and cultural protagonism and emancipation rather than on the tracks of humanitarian welfarism. The work of Diritti a Sud takes place in the rural areas of the Nardò, where seasonal workers arrive every year from June to September for the harvesting of tomatoes and watermelons, and find shelter in ghettos and shanty towns.

One of Sfruttazero's objectives is to intervene on the structural causes of the exploitation of migrant labour in southern Italy's agriculture, proposing a different and alternative idea of a quality agri-food chain, which is truly virtuous and transparent in guaranteeing and certifying not only the ethicality of labour relations but also of a production that is respectful of the land and the environment, and to intervene, therefore, on those contexts of social and housing marginalisation that keep migrants away from the socio-cultural and political fabric of the host contexts, encouraging awareness and emancipation paths starting from the claim of political, human and trade union rights.

Sfruttazero's experience does not involve farms or professional farmers, but back-to-the-landers, appealing to the principles of self-determination, autonomy and distancing from conventional markets, by distributing the product outside the commercial channels of large-scale retail trade. Migrants and natives together have created an entire production chain with a participatory guarantee, where genuineness, health, respect for the environment and the rights of the workers are the basis of the production organisation.

In Bari, the production of tomatoes to be transformed into sauce takes place on rented land in the heart of Bari urban area, two-thirds of which is dedicated to the cultivation of tomatoes for work purposes, while the remainder is used for the cultivation of vegetables in collaboration with another association, Orto Circuito, with the involvement of citizens. Those who work in Orto Circuito are also part of Sfruttazero. Activists and migrants gravitating around Solidaria's activities have begun to weave networks and links with local farmers and alternative production realities, from whom they have learned traditional, local and peasant farming techniques, deciding to ban the production mechanisms and chemically synthesised inputs used in conventional production in favour of an agro-ecological approach to land and food production.

In 2014, around 600 jars of tomato sauce were produced as a pilot project, and in 2020 production exceeded 10,000 jars. As demand for the product increased and the project grew, Solidaria began to rely on a small local business for the processing stage. All the migrant and indigenous people involved in the field work, since the second production season in 2015, are regularly contracted and paid according to the provincial scales laid down in the national collective labour agreements. Each worker, who is regularly employed, is paid 7 euros net per hour for a maximum of 6-8 working hours per day.

The six people who work continuously, from March to September, also taking care and management of the land receive a remuneration of about 400 euros per month, while in the most intense phases of work, those of planting and harvesting, other workers coming from the city occupations are added who carry out about 10 days of work regularly paid. In the most intense phases of work in the field, there are an average of 12 contracted workers, plus a number of Solidaria activists who already have paid jobs and work for free in solidarity. In addition, from the 2019 production season, a person in administration has been contracted on an annual part-time contract of 18 hours per week and a further 150 euros per month is set aside for those who distribute the jars.

In the first year, a crowdfunding initiative was launched to start the project, which was replicated the following year with the entry of Diritti a Sud and initially also Fuori dal Ghetto di Venosa. For the third and fourth seasons, instead, project funding was won from the Valdese Church. Today, the income obtained from the sale of the sauce is sufficient to support only ordinary activities (salaries, the purchase of seedlings, the payment of bills, the rent of the land, and insurance for the van). Expenditure on capital goods - for example, the purchase of the irrigation system, the irrigation pump for the land - is met from extra income from the business.

Diritti a Sud, thanks to the larger size of the land to be cultivated, has harvested a larger quantity of product since 2015, which immediately required the use of the "Nuova Generazione " processing plant in Martano. Despite the amount of work and the larger size of the land, Sfruttazero's work in Nardò is not full-time and does not involve too many workers. Starting from the core group of activists of the association, equally divided between Italian and foreign nationals, who take care of the preparatory phases of the field and planting, during the harvesting phase in August other people of mixed nationality were added: 24 contracts and among these migrants involved were about half of the total, so ten contracts to Italian workers and ten to foreign workers, in addition to four volunteers who were contracted for a question of safety at work although they were not paid. Among the migrants, several are those who come to Nardò every year to work in agriculture and choose to participate in the Sfruttazero campaign because of the good working conditions and direct knowledge of the group of activists who have been working for years in support of migrant labourers in the area. However, the amount of work involved in the project does not require too many working days, so migrant labourers have to work in other productions in the area.

Sfruttazero won the spring prize, an international award from Ash, a British natural cosmetics company, for its environmental and social regeneration activities (£23,000), reinvested in the project's

activities; the Livatino prize in 2017; CREA, the research center linked to the Italian Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Forestry, selected and awarded the project as one of Italy's rural excellences.

From just over 2 thousand jars of sauce produced in the 2015 season, in Sfruttazero's last production season in Nardò in 2019 more than 300 quintals of tomatoes were delivered to the processing plant and around 23,000 520 gram jars produced in four different varieties. After a temporary halt in the supply chain, in the 2020 season, for the summer of 2021 the Sfruttazero Project in Nardò resume work thanks to a new rented plot of land of more than two hectares, for which a more constant and continuous commitment and greater availability of manpower to be employed is required.

The tomato sauce from the self-managed supply chain is sold and distributed in markets, popular outlets and small shops thanks to the national networks "Fuorimercato" and "Genuino Clandestino", as for SOS Rosarno.

### *NO CAP*

The international association NO CAP was officially founded in 2017 from the idea of its president and founder, the Cameroonian Yvan Sagnet, that of promoting a new idea of economy based on the human and material resources of the territory, in order to intervene on the structural causes of migrant workers' exploitation in the agricultural sector. Yvan Sagnet was one of the workers who played a leading role in the 2011 migrant workers' revolt in Nardò (Apulia). By denouncing the 'caporali', first he became a key witness and civil party in the SABR criminal trial (an abbreviation of the name of one of the main defendants, the Tunisian Saber Ben Mahmaoud Jelassi also known as 'Giuseppe the Tunisian') and then began his trade union activity in the FLAI-CGIL, which led him several times over the years to denounce the poor living and working conditions of farm workers in the southern countryside.

In the initial stages of the work, NO CAP's activity focused on the cultural aspect of the fight against *caporalato*, in order to trigger a change in the vision and habits of consumers, but also of the workers themselves. Although it had not yet been established as an association, NO CAP promoted a campaign to raise awareness on the issues of exploitation in agriculture and the illegal intermediation of *caporalato*, also organising concerts in solidarity with the Nardò revolt. By questioning the current production system, which was considered unsustainable, NO CAP was able to work on building an alternative experience, starting from the need to control local products through a system of traceability of the agricultural supply chain that would also be able to counteract the dynamics of exploitation.

The main mission, as underlined by the name, is to intervene directly on the structural causes of the illegal work intermediation of *caporalato* and, more generally, on the exploitation of labour in agriculture. The aim is to promote a different idea of quality, starting from the creation of optimal conditions so that production is carried out correctly, in accordance with the law, starting from respect for the existential and working conditions of the people employed in the production process. In other words, the NO CAP projects aim to create and promote a formula according to which the agri-food product should not only be good, but also clean and fair, thus seeking to move away from the top-down, centralised and speculative paradigm that currently characterises agriculture from a structural point of view.

It is therefore of central importance in NO CAP's activities to identify companies, associations or projects that are willing to invest in an ethical and legal path, through the support of a network capable of dealing with every necessary aspect related to the production process. The challenge is precisely to build these networks in the agricultural areas of the, where the caporalato system is functional and difficult to crack, precisely because it is able to cope simply and effectively with the complex logistical characteristics of production and the inefficiencies of public policies for labour intermediation and reception of seasonal workers.

The association intervened in four macro-areas, namely the Capitanata-Foggia area in Apulia, the Metapontino area in Basilicata, the Plain of Gioia Tauro-Rosarno and the Siracusa-Ragusa area (the so called “transformed strip”) in Sicily, through the creation of specific projects in each of the areas. In these agro-food enclaves of southern Italy, which are dedicated to a production projected onto the long chains of national and international markets, the seasonal labour pool lives in precarious work and existential situations, in large crumbling ghettos lacking essential services and often completely abandoned by the institutions. This is a fertile ground for exploiters and corporali who manage to be the masters of this system, taking care of the logistical aspect of the work and managing to speculate on various levels.

NO CAP's work in these difficult contexts is to intervene in the logistical aspect of agricultural work, providing its own transport service for workers - from their accommodations to the field and vice versa - and above all creating participatory and shared paths out of the unhealthy ghettos in which many of the migrant seasonal workers live, by favor access to decent accommodation. So, NO CAP participates in regional calls for tenders and European projects, or promotes public fundraising campaigns on foot, in order to guarantee accommodation and transport services for farm workers.

To address the imbalances of power in the supply chains, NO CAP intervenes in the process of setting the final price of products. In order to cope with the overwhelming power of the global players in the large-scale retail trade - which impose purchase prices and production volumes in a top-down manner through a series of unfair and asymmetrical practices - farms cut production costs by employing underpaid and easily blackmailed labour, often working without labour contracts, with inhuman hours and rhythms and without any trade union or insurance guarantees.

NO CAP promotes a fair and transparent price, not only for end consumers but also for farms, by networking and bringing together the different players in the supply chain.

At the beginning of 2019, as part of the construction of territorial ethical supply chains, NO CAP promoted a network protocol between the association and the various supply chain actors, from farms to processors, through to distributors and civil society associations and bodies. This is a way of guaranteeing horizontality and transparency in decision-making processes and, above all, of allowing the project to go beyond its pilot phase and succeed in involving companies, distributors and working resources in other territorial areas.

The network protocol was drawn up in the first instance by the association itself with some of the agricultural enterprises that are members of the PerlaTerra Network. This is an association of social promotion stimulated by Altragricoltura and A.S.A. - Associazione per la Sovranità Alimentare, which works to network agricultural enterprises and social actors actively engaged in the design and management of economic and social cycles oriented towards agroecology, ethical and circular economy and, more generally, the management of the land based on the primacy of common goods and individual and collective rights. This network includes a number of farms that, in their first year of activity, have decided to take up the cause promoted by the NO CAP association and to produce the first ethical products that have reached supermarket shelves.

The direct relationship with companies was only one of the first steps in the definitive construction of the association's network protocol, which immediately included large and medium-sized distribution business partners. One of the major players in the large-scale retail sector in southern Italy, the MegaMark group of Trani (BT), an important distribution chain with over 500 supermarkets in the southern regions under the names Dok, Famila, IperFamila, A&O and Sole 365, was involved from the outset of the project. The Good Land group was the second commercial partner in the distribution sector to be actively involved in the project. Thanks to this partner, NO CAP products can also be found in fair trade shops. These are two radically different distribution channels, through which NO CAP aims to intercept consumers with different sensitivities and purchasing habits.

In 2021, the Aspiag group of Despar in the north-east of Italy has also entered into a new partnership with No Cap for the distribution of No Cap/Good Land branded tomato puree produced by the Prima Bio cooperative.

The distribution groups, MegaMark for the large-scale retail trade and GoodLand for the alternative fair-trade market, determine upstream the amount of product they are willing to buy and resell in supermarkets and shops respectively. However, if the volumes requested by Good Land may be smaller, given the sale within more niche distribution channels, the same does not apply to the main distribution partner of the NO CAP project, i.e., the MegaMark group, which needs a certain amount of production volume in order to cope with the medium-large distribution market throughout southern Italy. Obviously, as generally happens in the international food market, not all companies can cope with certain production volumes required by the players in the distribution market, and this also happens in the case of the NO CAP projects. So, NO CAP is looking for companies that can guarantee the quantities of product required; small companies cannot meet the demand and are unlikely to be chosen.

Instead of the large-scale retail trade defining and imposing the maximum purchase price of the product, it is the actors in the supply chain, within the network protocol, who establish what the right price is, taking into account, at various levels, the resources and labour employed to produce it. From this price, the distributors buy the product and resell it through their channels, taking care not to exceed a certain profit margin and thus guaranteeing access to a price that is sustainable both for consumers and for the forces and resources employed in the production chain.

As a result, on each of the products sold, the distributor makes a profit with a significantly reduced margin compared to that made through the unfair practices of the auctions at the bottom; the farm that has taken care of production and the regular hiring of workers manages to meet these costs and continue production in a regular manner and without exploitation of labour; finally, the NO CAP association takes royalties directly from the companies that allow it to meet the costs necessary to run the project and continue to perform all the services it provides.

Out of a total of about 500 seasonal labourers of non-Italian origin hired in about a year and a half in the context of the certified ethical supply chains promoted by No Cap in the regions involved, 26 are the workers that the association managed to regularise, of which 15 in the Foggia area and 9 in Ragusa, Sicily. In fact, in the 2020 production season, thanks to the amnesty promoted as part of the emergency measures caused by the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic - it was also possible for No Cap to involve some workers with administrative irregularities, allowing them to be regularised by being hired by some of the farms in the network.

Once the processing envisaged by the project is over, many of the workers tend to move to other territories to continue the seasonal transhumance between production seasons in the southern regions,

The No Cap branded products sold in the supermarkets of the MegaMark group are also marked with the ethical label Iamme - Liberi di Scegliere, developed by the same commercial group to promote the marketing of ethical and corporal-free products promoted by the network.

Similarly, products marketed through organic shops, fair trade shops and e-commerce, arrive on the shelves with the No Cap 'ethical label' and the Good Land logo, leaving plenty of room on the label for the name of the producers and the organic certification mark, which is in fact compulsory for companies selected and marketed through the Good Land group.

Among the twenty companies involved, five in particular have led the project, being the first to produce the No Cap branded products currently on the market, i.e., organic tomato puree; organic cherry tomato sauce; organic datterino tomato sauce; organic yellow datterino tomato sauce; organic peeled tomatoes; table grapes and fresh fruit and vegetables according to the season, in particular

fennel, cauliflower, peppers and artichokes. They are the Prima Bio agricultural co-operative in Rignano Garganico, the Conserve Rispoli company in Battipaglia, the Società Cooperativa La Vita Bio in Chiaramonte Gulfi in the province of Ragusa, the O.P. Primo Sole in Montescaglioso in the province of Matera and the Novello & C. farm in Mazzarrone in the province of Catania. Since 2021 NO CAP has also involved the cooperative I Frutti del Sole in the Plain of Gioia Tauro-Rosarno (already partner of Sos Rosarno).

The No Cap association was created with the aim of promoting, through virtuous tools and strategies, the spread of the principles of a culture based on respect for human and social rights, animals and the environment. These principles are put into practice by the association, on the one hand, by promoting a legal work circuit for workers, and on the other, by accompanying farmers in the process of converting their businesses to sustainable production models, also from an environmental point of view. This is an objective that No Cap manages to achieve within the framework of the internal collaborations of the 'network protocol', through the issuing of the certification of ethicality and environmental sustainability of production: the affixing of the 'ethical stamp' on the label allows the products of the farms involved in the supply chain projects to access a good positioning on supermarket shelves and to enjoy a special promotional activity towards the consumer, also guaranteeing an agreement on the final price, which must be transparent and shared by each of the partners.

For all aspects and scope of application regarding controls and inspections, reference is made to the laws in force, in particular to the specific regulations provided for by the SA8000 Social Accountability Certification standard issued by SAI (Social Accountability International) and the regulations in force regarding work in agriculture. A certification body "supervises" the control carried out by the No Cap team during the verification phase of the requirements possessed by the companies and their specific products. This is the D.Q.A. - Dipartimento di Qualità Agroalimentare (Department of Agri-food Quality), a certification body recognised by the State and accredited by Accredia, the Italian body that authorises certification mechanisms at the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Economic Development. In relation to the purely environmental characteristics of certification reference is made to accredited inspectors; in order to control and monitor the ethicality of working relationships, a specific role is played by the driver/trailer who, in each of the supply chains, is in a sense responsible for guaranteeing and self-certifying the legality of the contractual, income and housing position, reporting any problems or changes to the association.

In order for a farm to become part of the network and the activities of the anti-exploitation campaign promoted by No Cap, a number of basic criteria set out in the association's manifesto must be met. It is precisely with the periodic control of these criteria, carried out through inspections in the company and monitored by the workers themselves during the production seasons, that a company can access certification and recognition of the No Cap "ethical label", alongside the Good Land or Iamme - Liberi di Scegliere brands, depending on the distribution channels of reference.

In order to support conventional entrepreneurs in their conversion to sustainable models and to certify companies and the references they produce by issuing an 'ethical label', the No Cap association has drawn up a 'multi-criteria matrix' capable of assessing and certifying the virtuousness of a company and helping it to promote its products thanks to the ethical quality label. This matrix is therefore the main reference for inspections carried out by the association's accredited inspectors on farms. For each of the six analysis criteria, identified and studied by the experts of No Cap and CETRI (European Club Third Industrial Revolution) according to the new sharing economy, a score from one to five is assigned according to the level assessment. The score achieved in each criterion, governed by a specification for each indicator, is then expressed graphically on the label.



For farms access to quality certification is now a compulsory requirement for access to markets, which imposes a continuous reorganisation of the company and production in order to meet the quantities and characteristics of wholesomeness and safety required by the large-scale retail trade.

The certification issued by No Cap is the result of a participatory mechanism, in which the farm manages to cope with the changes and adaptations required by the association, and pursuing social goals. This is made possible, on the one hand, thanks to the operation of the "network protocol", in which the horizontal relationship between the partners allows No Cap to mediate between producers and retailers, controlling the price formation process and guaranteeing fairness and transparency; on the other hand, the fact that No Cap issues the "ethical label" only for products produced within the certified ethical supply chain, allows the farm to adapt to the requirements only the production area related to the project, potentially leaving the rest of the company's characteristics unchanged.

In addition to the main criterion of work ethic, the matrix assesses other business aspects with a score from 1 to 5: short supply chain, zero waste approach, decarbonisation, treatment of animals and added value of the product.

No Cap project involves around 20 companies and 500 non-European labourers (from Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Gambia and the Ivory Coast), selected mainly from ghettos and shanty towns in the four regions (such as Borgo Mezzanone in Cerignola, Casa Sankara in San Severo, San Ferdinando-Rosarno), who have been guaranteed decent housing, regular work contracts, adequate transport, medical examinations, work safety devices and chemical toilets. safety devices and chemical toilets in the camps.

#### *The network agreement between Princes and Coldiretti Foggia*

Princes Industrie Alimentari (PIA) is the Italian branch of Princes Limited a British group based in Liverpool and owned by Mitsubishi Corporation. PIA owns Europe's largest tomato processing plant near Foggia. The location is strategic, because it is linked to management and quality aspects of the product and production. Tomatoes in particular can only be processed fresh, so they cannot be preserved or frozen, and the quality of the finished product is all the higher the shorter the period from harvesting to processing and canning.

The factory produces both tomatoes and canned vegetables. About 50% of the tomato production is for its own brand Napolina, a market-leading brand in the UK. But Princes also produces for the world's largest retailers, the so-called private labels, located in England but also in continental Europe, South America, Oceania and South Africa. About 95% of production is for export.

The processed raw material comes almost exclusively from Apulia, from Foggia, and small quantities also from Campania, the south of Apulia, Basilicata and Molise.

Mitsubishi Corporation's management principles place great emphasis on respect for human rights and the central role of people in all business processes, in all economic processes. A number of investments are therefore geared towards ensuring ethical compliance. Princes is asked by its international customers not only to guarantee the quality of its products, but also to ensure that human rights are respected throughout the supply chain.

Princes has an agronomic department of 13 units, which during the tomato season has the task of supporting all farmers in their agronomic practices, but also to ensure ethical compliance throughout the supply chain and at all stages of the tomato growing process.

Membership of ETI by the multinational industry Princes meant that, processed tomatoes are produced by companies adopting Global Gap/Grasp and SA8000 certifications. These are two quite

equivalent certifications. As of 2020, producers are also required to register with the Quality Agricultural Work Network.

Through the agronomic team, field audits are carried out. In 2019 a thousand audits were organized, in 2020 a few less. About 300-350 farmers supply Princes with tomatoes, each field is visited at least three times. The visits are made at critical stages, both from the agronomic point of view and from the point of view of potential human rights violations. So, when the transplants take place, when the seedlings are sent from the nurseries to the fields and are physically placed in the soil. Then during the first growth phase of the plants and then during harvesting. Both transplanting and harvesting are quite critical moments where the most critical situations have historically occurred, especially during harvesting, where corporals have thrived in past years. The presence of Princes' agronomists during the harvesting phases aims to ensure that a whole series of things are checked: employees' pay slips, workers having PPE (personal protective equipment), right breaks and so on and so forth.

Starting in 2019, the "Work Without Borders" programme was promoted in collaboration with Caritas through which immigrants were hired in the factory. Some have been dedicated to this very job of auditing the fields, they speak the language of the workers in the fields, so that barrier can be broken between those who are exploited and those who can potentially give them a hand.

In 2019-2020, Princes and the producers' organization Coldiretti jointly promoted a supply chain agreement which is aimed at guaranteeing all-round sustainability for the entire industrial tomato chain, which is so important in the Foggia area. The agreement is made of specific elements: a) shortening the supply chain, avoiding the intervention of gangmasters, b) the introduction of mechanized harvesting, thus specialized and stable workforce, since it is at the service of several companies, 3) quality control all along the chain by technical assistance, digitalized input control and a blockchain system; 4) the definition of a fair price and thus the return of added value to all participants in the chain.

Farmer-suppliers are trained in the standards to be met. In addition to adhering to quality certifications, suppliers have other contractual obligations in the area of sustainability. For example, they must accept a Princes programme called Ecofert, which aims to save irrigation water and nitrogen use in the fields. Water is a scarce resource and therefore with this system a 20% reduction in irrigation water is guaranteed. The system makes it possible to assess soil moisture and the real need for irrigation in the field. Along with this there are other tools that producers are required to use; for example, Trap view is a system that aims to reduce the use of pesticides. It is a web-based, cloud-based system that uses actual traps in the field to give an indication of which specific pest is attacking that field, so that the farmer is told when to irrigate and which type of pesticide to use. This clearly aims to reduce pesticides; previously without this system the farmer tended to use more generic pesticides, several times during the harvest. With this system he only uses them when he needs them and only what is strictly necessary. 85% of Princes' production in the last two years has been completely free of any chemical residue, despite the fact that the law allows a minimum percentage of chemical residue in their food.

Princes requires mechanized harvesting from producers, which does not eliminate the problem of exploitation, but reduces it, because in an average field (5 hectares), mechanized harvesting normally requires six people working in a day, whereas manual harvesting requires 50-60. Mechanized harvesting is not possible in certain weather situations, for example after it rains it is very difficult to use the harvesting machine.

The contracts are signed with nine Producer Organizations (POs), which in turn bring together 35 cooperatives, involving some 300350 growers. Princes develop longer-term support relations with both cooperatives and farmers. The supply chain contract serves to guarantee that the tomato chain

that is done with Princess is an ethical chain. The supply chain contract also helps to sponsor the whole sector, the whole area of Foggia that produces in a certain way.

Following the introduction of Law 199, many farms gave up tomato production and moved on to other, less publicized or less noticed crops. In the last 7-8 years, between 3 and 4,000 hectares of tomatoes have been lost in the Foggia countryside.

Mulching an agronomic technique allowing less water consumption leads to a premium of even €1. Drip systems for water resource management are made by the companies. The technical assistance is provided by Princess, but in collaboration with Coldiretti too, for example for the compilation of the Field notebooks.

The Digital Field Notebook allows you to record treatments directly in the field from smartphones, tablets or PCs. Thanks to the perfect integration with the farm dossier, the program allows you to manage crop cycles, the storage of agro-pharmaceuticals, treatments, weed killers, fertilisations (with automatic and complete checks in real time with respect to labels and specifications) and all processing, irrigation, machinery and much more. The Digital Farm Notebook is also applied to CAP applications and reduces the risk of sanctions and cuts to EU premiums. Perfectly adaptable to the company's needs, it provides tools to manage organic production, fertilisation plans, cartography, labels and everything related to production and regulations in general.

In fact, the portal also includes Demetra, the first integrated system for online management of the farm with real-time reading of the health of crops, data on weather forecasts and temperatures, soil fertility and water stress; digital invoicing - Digit for the digital management of invoices and the entire active cycle of business accounting; the attendance service for workers; the business file online to monitor the progress of the applications Pac and Psr submitted; the practical counter Caa, the electronic archive invoices.

Companies are required to use two digital platforms: the Princess platform where they have to enter the pesticides, etc... and the blockchain platform of Coldiretti. So, they have an extra job, with a lot of difficulties related to the compilation of these platforms.

The start-up Tokenfarm through blockchain-based technology guarantees the execution of supply contracts that the industry has signed with POs/Cooperatives/individual companies. The guarantee is extended to all contractual elements such as quality, quantity, ethicality up to the fair remuneration of each individual link in the production chain.

The DLT (Distributed Ledger Technology) is based on the absence of trust, or rather on the creation of trust through disintermediation, on the accessibility of data by all members of the supply chain, and on the reliability of the data guaranteed by cross-checking and the possibility of tracing it back to whoever entered it in the digital register.




Coldiretti has put in place a collaboration with Casa Sankara. Ghetto-Out Casa Sankara is a non-profit organisation created in 2016 and based in a farm owned by the Region of Puglia, Azienda Fortore. Casa Sankara, coordinated by some migrants for Senegal, is responsible for managing the facilities and the area of the Fortore company to provide accommodation for migrant workers. In July 2019, the Apulia Region brought and installed new housing modules there, increasing the total number of places available for Casa Sankara, which now stands at around 500.



As No Cap did, Coldiretti companies recruit farm workers among the migrants living in Casa Sankara and having a regular residence permit. Job matching between the Coldiretti companies and Casa Sankara could support housing intermediation, so farmworkers could live in Casa Sankara and access regular housing in urban centers.

A 9-seater bus transport service to and from the fields is promoted in collaboration with EBAT ((Ente Bilaterale Agricolo Territoriale) Foggia and founded by Supreme,

Casa Sankara has succeeded in building a public-private partnership for an ethical and sustainable agriculture project to farming in the 16 hectares-lands, provide work for our young people and give substance to Casa Sankara's idea of self-sufficiency. The Apulia Region granted it permission to work them and three local farms, worked alongside Casa Sankara to produce its own brand of agricultural produce “Ri-Accolto”, then distributed by Coop retailing group.

*Table: Agri-food projects addressing migrant workers’ rights and social inclusion*

PROJECTS	CHARACTERISTICS	CERTIFICATION	HOUSING	RECRUITMENT	DISTRIBUTION	PRICES
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Participation in the Network of Quality Agricultural Work</li> <li>-Price negotiated to cover production costs</li> <li>-mechanisation of harvesting</li> <li>-Digitalization (Water &amp; inputs control, Blockchain for quality control)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-multi-stakeholder standard (ETI)</li> <li>-Workers’ rights control by audits and migrant workers</li> <li>-Global G.A.P. GRASP or SA8000 Ethical Standard</li> </ul>	<p>Collaboration with Casa Sankara, reception project founded by Regional Government</p>	<p>Collaboration with Casa Sankara, reception project founded by Regional Government (Ghetto out)</p>	<p>National and international retailing groups</p>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- contracts and working days sufficient for social security benefits (unemployment allowance)</li> <li>- agreements with small and medium size agricultural cooperatives, and enterprises (aiming to differentiate products and markets)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SR - SA8000 Ethical Standard</li> <li>- Multicriteria matrix: ethical work relationships, short supply chain, zero waste, animal welfare, added value, renewable energy (organic)</li> </ul>	<p>Evacuate migrant workers from rural ghettos, and organize legal home-to-fields transport service</p>	<p>In collaboration with local CSOs</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Megamark Group (small retailer in Southern Italy)</li> <li>- Despar Nord-est</li> <li>-small distributor for quality products shops (Good Land)</li> <li>-GAS</li> </ul>	<p>0,80-1 Euro for chopped tomatoes; 1,40-2 euro for the sauce</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Agroecological production methods,</li> <li>-Migrant seasonal farmworkers, refugees, native precarious workers, urban activists, (part-time) back-to-the landers</li> <li>-practices of social inclusion, conflictual mutualism and</li> </ul>	<p>participative quality guarantee</p>	<p>Reception center or</p>	<p>Informal and personal networks</p>	<p>Alternative food chains (i.e., GAS, social centers), and direct selling</p> <p>Construction of local networks: agricultural cooperatives, processing enterprises,</p>	<p>2,60-3,50 euro for tomato sauce</p>

	solidarity, legal & trade union assistance, cultural activities				and cultural associations	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Social inclusion</li> <li>- Farming in public lands</li> </ul>	Social responsibility	Casa Sankara, reception project founded by Regional Government (Ghetto out)	Casa Sankara, reception project founded by Regional Government (Ghetto out)	Coop, Italian retail group	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organic production</li> <li>- Regular contracts</li> <li>- Fair price</li> <li>- Migrants as member of the cooperative Manie Terra</li> </ul>	Organic certification	In the city center (out of the ghetto)	Informal and personal networks	Alternative food chains (i.e. GAS, social centers),	

### List of interviews (2020-2021)

<b>P u g l i a</b>	1.	Salvatore Ferrara	Coop. Due Palme
	2.	Mbaye Ndiaye	Casa sankara
	3.	Raffaele Falcone	FLAI CGIL
	4.	Mohammed El Majdi	FAI CISL
	5.	Ana	Centro Interculturale Baobab Foggia
	6.	Domenico LaMarca	Cooperativa Arcobaleno
	7.	Angelo Cleopazzo	Diritti a Sud
	8.	Rosa Vaglio	Diritti a Sud
	9.	Gianni	Sfruttazero - Solidaria
	10.	Giovanni Notarangelo	Camilla Emporio di Comunità Bologna
	11.	Maria Teresa Terrenzio	Prima bio
	12.	Giuseppe Maffia	OP Principe di Puglia
	13.	Yvan Sagnet	No Cap
	14.	Francesco Strippoli	No Cap Capitanata
	15.	Francesco Pomarico	Gruppo Megamark
	16.	Lucio Cavazzoni	Goodland Srl
	17.	Gervasio Ungolo	Associazione 'Rete Perlaterra'
	18.	Marino Pilati	Coldiretti
	19.	Gianmarco Laviola	Princes Industrie Agroalimentari
	20.	Domenico Di Giosa	Regione Puglia
	21.	Gianpietro Nicola Ambrogio Occhiofino	Regione Puglia

	22.	Stefano Campese	Avv. Caritas
	23.	Erminia Rizzi	ASGI
	24.	Alessandro Verona	Intersos
	25.	Ilaria Chiapperino	Oasi2
<b>C a l a b r i a</b>	26.	Nino Quaranta	Della Terra
	27.	Peppe Pugliese	Sos Rosarno
	28.	Ibrahim	Sos Rosarno
	29.	Nello Navarra	Coop. I Frutti del Sole
	30.	Francesco Piobbichi	Mediterranean Hope
	31.	Ilaria Zambelli	MEDU
	32.	Edith Macrì	Regione Calabria
	33.	Peppe Marra	USB
	34.	Luca Gaetano	Councilor at the San Ferdiando Municipality
<b>S i c i l i a</b>	35.	Michele Mililli	USB Ragusa
	36.	Gaetano Pasqualino	Progetto diritti
	37.	Giuseppe Scifo	FLAI CGIL (Ragusa)
	38.	Carmelo La Rocca	Journalist based in Ragusa
	39.	Andrea Gentile	Diaconia Valdese
	40.	Vincenzo Lamonica	Caritas Ragusa – I tetti colorati
	41.	Rita Gentile	Councilor at the Siracusa Municipality
	42.	Roberto Roppolo	Intersos
	43.	Martina Lo Cascio	Contadinazioni
	44.	Ausilia Maniscalco	Coop. Proxima
	45.	Margherita Maniscalco	CISS
	46.	Nicola Arena	Coop. La Vita Bio

*Portfolio: housing in the fields*



San Ferdinando, Reggio Calabria



San Ferdinando, Reggio Calabria



San Ferdinando, Reggio Calabria



Marina di Acate, Ragusa  
2021



Cassibile, Siracusa

2021



Marina di Acate, Ragusa

2021



Torretta Antonacci, Foggia

2020





Torretta Antonacci, Foggia

2020



Nardò, Lecce

2021

## Bibliography

- Baldwin A. (2013), “Racialisation and the figure of the climate-change migrant”, *Environment and Planning A*, volume 45, pages 1474 – 1490
- Benegiamo, M. (2020), “Extractivism, exclusion and conflicts in Senegal’s agro-industrial transformation”, *Review of African Political Economy*, 1-23.
- Borras, S. & Franco, J., (2012), “Global Land Grabbing and Trajectories of Agrarian Change: A Preliminary Analysis”, *Journal of Agrarian Change*, 12(1): 34-59.
- Brovia, C., & Piro, V. (2020), “Ghettos, camps and dormitories: Migrant workers’ living conditions in enclaves of industrial agriculture in Italy”, *International Labour Migration to Europe’s Rural Regions* (pp. 52-69). Routledge.
- Burch D., Lawrence G. (2005), “Supermarket own brands, supply chains and the transformation of the agri-food system”, *International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food*, 13.1: 1-18.
- Caruso F., Corrado A. (2015), “Migrazioni e lavoro agricolo: un confronto tra Italia e Spagna in tempi di crisi”, in M. Colucci, s. Gallo (a cura di), *Tempo di cambiare. Rapporto sulle migrazioni interne in Italia*, Roma, Donzelli.
- Corrado A. (2021), “Un nuovo regime agroalimentare”, Ippolito I., Perrotta D., Raeymaekers T. (Eds), Braccia Crea (Consiglio per la ricerca in agricoltura e l’analisi dell’economia agraria), *Il contributo dei lavoratori stranieri all’agricoltura italiana*, a cura di M.C. Macrì, 2019, [www.crea.gov.it/web/politiche-e-bioeconomia/-/on-line-il-contributo-dei-lavoratori-stranieri-all-agricoltura-italiana](http://www.crea.gov.it/web/politiche-e-bioeconomia/-/on-line-il-contributo-dei-lavoratori-stranieri-all-agricoltura-italiana)
- Corrado A., C. De Castro, D. Perrotta (eds) (2016), *Migration and agriculture: Mobility and change in the Mediterranean area*. Routledge.
- Corrado A, D’Agostino M. (2018), “Migrations in multiple crisis. New development patterns for rural and inner areas in Calabria (Italy)?”, in S. Kordel, I. Jelen, T. Weidinger (eds), *Current immigration processes to European peripheries: status quo, implications and development strategies*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing House.
- Corrado A., Iocco. G., Lo Cascio M. (2020), “Respatialization of migrations, and differentiated ruralities in times of crisis in Southern Italy”, F. N. Döner, E. Figueiredo, M. J. Rivera (eds.), *Crisis, Post-Crisis and Rural Territories: Social change, challenges and opportunities in Southern and Mediterranean Europe*, Springer.
- Corrado A., Lo Cascio M., Perrotta D. (eds) (2018), “Agricoltura e cibo”, *Meridiana*, 93.
- Corrado A., Palumbo L. (2021), “Essential farmworkers and the pandemic crisis: migrant labour conditions, and legal and political responses in Italy and Spain”, Anna Triandafyllidou (ed), *Migration and Pandemics: Spaces of Solidarity and Spaces of Exception*, IMISCOE, Springer (forthcoming).
- Dines, N., & Rigo, E. (2015), “Postcolonial Citizenships and the “Refugeeization” of the Workforce. Postcolonial transitions”, *Europe: Contexts, practices and politics*, 151.
- Ethical Trading Initiative Norway (IEH), “Ethical Trading Initiative in the UK (ETI), Follow-up di un accordo nel settore della lavorazione dei pomodori italiani”. *Relazione sulla visita di IEH del 16-18 ott. 2013*. Available at:  
[https://st.ilsole24ore.com/pdf2010/Editrice/ILSOLE24ORE/ILSOLE24ORE/Online/\\_Oggetti\\_Correlati/Documenti/Impresa%20e%20Territori/2013/11/IEH\\_report-follow-up-agreement-Oct%2016-18.pdf](https://st.ilsole24ore.com/pdf2010/Editrice/ILSOLE24ORE/ILSOLE24ORE/Online/_Oggetti_Correlati/Documenti/Impresa%20e%20Territori/2013/11/IEH_report-follow-up-agreement-Oct%2016-18.pdf)
- Ethical Trading Initiative Norway (IEH), Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), Danish Ethical Trading Initiative (DIEH), Due diligence in agricultural supply chains: Counteracting exploitation of migrant workers in Italian tomato production, 2015, [https://www.ethicaltrade.org/sites/default/files/shared\\_resources/italian\\_tomato\\_production\\_report.pdf](https://www.ethicaltrade.org/sites/default/files/shared_resources/italian_tomato_production_report.pdf)

- Friedmann H. (2005), "From colonialism to green capitalism: Social movements and the emergence of food regimes", Buttel, F.H. and P. McMichael (eds) *New directions in the sociology of global development*, Oxford, Elsevier, pp 229-267.
- Guadagno E. (2017), "Movimenti di popolazione e questioni ambientali: una lettura del recente dibattito", *Bollettino Della Società Geografica Italiana Roma - Serie XIII*, vol. X, pp. 195-208
- Heinrich Böll Foundation, Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, Friends Of The Earth Europe, Agrifood Atlas. Facts and figures about the corporations that control what we eat, 2017.
- Iocco G. & Siegmann K.A., (2017) *A worker-driven way out of the crisis of Mediterranean agriculture. Global Labour Column 289*, <http://column.global-labour-university.org/2017/09/a-worker-driven-way-out-of-crisis-in.html>
- Ionesco D., Mokhnacheva D., Gemenne F. (2017), *The Atlas of environmental migration*, Routledge.
- ISMU (2020), *Nuova regolarizzazione: le considerazioni di Fondazione ISMU* – Comunicato stampa 11.6.2020, <https://www.ismu.org/nuova-regolarizzazione-le-considerazioni-di-fondazione-ismu-comunicato-stampa-11-6-2020/>
- Laczko, F., & Aghazarm, C. (eds) (2009). *Migration, Environment and Climate Change: assessing the evidence*, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva.
- Lo Cascio, M., & Piro, V. (2018). *Ghetti e campi: la produzione istituzionale di marginalità abitativa nelle campagne siciliane*, 77-97.
- Mezzadra S., Neilson B. (2012), *Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- McMichael, P. (2014). *Food regimes and agrarian questions*, Practical Action Publishing.
- McMichael P., Friedmann H. (2007), "Situating the 'retailing revolution'", D. Burch, and G. Lawrence (eds), *Supermarkets and agri-food supply chains: Transformations in the production and consumption of foods*, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, pp. 291-319.
- Ministero del Lavoro (2020), *Emersione dei rapporti di lavoro 2020, Analisi Statistica delle domande - Dati Aggiornati alle ore 24:00 del 15 Agosto 2020*, [https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/2020-08/dlci\\_-\\_analisi\\_dati\\_emersione\\_15082020\\_ore\\_24.pdf](https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/2020-08/dlci_-_analisi_dati_emersione_15082020_ore_24.pdf)
- Molinero-Gerbeau, Y. (2020), "La creciente dependencia de mano de obra migrante para tareas agrícolas en el centro global. Una perspectiva comparada", *Estudios Geográficos*, 81(288), 031.
- Molinero Gerbeau, Y., & Avallone, G. (2016), "Produciendo comida y trabajo baratos: migraciones y agricultura en la ecología-mundo capitalista", *Relaciones Internacionales* 33 , 31-51
- Molinero Gerbeau, Y., & Avallone, G. (2020), "Ecología-mundo: un nuevo paradigma para el estudio de las migraciones internacionales", *Empiria*.
- Muirhead, J. (2020), "Indirect Land Grabbing, Private Certification, and GlobalGAP", *Finance or Food?* (pp. 80-107). University of Toronto Press.
- Natale F. et al. (2019), *Migration in EU Rural Areas*, European Union, Luxembourg
- Palumbo L., Corrado A. (eds) (2020), *Are Agri-food Workers Only Exploited in Southern Europe? Case Studies on Migrant Labour in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden*, Open Society Foundations.
- Patel, R., & Moore, J. W. (2017), *A history of the world in seven cheap things*, University of California Press.
- Pedreño A., (2005), "Sociedades etno fragmentadas", A. Pedreño, M. Hernández (coord.), *La condición inmigrante. Exploraciones e investigaciones desde la Región de Murcia*, Murcia, Ediciones de la Universidad de Murcia.
- Pedreño Cánovas, A. P. (2020). "La cuestión jornalera entre dos crisis: condición inmigrante, desafiliación y riesgo de contagio", *Sociología Del Trabajo*, (96), 1-15.

- Piguet E., Pécoud A., de Guchteneire P. (eds.) (2011) *Migration and Climate Change*, UNESCO.
- Rye, J. F. Scott S., (2018), “International Labour Migration and Food Production in Rural Europe: A Review of the Evidence”. *Sociologia Ruralis*, 58, 928-952.
- Piro V. (2021), “Migrant Farmworkers in 'Plastic Factories'”, *Investigating Work-Life Struggles*, Palgrave Pivot, Cham.
- Piro, V., & Sanò, G. (2016), “Entering the ‘plastic factories’: conflicts and competition in Sicilian greenhouses and packinghouses”, *Migration and Agriculture*, pp. 317-332,
- Sanò, G. (2018). *Fabbriche di plastica: il lavoro nell'agricoltura industriale*, Ombre corte.
- Sanò, G., & Piro, V. (2017), “Abitare (ne) i luoghi di lavoro: il caso dei braccianti rumeni nelle serre della provincia di Ragusa”. *Abitare (ne) i luoghi di lavoro: il caso dei braccianti rumeni nelle serre della provincia di Ragusa*, 40-55.
- Sassen, S. (1999), *Guests and Aliens*, Nueva York, The New Press.
- Sassen, S. (2016), “A massive loss of habitat: New drivers for migration”, *Sociology of Development*, 2(2), 204-233.
- Sassen S. (2014), *Expulsions: brutality and complexity in the global economy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Scoones, I., Hall, R., Borras, S., White, B. & Wolford, W. (2013), “The Politics of Evidence: Methodologies for Understanding the Global Land Rush”, *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 40(3): 469-483.
- Tagliacozzo, S., Pisacane, L., & Kilkey, M. (2020), “The interplay between structural and systemic vulnerability during the COVID-19 pandemic: migrant agricultural workers in informal settlements in Southern Italy”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 1-19.
- United Nations (2015), *Agenda2030 for sustainable development*.
- Vigil Diaz Telenti, S. (2012), *The model of Almeria: temporary migration programs as a solution for environmentally-induced migration*, available at <http://hdl.handle.net/2268/147485>, 107-122.
- Vigil, S. (2015), “Displacement as a consequence of climate change mitigation policies”, *Forced Migration Review*, (49).
- Vigil Diaz Telenti, S. (2017), “Climate Change and Migration. Insights from the Sahel. Out of Africa”, in *Why People Migrate*, 51-72.
- Vigil, S. (2018), “Green grabbing-induced displacement”, . R. McLeman and F. Gemmene (eds), *Routledge Handbook of Environmental Displacement and Migration*, 370-387.
- Vigil Diaz Telenti, S. (2019), *Geopolitical Ecologies of Environmental Change, Land Grabbing and Migration. Comparative perspectives from Senegal and Cambodia* (Doctoral dissertation, Université de Liège, Liège, Belgique).
- Wallerstein, I. (1974), *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York and London, Academic Press.
- Warner, K. (2010), “Global environmental change and migration: Governance challenges”, *Global environmental change*, 20(3), 402-413.
- Wiegel, H., Boas, I., & Warner, J. (2019), “A mobilities perspective on migration in the context of environmental change”, *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, 10(6), e610.
- Zimmerer, K. S., Jiménez-Olivencia, Y., Ruiz-Ruiz, A., & Porcel-Rodríguez, L. (2020), “Agri-Food Land Transformations and Immigrant Farm Workers in Peri-Urban Areas of Spain and the Mediterranean”, *Land*, 9(12), 472. doi:10.3390/land9120472.

## **Third Section**

### **Climate, Environment, Migration. From Present to Future**

## 9. Empowerment of Young Migrants in Malta

Mark Causon, Genista Research Foundation Malta

### **Abstract**

*Malta experienced the arrival of mixed flows of migrants, largely sub-Saharan asylum-seekers arriving from the coast of North Africa in 2002. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the context of the ongoing conflicts in the Syrian Arab Republic and Libya, in recent years, Malta has also been receiving increasing numbers of asylum applications from Libyan and Syrian nationals.*

*Due to the predominant mode of entry by boat, the vast variety of ethnic backgrounds among the migrant population, asylum and irregular migration have largely been at the forefront of the migration debate in Malta, both in public and political discourse. Leading to conflicting debates in society and exposing further the needs and issues of both the local inhabitants and the migrants. The issue is further complicated by the media who are more looking at sensational news and some NGO's who blow out of proportion the issue.*

**Keywords:** Case Study, Climate Migration, Mediterranean Region, young migrants

**Introduction of Research: Aims, methods, results.** In the first paragraph I talk about the issue and needs for the empowerment of young migrants and in the second i will focus on good examples of integration of young migrants

### **Malta: a general social outlook**

The economy of Malta is a highly industrialised, service-based economy, classified as an [advanced economy](#) by the [International Monetary Fund](#) and is considered a [high-income country](#) by the [World Bank](#) and an innovation-driven economy by the [World Economic Forum](#). The strengths of [Malta's](#) economy are its strategic location, being situated in the middle of the [Mediterranean Sea](#) at a crossroads between Europe, [North Africa](#) and the [Middle East](#), its fully developed open [market economy](#), [multilingual](#) population (88% of Maltese people speak English), productive [labour force](#), low corporate tax and well developed finance and ICT clusters. The economy is dependent on foreign trade, manufacturing (especially electronics), [tourism](#) and [financial services](#). With over 1.7 million tourists visiting the island.

- The government has introduced a national strategic policy for poverty reduction and social inclusion 2014 – 2024. Taking into consideration that Poverty and social exclusion have profound effects on a multitude of facets of an individual's life experience such as negative impacts on physical and mental health, increase in tendency of school drop-out rates and underachievement, unemployment and precarious employment, low participation in socio-cultural life and increased potential for homelessness and housing exclusion. The complex reality underpinning poverty and social exclusion requires a multifaceted approach which are reflected in the large number of diverse, yet corresponding actions identified within the Poverty Strategy. These actions not only represent key contributors to the wellbeing of individuals who are at-risk-of or already experiencing the detrimental

consequences of poverty or social exclusion, but also aim to serve as a safety net for the population as a whole, based on the premise that poverty or social exclusion can affect any individual over the course of their life. It is within this context that the Poverty Strategy takes a life-course approach in its endeavours to meet people’s needs given that such needs change during the course of life document. Through the implementation of this strategy, Government aims to contribute towards achieving the following results, namely:

- increasing disposable income for a good standard of living;
- promoting activation and creating more quality employment opportunities;
- ensuring equal access to quality healthcare and a health-friendly environment;
- promoting inclusive education, and opportunities for further and higher education;
- consolidating social services to promote social solidarity and social cohesion; and
- promoting a more inclusive culture

#### Targeting SDG 1: No Poverty

- However, with the ever increase in migration which contributed to 4.9% of the total population of the [Maltese islands](#) in 2011, i.e., 20,289 persons of non-Maltese citizenship, of whom 643 were born in Malta. Most of these people are not taken into consideration when formulating policy and can lead to social problems in the coming years since most do not fall under the various aid schemes available for locals.

Applications and granting of protection status at first instance: 2020<sup>2</sup>

	Applicants in 2020	Pending at end 2020	Refugee status	Subsidiary protection	Rejection	Refugee rate	Sub. Prot.rate	Rejection rate
<b>Total</b>	2,419	4,320	76	192	605	8.5%	22%	69.5%

Breakdown by countries of origin of the total numbers

<b>Sudan</b>	444	1,149	19	0	24	44%	0%	56%
<b>Bangladesh</b>	260	144	0	0	130	0%	0%	100%
<b>Eritrea</b>	227	367	1	5	5	9%	45.5%	45.5%
<b>Nigeria</b>	214	224	1	0	30	3%	0%	97%
<b>Somalia</b>	146	205	0	5	79	0%	6%	94%
<b>Syria</b>	136	366	45	107	57	21.5%	51%	27.5%
<b>Morocco</b>	120	-	0	0	78	0%	0%	100%
<b>Cote d'Ivoire</b>	115	189	1	0	14	6.5%	0%	93.5%
<b>Guinea</b>	81	124	0	0	9	0%	0%	100%
<b>Mali</b>	67	154	0	0	17	0%	0%	100%

Source: International Protection Agency (IPA), April 2021. It should be noted that rejections include inadmissibility decisions

## The Environmental Context in Malta

The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in 2015 can be seen as a global recognition that development should be conducted without risking the depletion of natural resources. This Agenda has provided each state with a set of important guidelines of how to reach sustainability. These are reflected in the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), further broken down into 169 targets and indicators, which have at their very core the aim of ending poverty, protecting the planet, and promoting global peace and prosperity.

Recognising Malta’s environmental challenges, the national strategy for the environment for 2050. The government is working on the circular economy strategy which presents an alternative model to the linear economic model, recognizing the central role of the environment and its functions, and its interactions with the economic system. Transition towards a circular economy requires the support

of innovation in the business models, stimulating investments in green products and services. A circular business model limits the environmental footprint of infrastructural developments, and hence seeks to maximise resource efficiency at an individual business level. There is an opportunity to stimulate such efforts and effective investments in eco-innovation, through the Green Public Procurement, use of market-based instruments, and environmental taxation. Green Public Procurement offers the added prospect of promoting and implementing environmentally positive procurement practices, whilst fostering and potentially financing a green economy in the process.

Citizen choices are influenced by a societal environmental ethic that is grounded with a basic understanding of how our daily livelihood systems are supported by the environment we live in. Education through increased quality public information, awareness, and participation hence plays an important role, invigorating environmental efficient choices within the individual sphere. There is opportunity to further expand the environmental education role, by encouraging environment-related voluntary initiatives, and enhancing the government and NGO management of Natura2000 sites. Enhanced environmental education initiatives also equips the public and stakeholders with the incentive to actively participate in an informed decision process.

- Taking into consideration the SDG 2: Zero Hunger National Agricultural Policy for the Maltese Islands 2018-2028. The agricultural sector in the Maltese Islands has been significantly reshaped following Malta's accession to the European Union and changes throughout its various facets are still ongoing. Thus, the National Agricultural Policy for the Maltese Islands 2018-2028 is intended to steer the agricultural sector into a more sustainable direction, by providing the means along which it can develop and flourish, whilst remaining within the parameters of the EU Common Agricultural Policy and other pertinent regulations. The Policy is intended to provide a clear direction to all relevant stakeholders, ranging from public entities involved with certification, permits, and decision making, to private entities directly involved in the agricultural scenario that intend to invest or diversify their business. As the overarching objective of this Agricultural Policy, a 'vision' for the Maltese agricultural sector was identified and agreed upon between Government entities, representatives of the private sector and the farming community. This vision contemplates the development of a policy that targets the following critical targets:

- Increasing the competitiveness of active farmers and livestock breeders by focusing on quality and encouraging diversification;
- Facilitating the entry of young farmers by creating a cost-effective agri-business sector;
- Fostering sustainability of farming activities by adapting to the local geo-climatic conditions; - Ensuring that farmland is managed by genuine farmers for agricultural purposes and related activities.

We believe that this can be a focus area were the integration of migrants could be easily integrated taking into consideration the young age of the migrants who could potentially take full time farming as an employment opportunity, help in the economic development of agriculture which has an aging workforce thus enabling agriculture to further grow and provide sustainable food for the country, lowering the dependency of food importation. This can be initiated by providing migrants with training opportunities in agricultural studies and providing placement in farms as interns following which they would be provided with farming work opportunities.

### **Migration in Malta a historical perspective**

Malta is situated in the center of the Mediterranean sea and throughout its history migration has been an integral part of its history, first inhabited in around 5900 BC. The first inhabitants were farmers,



and their agricultural methods degraded the soil until the islands became uninhabitable. The islands were repopulated in around 3850 BC by a civilization which at its peak built the Megalithic Temples, which today are among the oldest surviving buildings in the world. Their civilization collapsed in around 2350 BC, but the islands were repopulated by Bronze Age warriors soon afterwards. Malta's prehistory ends in around 700 BC, when the islands were colonized by the Phoenicians. They ruled the islands until they fell to the Roman Republic in 218 BC. The island was acquired by the Eastern Romans or Byzantines in the 6th century AD, who were expelled by Aghlabids following a siege in 870 AD. Malta may have been sparsely populated for a few centuries until being repopulated by Arabs in the 11th century. The islands were invaded by the Norman County of Sicily in 1091, and a gradual Christianization of the islands followed. At this point, the islands became part of the Kingdom of Sicily and were dominated by successive feudal rulers including the Swabians, the Aragonese and eventually the Spanish.

The islands were given to the Order of St. John in 1530, who ruled them as a vassal state of Sicily. In 1565, the Ottoman Empire attempted to take the islands in the Great Siege of Malta, but the invasion was repelled. The Order continued to rule Malta for over two centuries, and this period was characterized by a flourishing of the arts and architecture and an overall improvement in society. The Order was expelled after the French First Republic invaded the islands in 1798, marking the beginning of the French occupation of Malta. After a few months of French rule, the Maltese rebelled and the French were expelled in 1800 with British, Neapolitan and Portuguese assistance. Malta subsequently became a British protectorate, becoming a de facto colony in 1813. This was confirmed by the Treaty of Paris a year later. The islands became an important naval base for the British, serving as the headquarters of the Mediterranean Fleet. The Crown Colony of Malta was self-governing from 1921–33, 1947–58 and 1962–64. Malta became independent as a Commonwealth realm known as the State of Malta in 1964, and it became a republic in 1974. Since 2004, the country has been a member state of the European Union.

Between 1948 and 1967, 30 per cent of the population emigrated. Between 1946 and the late 1970s, over 140,000 people left Malta on the assisted passage scheme, with 57.6 per cent migrating to Australia, 22 per cent to the United Kingdom, 13 per cent to Canada and 7 per cent to the United States.

Immigration to Malta contributed to 4.9% of the total population of the [Maltese islands](#) in 2011, i.e. 20,289 persons of non-Maltese citizenship, of whom 643 were born in Malta. In 2011, most of migrants in [Malta](#) were [EU citizens](#) (12,215 or 60.2 per cent), predominantly from the [United Kingdom](#) (6,652 persons); the biggest community of non-EU nationals in Malta were the [Somalis](#) (1,049). In 2011, 2,279 non-Maltese nationals were resident in institutional households, particularly in open centres and refugee homes.

Demographically, non-Maltese residents in Malta are predominantly males (52.5 per cent) and younger than average (40.6 years of average age). They are mainly residing in the Northern Harbour District (38.3 per cent), consistently with the overall Maltese population (28.4 per cent residing in the district). A smaller proportion of non-Maltese citizens resides in the Southern Harbour District (7.6 per cent as opposed to 19.6 per cent for Maltese nationals).

### **Detention and reception centres**

- Illegal migrants are placed in 3 distinct centres namely:
- Initial Reception Centre: According to the Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security, the Initial Reception Centre is “the structure to implement this Government's policy not to detain

minors. Upon arrival, service users would undergo primarily age assessment and medical clearance and then proceed to the closed centre”.

- Closed Centre: The preferred jargon used to refer to centres housing immigrants whose liberty is limited, is closed centres. The term ‘detention centres’ is still in use given that immigrants are technically detained from leaving these centres. There is no further information readily available on any distinction between the two, although one can refer to the section referring to a potential distinction based on the length of the procedure.
- Open Centre: According to the Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security, an “open centre is a key part of reception management, offering accommodation and facilitating access by service-users to mainstream services, such as free health and free education”.
- It is government policy to further press for an EU-wide platform which should be created to make burden-sharing mandatory for all Member States whilst pointing out that such burden is to be shared amongst States equitably.

### **Council of Europe Migration in Malta report March 2021**

- A Council of Europe report on visit says Malta is breaking international law since it said that: The state of Malta's migrant centres during COVID-19 have been laid bare in a Council of Europe report that accuses the government of breaking international law and flouting European values.
- A delegation of the CoE's torture committee visited Malta in September 2020 and found migrants who were “forgotten for months”, locked in filthy and degrading conditions without adequate healthcare.
- Their report, published on Wednesday paints a chaotic picture of COVID-19 patients mingling with other detainees and management not clear about who was being held and on what grounds. They highlighted reports of excessive force and the death of one migrant after a fall - expressing doubts over whether enough was done to [save his life](#) after he was left for hours before help was called.
- The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) visited Malta shortly after human rights NGOs said they were denied access, due to COVID-19 restrictions.
- They visited Marsa Initial Reception Centre, Hermes Block (Lyster Barracks), Hal Far Reception Centre/“China House” and Safi Detention Centre.
- More than 90 per cent of the 1,400 people in the centres at the time of the visit were detained 'under public health grounds', which Malta's courts have found to be [unlawful](#).
- The report provides a detailed picture of the situation at detention centres, including the lack of life-saving equipment such as defibrillators, oxygen and nebulisers. It found dripping ceilings and migrants wearing the same clothes they wore when they landed in Malta weeks before.
- The report acknowledges that the COVID pandemic served only to push a strained migration reception and detention system to breaking point, with most migrants “appearing to have no lawful basis for their detention, held in severely overcrowded facilities under extremely poor living conditions, offered no purposeful activities, and with an absence of regular and clear information being imparted to them”.
- At the time of the delegation's visit, Malta was hosting around 13,000 refugees and asylum seekers, one of the largest numbers per capita in Europe. In fact, the committee calls on the EU to be

far more proactive in providing support and facilitating the transfer of migrants to other member states, or their repatriation to their home country.

- The CPT acknowledged the challenge of a public health crisis combined with the arrival of relatively high numbers of migrants but said the state could not derogate from its duty to ensure that all detained migrants are treated with dignity and held in humane and safe conditions. “This was not the case at the time of the visit,” it said. “Overall, the CPT’s delegation found a system that was struggling to cope, and which relied on a purely ‘containment’ approach for immigration detention. Conditions of detention and associated regimes for migrants deprived of their liberty appeared to be bordering on inhuman and degrading treatment as a consequence of the institutional neglect,” it added.

- The delegation noted that migrants were “generally locked in accommodation units with little, if any, access to time outside, in severely overcrowded spaces, and essentially forgotten for months on end”. This neglect came from both the management and staff, but also from a government policy that has not sufficiently focused on how to cope with the increasing numbers of migrant arrival, it said. “As a result, it was detaining migrants en masse, many for unlawful and arbitrarily long periods under public health orders and others for long periods under the reception and removal orders, along with a lack of due process safeguards.”


- The report links the cumulative effect of a lack of basic rights, poor conditions and frustration at long detention periods and lack of information on their situation to an increase in escapes, attempted escapes and riots from June 2020 onwards. “The CPT considers that certain living conditions, regimes, lack of due process safeguards, treatment of vulnerable groups and some specific COVID measures undertaken are so problematic that they may well amount to inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.”

- The situation needed to change “radically”, and to begin with, migrants should not be regarded as criminal offenders, and should not be held in prison-like conditions.

- Subjecting migrants to the harsh [treatment](#) found during the CPT’s visit was contrary to European values and international human rights law, it said. During its visit, the delegation found 25 people who tested positive for COVID mingling with other detainees in Marsa, allowing “a dangerous, and potential fatal environment” which was “symptomatic of institutional neglect”. Although the Maltese authorities said this was an exceptional situation due to lack of space, the incident raised issues about Malta’s obligation to protect life, the report said.

- Another shortcoming that the delegation flagged was the lack of registers, or copies, of detention orders, while the management did not appear to know who was being held on which grounds.

- “This incredible state of affairs meant that the management could not ensure any oversight of the safeguards related to detention. Indeed, the management took it on trust from the Immigration Police and Ministry of Health that all migrants were being detained lawfully. The Detention Service told the delegation that they were informed on an ad hoc basis when individual migrants were to arrive, be transferred, deported or released.” The vast majority of the migrants interviewed were completely unaware of whether they were detained on public health grounds, international protection or asylum procedures, or whether they were facing removal orders. It called on the authorities to urgently review the legal basis for detention on public health grounds as its current application may well amount to hundreds of migrants being de facto deprived of their liberty on unlawful grounds.



*File photo: Times of Malta*

- The CPT is calling on Malta to ensure that: every detained person who tests positive for COVID is isolated immediately and not allowed to mix with other Covid-19 non-positive migrants as a minimum, during the pandemic, all detained migrants are provided with at least one hour of outside exercise every day, and are offered the possibility to regularly communicate with the outside world unaccompanied and separated minors, and those who are awaiting age assessment results are accommodated separately from unrelated adults, until their transfer is effected to an open centre the poor hygiene situation at Safi's Warehouses and B-Block, notably, access to functioning toilets, showers, sufficient hygiene and washing products, is rectified a 24-year-old Sudanese man in the sick bay on Marsa IRC's 2nd floor is provided with a package of care whereby his health and social care needs are appropriately addressed such that he does not have to rely on fellow detainees to cater for his basic needs, including assistance with washing and dressing.



*File photo: Times of Malta*

## EU Asylum policies and political trends

- The Valletta summit on migration brought together European and African Heads of State and Government in an effort to strengthen cooperation and address the current challenges but also the opportunities of migration.
  - Highlights of the conference following the Valletta Summit on migration
  - It recognised that migration is a shared responsibility of countries of origin, transit and destination.
  - EU and Africa worked in a spirit of partnership to find common solutions to challenges of mutual interest.
  - Leaders participating in the summit adopted a political declaration and an action plan designed to:
    - address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement
    - enhance cooperation on legal migration and mobility
    - reinforce the protection of migrants and asylum seekers
    - prevent and fight irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings
    - work more closely to improve cooperation on return, readmission and reintegration
- **EU cooperate with Africa on migration**
- On the basis of its [Global Approach to Migration and Mobility](#) (GAMM) – the overarching framework of the EU external migration and asylum policy – the EU is running a broad dialogue with countries on the African continent on migration and mobility at bilateral, regional and continental levels:
  - Continental level, with the African Union. A key [political declaration](#) on migration and mobility was endorsed by the Heads of State and Government at the EU-Africa Summit in April 2014. It reiterated the parties shared commitment to, amongst others, fight irregular migration and to address all its relevant aspects, including prevention, strengthened migration and border management, smuggling of migrants, return and readmission, as well as addressing the root causes of irregular migration and enhance cooperation to address trafficking of human beings, and offering international protection. The above mentioned declaration is underpinned by an [Action Plan](#) (2014-17), and the necessary financial resources.
  - Regional level, with policy dialogues with countries along the western migratory route ([Rabat Process](#)) and the eastern migratory route ([Khartoum Process](#)). The regional dialogues are underpinned by concrete action plans and financial resources.
  - Bilateral level, with specific political agreements concluded with Morocco, Tunisia, Cape Verde and Nigeria. These political agreements are matched by concrete actions, including a wide range of programme and project support, that aim to contribute to institutional and legislative reforms and capacity building in partner countries.

## EU-Africa Migration and Mobility Dialogue

- The [Africa-EU Migration, Mobility and Employment \(MME\) Partnership](#) was launched during the second Africa-EU Summit of Heads of State and Government in December 2007 in Lisbon, where the Joint EU-Africa Strategy and the [First Action Plan](#) (2008-2010) were adopted.
- The EU-Africa Summit in 2014 gave new impetus to the cooperation on migration: In addition to the declaration on migration and mobility, an [action plan 2014-2017](#) was also adopted, focusing on the following priorities:
  - Trafficking in human beings
  - Remittances
  - Diaspora
  - Mobility and labour migration (including intra-African mobility)

- International protection (including internally displaced persons)
- Irregular migration

### **The Rabat Process**

• The Rabat Process was first launched at the first Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in July 2006 in Rabat. It brings together governments of 55 European and African countries from North, West and Central Africa, together with the European Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The objective is to enhance dialogue and cooperation on migration more broadly (legal migration and mobility; prevention of irregular migration and measures to counteract it; migration and development; international protection), as well as to identify common priorities in order to develop operational and practical cooperation.

• The Rabat Process has established a solid and fruitful dialogue between the EU and countries in North, West and Central Africa, and has fostered enhanced cooperation through the implementation of bilateral, sub-regional, regional and multilateral initiatives. The Seahorse Atlantic Network is an example of a concrete cooperation at regional level between Spain, Portugal, Senegal, Mauritania, Cape Verde, Morocco, Gambia and Guinea Bissau. It enables the information exchange between authorities along the Western African coast in order to prevent irregular migration and cross-border crime.

• The fourth Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development took place in November in Rome. The [Rome Declaration and Programme for 2015-17](#), adopted during this conference, identified two main priorities for future action: 1) strengthening the link between migration and development, and 2) the prevention and fight against irregular migration and related crimes, namely trafficking in human beings and smuggling of persons. It also introduced international protection as one of the four pillars for cooperation aligning them with the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility. Last week, the Steering Committee discussed the operationalisation of the Rome Declaration and the Programme.

### **How is the EU providing financial support to the Rabat Process?**

• Specific support to the Rabat Process is included in the [Annual Action Programme 2014 under the Pan-African Programme](#) of the Development Cooperation Instrument, through which the EU is funding an action supporting the migration and mobility dialogue with the African Union. In addition, the EU is funding through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) an important number of migration-related actions at bilateral and regional levels that support the implementation of various commitments taken under the Rabat Process. For instance, under the 10th European Development Fund, the EU is funding a €26 million project to support the free movement of persons and migration in West Africa. The project is implemented in joint management with the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The overall objective is to support the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Free Movement of Persons Protocols and ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration. The EU also envisages continued funding in the area of migration under the 11th European Development Fund which should be signed in the first half of 2015. As part of the Sahel Regional Action Plan, the EU will reinforce the development-migration nexus and mainstream migration into the EU and Member States' collective actions based on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility and the Rabat process.

### **The Khartoum Process**

• The Khartoum Process was launched at a Ministerial Conference in November 2014 in Rome. The objective is to establish a long-standing dialogue on migration and mobility aimed at enhancing

the current cooperation, including through the identification and implementation of concrete projects. In the first phase, activities should concentrate on addressing trafficking in human beings as well as smuggling of migrants.

- The Khartoum Process is led by a Steering Committee comprised of five EU Member States (Italy, France, Germany, UK, and Malta), five partner countries (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, Sudan) as well as the European Commission, the European External Action Service and the AU Commission on the African side.

### **How is the EU providing financial support to the Khartoum Process?**

- The Khartoum Process will be directly supported under the "Support to Africa-EU Migration and Mobility Dialogue" programme (€ 17.5 million under the Pan-African Programme).
- Additional initiatives are planned to implement actions in line with the Ministerial declaration of November 2014, including a project on Addressing Mixed Migration Flows in East Africa (€5 million under the Development Cooperation Instrument- Global Public Goods and Challenges thematic programme (DCI-GPGC), to be implemented by Expertise France) and a project on support to EU law enforcement cooperation along the Horn of Africa Migration Route (€0.75 million under the Internal Security Fund for police cooperation). Under the forthcoming Regional Indicative Programme for East Africa, South Africa and Indian Ocean region of the 11th European Development Fund, a cross-regional envelope of €25 million has been earmarked for migration in this region, with a particular focus on the Khartoum process, including the need to address international protection needs.

### **The Sahel Regional Action Plan?**

- On 20 April 2015, the Council adopted the [Sahel Regional Action Plan 2015-2020](#) which provides the overall framework for the implementation of the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, as adopted and revised in its Conclusions on 21 March 2011 and 17 March 2014, respectively.
- The Action Plan provides a solid basis for reinforcing the EU's focus around four domains that are highly relevant to the stabilisation of the region, namely prevention and countering radicalisation; creation of appropriate conditions for youth; migration, mobility and border management; the fight against illicit trafficking; and transnational organised crime.

### **Migration and Mobility**

- People move to escape poverty and conflict, to seek protection from persecution or serious harm, or to build a better life. For individuals, migration can be one of the most powerful and immediate strategies for poverty reduction. In the absence of employment opportunities, many youth seek for better opportunities by migrating. The Sahel Regional Action Plan will focus on this link between migration and development. In addition, the EU will focus on preventing and fighting against irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking in human beings; promoting international protection and organising mobility and legal migration.
- The situation in Niger, as a major transit country, will require strengthened efforts, notably to reinforce and accompany the actions already launched by the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission EUCAP Sahel Niger.

### **The types of recent migrants Malta**

- Trends of Migrations- The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Malta estimates in its 2014 midyear update that less than 30 per cent of the around 19,000 individuals who arrived by boat from Libya since 2002 remain in Malta, while more than 2,600 beneficiaries of protection have been resettled or relocated since 2005.

- 2020 Arrivals and Asylum Trends.

- From January to December 2020, 2,281 people were rescued at sea and disembarked in Malta. This is a 33% decrease compared to 2019 sea arrivals (3,406 sea arrivals in 2019). The number of sea arrivals to Malta at the start of 2020 was relatively high in January and February, with 989 people being disembarked in Malta during this period. In March, 146 people were rescued and disembarked in Malta by the AFM, 66 people in April, 72 in May and 426 in June. In July and August 2020, there were 463 sea arrivals. In September, there were no sea arrivals, 94 persons disembarked in Malta in October, and there were 25 arrivals in November. Unaccompanied children: 537 unaccompanied and separated children reached Malta in 2020, representing 24% of all arrivals. Unaccompanied children originate mostly from Sudan (22%), Somalia (21%), Bangladesh (15%) and Eritrea (14%).

In mid-2020, the top five countries of origin of asylum seekers were Sudan (33%), Bangladesh (15%), Somalia (11%), Eritrea (7%) and Cote D'Ivoire (7%) Most were men (69%), with relatively few women (5%), and children accounting for 26% of migrants. In the same period, 395 unaccompanied children reached Malta, an increase of 35% compared to mid-2019. The majority of these children were from Sudan (27%), Somalia (23%), Bangladesh (18%) and Cote d'Ivoire (7%).

Between January and June 2020, some 4468 children, including 415 (93%) UASC were among arrivals resulting from search and rescue activities. Most children, including UASC, originated from Sudan, Somalia and Bangladesh. Upon arrival, unaccompanied children awaiting age assessment are placed in detention facilities. After the age assessment has been conducted, those found to be underage may be placed in open reception centers with dedicated sections for unaccompanied children over the age of 16. Unaccompanied children below the age of 16 are usually accommodated in Dar Il-Liedna open centre, designated for children. ▪ At the end of June 2020, an estimated 350 unaccompanied children were accommodated in open centers, while a further 338 remained in detention facilities. Another 90 unaccompanied children were hosted at the Initial Reception Center.

- Between 1 January and 30 April 2021, there were 79 sea arrivals to Malta. This is a 93% decrease compared to the same period last year (1201 sea arrivals to Malta from January to April 2020), and 74% less than the 301 sea arrivals in the same period in 2019. Of the 79 persons that arrived in Malta, 65 landed on Malta spontaneously in February, while 14 persons were rescued by the AFM in April. There were no sea arrivals in January or March 2021. The UNHCR team attends and monitors disembarkations, providing interpretation support to the authorities and giving initial information on reception and asylum procedures to all new arrivals.

- Stock data compiled from the National Census published in 2011 indicates that, at the time, 35,116 individuals lived in Malta, albeit their country of birth was not Malta. This amounts to 8.4 per cent of the total population. It becomes apparent that those born in the United Kingdom constitute by far the largest group (30%), reflecting Malta's colonial history and the British legacy in many aspects of the contemporary Maltese society, as well as Maltese emigration to the United Kingdom. Collectively, these factors have ensured a continuation of transnational relationships and influence. Persons born in Australia, in turn, make up 12 per cent of the individuals living in Malta whose country of birth was not Malta, reflecting the high levels of Maltese emigration to Australia post-World War II. Those born in "other countries", namely non-European countries and countries not otherwise explicitly mentioned (including countries in Asia and Africa but excluding Somalia), make up 19 per cent of the total population of individuals living in Malta whose country of birth was not Malta.



### **Migration Libya to Malta: its specificity**

The on-going Libyan conflict and ensuing lawlessness allows smugglers to operate with impunity. Stabilising Libya constitutes a crucial step in preventing further loss of life off the Libyan shores. The EU strongly supports the work of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya and the UN led dialogue process. The EU strongly encourages the Libyan parties to agree to a Government of National Unity. The EU is ready to offer support to that future government in a whole array of areas including on migration issues so as to help bring an end to the human suffering of migrants. In the meantime, the EU continues to address the humanitarian consequences of the crisis and its impact on migrants and other vulnerable groups.

Recent years have witnessed a significant investment in migration projects in Libya (€42.7 million committed between 2011 and 2014). Each EU funded programme entails different areas of interventions. Support to migration management focuses on three sub-sectors: human rights based migration management; countering irregular migration; and assistance to people in need of international protection.

After the deterioration of the security situation last year and in order to respond to the needs of people fleeing fighting areas in Libya, EU migration support has been refocused to guarantee emergency care and support for stranded migrants, refugees, asylum seekers and displaced people in Libya and in the neighbouring countries. Due to the very volatile political context, the institutional support programmes are on hold with the exception of training activities targeting the Libyan Coastal Gard (SeaHorse Programme, € 4.5 million).

Since the beginning of the crisis in 2014, the EU funded programme START (€9.9 million), implemented by IOM, has supported the evacuation and repatriation of 788 stranded migrants (around 4,000 additional cases have been identified by IOM) and the distribution of Non-Food Items and Hygiene kits to 1,100 stranded migrants and to 2,600 displaced families across Libya. Two new programmes to be implemented by the International Federation of Red Cross in coordination with the Libyan Red Crescent have been signed y and are expected to start delivering assistance to migrants (€6.25 million) and to IDPs and at risk groups (€2.9 million) in the coming weeks.

### **Integration and redistribution of migrants in EU societies: to stay or not to stay**

Malta Declaration by the members of the European Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the Central Mediterranean route put forward all elements of the EU's comprehensive migration policy. EU member states reaffirm the determination to act in full respect of human rights, international law and European values, and in conjunction with UNHCR and IOM.

A key element of a sustainable migration policy is to ensure effective control of our external border and stem illegal flows into the EU. In 2016, arrivals decreased to one-third of the levels in 2015. On the Eastern Mediterranean route, while pressures remain, arrivals in the last four months of 2016 were down 98% year-on-year. EU remain committed to the EU-Turkey Statement and the full and non-discriminatory implementation of all its aspects, as well as to continued support for the countries along the Western Balkans route.

On the Central Mediterranean route, however, over 181,000 arrivals were detected in 2016, while the number of persons dead or missing at sea has reached a new record every year since 2013. With hundreds having already lost their lives in 2017 and spring approaching, we are determined to take additional action to significantly reduce migratory flows along the Central Mediterranean route and break the business model of smugglers, while remaining vigilant about the Eastern Mediterranean as

well as other routes. Leaders agreed to step up work with Libya as the main country of departure as well as with its North African and sub-Saharan neighbours.

The Partnership Framework and the Valletta Action Plan have allowed us to deepen long-term cooperation with a number of partner countries, including on root causes of migration, through a solid partnership based on mutual trust. This work is already yielding results and will be intensified. At the same time, the urgency of the situation requires immediate additional operational measures at the regional level, taking a pragmatic, flexible and tailor-made approach at each and every point involving all actors along the migratory route. In this context, we welcome the joint Commission and High Representative Communication "Migration on the Central Mediterranean Route - Managing flows, saving lives".

Efforts to stabilise Libya are now more important than ever, and the EU will do its utmost to contribute to that objective. In Libya, capacity building is key for the authorities to acquire control over the land and sea borders and to combat transit and smuggling activities. The EU remains committed to an inclusive political settlement under the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement and to supporting the Presidency Council and the Government of National Accord backed by the United Nations. Where possible the EU and Member States will also step-up cooperation with and assistance to Libyan regional and local communities and with international organizations active in the country.

Priority will be given to the following elements:

- Training, equipment and support to the Libyan national coast guard and other relevant agencies. Complementary EU training programmes must be rapidly stepped up, both in intensity and numbers, starting with those already undertaken by Operation SOPHIA and building on its experience. Funding and planning for these activities needs to be made sustainable and predictable, including through the Seahorse Mediterranean Network;
- further efforts to disrupt the business model of smugglers through enhanced operational action, within an integrated approach involving Libya and other countries on the route and relevant international partners, engaged Member States, CSDP missions and operations, Europol and the European Border and Coast Guard;
- Supporting where possible the development of local communities in Libya, especially in coastal areas and at Libyan land borders on the migratory routes, to improve their socio-economic situation and enhance their resilience as host communities;
- Seeking to ensure adequate reception capacities and conditions in Libya for migrants, together with the UNHCR and IOM;
- Supporting IOM in significantly stepping up assisted voluntary return activities;
- Enhancing information campaigns and outreach addressed at migrants in Libya and countries of origin and transit, in cooperation with local actors and international organisations, particularly to counter the smugglers' business model;
- Helping to reduce the pressure on Libya's land borders, working both with the Libyan authorities and all neighbours of Libya, including by supporting projects enhancing their border management capacity;
- Keeping track of alternative routes and possible diversion of smugglers' activities, through cooperative efforts with Libya's neighbours and the countries under the Partnership Framework, with the support of Member States and all relevant EU agencies and by making available all necessary surveillance instruments;
- continuing support to efforts and initiatives from individual Member States directly engaged with Libya; in this respect, the EU welcomes and is ready to support Italy in its implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 2 February 2017 by the Italian Authorities and Chairman of the Presidential Council al-Serraj;

- Deepening dialogue and cooperation on migration with all countries neighbouring Libya, including better operational cooperation with Member States and the European Border and Coast Guard on preventing departures and managing returns.
- These objectives shall be underpinned by the necessary resources. In line with the Valletta Action Plan, the European Union is strengthening the mainstreaming of migration within its Official Development Assistance for Africa, which amounts to €31 billion during this financial period. Some of the actions referred to above can be funded within projects already under way, notably projects funded by the EU Trust Fund for Africa as appropriate, which mobilises €1,8 billion from the EU budget and €152 million from Member States' contributions. To cover the most urgent funding needs now and throughout 2017, we welcome the Commission's decision to mobilise as a first step an additional €200 million for the North Africa window of the Fund and to give priority to migration-related projects concerning Libya.
- We will further develop our external migration policy in order to make it resilient for future crises. We will identify potential barriers, for example in relation to conditions to be met for returns, and reinforce EU return capacities, while respecting international law. We welcome the Commission's intention to rapidly present, as a first step, an updated Action Plan on Returns and to provide guidance for more operational returns by the EU and Member States and effective readmission based upon the existing acquis.
- EU states agreed to act determinedly and speedily to achieve the objectives set out in this Declaration and call upon all actors to work towards this end. We welcome the intention of the Maltese Presidency, in close cooperation with the Commission and the High Representative, to present a concrete plan for implementation to this effect to the Council at the earliest opportunity, to take work forward and to ensure close monitoring of results. The European Council will review progress on the overall approach at its meetings in March and in June on the basis of a report from the Maltese Presidency.

### **A qualitative approach in front of young migrants: approaches and results**

It is seen to be extremely difficult to move out of the open centres for a number of reasons. Firstly, the immigrants are given a small sum of money a week, and must be at the open centres at a certain time three times a week to sign in. This therefore makes it harder for them to hold onto a job or to any classes, as if they do not attend this, they would not receive their allotted allowance for the week, which is ultimately what they live off. This sum, plus the money they get paid for work, which is usually minimum wage or less is not enough for the immigrant to move out of the open centres and start a living within a community, which makes it harder for them to further their studies or integrate in any way.

Youth- Economic growth is necessary to create employment and to significantly reduce widespread poverty and income inequalities that continue to prevail across the Sahel. More effort is needed to create job opportunities throughout all sectors, in particular for youth.

The EU will provide assistance relevant for youth, including education and training as well as job creation, and ensure equal opportunities for boys and girls. An example of such as assistance is the empowerment of mainstream youth through identification of indicators to monitor and to promote education and youth employment so as to offer alternatives to illegal activities/extremist actions.

Further analysis on how to support youth as agents for positive change will also be provided. The EU will build youth resilience, e.g. by further promoting economic and employment opportunities

(through support to SMEs and key value chains, the recruitment of local labor, etc.) and the reduction of inequalities in EU and Member States programmes, wherever possible.

A special reflexion could also be launched on demography challenge in order to know how to better address it. Demography should become progressively and more systematically part of the political dialogue with beneficiary countries. More broadly, EU and Member States' instruments will be mobilised to improve social cohesion and inclusive economic growth, including regional integration, in particular through the implementation of Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme (EPADP).

## **The Case for Climate Reparations**

The world's poorest will bear the worst consequences of the climate crisis. Redirecting international resources to address entrenched inequalities provides a way out said [OLÚFÉMI O. TÁÍWÒ](#), [BEBA CIBRALIC](#)

Taking current estimates put the world on track for as much as a [5°C temperature increase](#) by the end of the century, reshaping the places that humans have lived for thousands of years. Island states such as Haiti, Cape Verde, and Fiji face "[existential risks](#)" from sea level rise and extreme weather events. By as soon as 2050, large parts of Mumbai, Ho Chi Minh City, and New Orleans may be [underwater](#). Over the next 30 years, the climate crisis will displace more than [140 million people](#) within their own countries—and many more beyond them. Global warming doesn't respect lines on a map: It will drive massive waves of displacement across national borders, as it has in [Guatemala](#) and Africa's [Sahel region](#) in recent years.

The [great climate migration](#) that will transform the world is just beginning. To adapt, the international community will need a different approach to politics. There are two ways forward: climate reparations or climate colonialism. Reparations would use international resources to address inequalities caused or exacerbated by the climate crisis; it would allow for a way out of the climate catastrophe by tackling both mitigation and migration. The climate colonialism alternative, on the other hand, would mean the survival of the wealthiest and devastation for the world's most vulnerable people.

As the climate crisis intensifies, social divisions will arise within countries and communities between those who can pay to avoid the worst impacts of climate change and those who cannot—a system of [climate apartheid](#). In Bangladesh, rising sea levels have displaced [hundreds of thousands of people](#), pushing some into poverty and deepening socioeconomic inequality. Increased desertification in Nigeria has caused resource shortages in water and land, leading to [conflict](#) between herders and farmers. In the United States, [unprecedented wildfires](#), heat, and smog have hit unhoused people the hardest.

The wealthy find ways to insulate themselves from the worst consequences of the climate crisis. In Lagos, Nigeria, for example, the government cleared hundreds of thousands of slum dwellers to make way for developers. The so-called [Great Wall of Lagos](#) sea wall will shield a planned luxury community on Victoria Island from sea level rise at the expense of neighbouring areas. The poor, the unemployed, and those who lack stable housing are seeing their living conditions rapidly deteriorate, with little hope for a solution.

Climate colonialism is like climate apartheid on an international scale. Economic power, location, and access to resources determine how communities can respond to climate impacts. But these factors are shaped by existing global injustices: the history of slavery, colonialism, and imperialism that enriched some countries at the expense of others. Global warming has [exacerbated](#) these inequalities, and the climate crisis will lead to new divisions between those who can mitigate its impact and those who cannot.

## Good practices and solutions

1. Integration of youth with migrant parents
  - Use inclusive language to refer to youth with migrant parents.
  - Make sure all children start school on an equal footing
  - Provide flexible education pathways for youth born abroad
  - Involve immigrant parents in the education process
  - Reduce the concentration of disadvantaged youth with immigrant parents
  - Prevent school drop-out and establish second-chance programmes
  - Promote educational excellence and role modelling
  - Facilitate the school-to-work transition
  - Tackle discrimination and encourage diversity
  - Foster social integration through sports and associations
  - Encourage naturalisation
  
2. Challenges in the integration of youth with migrant parents
  - Identify the gaps vis-à-vis their peers with native-born parents in terms of education and labour market outcomes.
  - Create networks for finding a job – and here youth with migrant parents tend to be at a structural disadvantage. There is also evidence that discrimination may be more pronounced. Tackling the high risk of the gaps in terms of education and labour market outcomes widening again, leaving not only lasting scars on the life-chances of youth with migrant parents but also posing a threat to social cohesion at large.
  - Make full use of instruments available at EU level, notably the EU reinforced youth guarantee, which pays a special attention to this group.

### Examples of good practices:

In Germany, the Joblinge programme trains mentors and connects young people with the labour market.

In Portugal, the ‘Choices Programme’ (Programa Escolhas) promotes the integration of 6 to 24 years old from disadvantaged social backgrounds, many of whom are children of immigrants. The programme involves local authorities and civil society organisations. It includes several strategic areas of intervention, including combatting early school drop-out through the creation of new educational tools; the development of personal, social and cognitive skills through formal and non-formal education; and the promotion of family co-responsibility in the parental surveillance process. Promote educational excellence and role modelling Youth with migrant parents need to be able to excel in the educational system.

Use peer-mentoring schemes. The public sector can also be a role model itself, by pro-actively promoting recruitment of candidates with migrant parents and encouraging immigrants and their children to apply to public sector jobs.

In Norway they introduced legal requirements for the public sector to invite a certain number of candidates with migrant parents for interviews. The country has also established diversity recruitment plans, set diversity targets and provides diversity training for recruitment staff in the public sector.

In Australia, the ‘Pathways to Employment Program’ offers youth direct guidance, employment opportunities, traineeships, apprenticeships, and work experience across a wide range of industries. The programme also includes a mentorship scheme that matches volunteers with professional work experience with tertiary-level students. Tackle discrimination and encourage diversity Discrimination plays an important role in the persistent disadvantage faced by many youths with migrant parents. It has two distinct facets: individuals' subjective perception of being discriminated against and actual discrimination, for example in the hiring process.

In Europe, in several countries there are alarmingly high shares of youth with migrant parents who feel discriminated against.

In France, the government, for example, provides companies with the possibility of passing an audit as to whether or not they use fair hiring and promotion practices. If enterprises satisfy certain criteria, they can obtain a diversity label (‘label diversité’).

In Belgium grants specific diversity awards to employers with diversity-friendly company structures.

NGO’s can foster social integration through sports and associations Integration of youth with migrant parents is more effective to be full and equal part of the society. Participation in associations such as sports clubs, music groups or charities, provides an excellent opportunity for all youth to interact. Active participation in associations also promotes opportunities to demonstrate talent and assume leadership roles in ways that might not be feasible in other settings and can provide the relevant networks for better inclusion in the labour market. Signalling social engagement has also significantly limited discrimination in testing studies. Alongside setting incentives for associations, policies can counter barriers and obstacles for youth with immigrant parents by reducing barriers to participate in associations through active reach-out, better information sharing and facilitated access through intermediaries like schools. There is also a case for supporting and showcasing successful projects that enhance the interaction between youth of native- and foreign-born parentage and facilitate entrance into the labour market.

The Football Association of Ireland, for example, has set up a nationwide afterschool programme in partnership with schools and grass-root clubs, linking students with migrant parents and their parents to local sports clubs.

In Italy, Ministry of Labour has a longstanding “Sport and Integration” project in collaboration with the Italian Olympics Committee (CONI), to foster social integration and fight racial discrimination and intolerance. Encourage naturalisation Citizenship is a powerful asset that can positively impact various aspects of life. Citizenship legally enables full social and civic participation and also builds a sense of belonging and is associated with better labour market outcomes for youth with migrant parents.

In Canada, a country with the highest citizenship take-up rate, has a long tradition of encouraging and facilitating naturalisation among eligible residents. An example is the ‘Citizenship Awareness Program’, includes the distribution of the citizenship study guide ‘Discover Canada’, the organisation of an annual citizenship week, and social media campaigns for promoting citizenship.

In Malta through the youth guarantee scheme it provides good education, apprenticeship, traineeship or employment to youth. This EU-funded project developed for young people aged 15 to 24 years, retained its efforts towards its four education and employment related initiatives, namely: • The

NEET Activation Scheme II<sup>68</sup>, • SEC Revisions Classes<sup>69</sup>, • MCAST Preventive Classes<sup>70</sup>, • and the ICT Summer Courses<sup>71</sup>. Based on preventive and assistive measures, each opportunity is designed to help young people continue their education or increase their chances of finding satisfaction and success in the world of work. The Youth Guarantee scheme helped to reduce the number of youths who are not in education and employment (NEET) and early school leavers (ESL), increase their skills through training programmes and provided incentives for education and continuous learning with the aim to improve youth skills and enhance their employability.

Work Exposure Scheme: a change has been undertaken with respect to the number of hours in on the job training. Whereas before the 240 hours had to be spread over 12 weeks with an average of on the job training of 20 hours per week, now the maximum number of placement hours in a given week has risen to 40 hours. The 240 hours threshold within the maximum period of 12 weeks still applies.

Investment in job creation for vulnerable groups was sustained through a number of schemes, projects and services as follows: The Community Work Scheme provided dignity and work for a number of vulnerable persons who had been claiming unemployment benefits for years through an agreement signed between Malta Investment Management Company and the General Workers Union in 2016. By end December 2019, there were 919 employees, of whom 740 are males and 179 are females.

However, we believe that these schemes be opened to those immigrants who are in the open centres in order to train them and equip them with opportunities to be ready to join the labour market once their legal papers are finalised, avoiding boredom and waiting in desperation.

## References

<https://family.gov.mt/en/Documents/Poverty%20Strategy%2014%20English%20Version.pdf>

National Agricultural Policy for the Maltese Islands 2018-2028

Malta's harsh migrant treatment broke international law - Council of Europe report

## **10. Climate and Migration – Power, Perception and Policy**

**What can we learn from public opinion Surveys in the Euro–Med region?  
Is there a link between the public attitudes in the two fields, and what can be deduced from the perceptions in relation to the outline of climate migration' strategic plan in a regional perspective?**

Carmit Lubanov, Association of Environmental Justice in Israel

### ***Abstract***

*The results of surveys of the world's leading institutes in recent years, shown that the awareness of the climate crisis has increased, and in lesser extent following increasing of the awareness of the socio-economic aspects of the climate crisis, in which vulnerable populations in sensitive geographical areas are vulnerable to far-reaching changes in livelihood and life threat, the discourse on climate migration has been expanded.*

*From a climate point of view, the rise in the level of awareness seems to help a broader understanding of the current and future effects of the climate crisis.*

*What is the nature of these long-term trends as observed in the field, that have already an expression in the surveys?. In this context, the research examined if one who is aware of the consequences of climate change in a place inhabited in areas not at the forefront of climate change (but as more of 'climate security' area), associating these processes with an impact on a distant continent that threatens the lives of millions of people to migrate to more physically safe places.*

*The present study examines what can be learned from the surveys conducted on the subject in recent years, and whether there is a correlation between the level of awareness of climate change with migration against this backdrop, and how, if at all, surveys of recent years can be used to address synced policies of Climate justice and migration.*

*The study seeks to review public attitudes surveys on climate and migration as reflected in key aspects that are central in framework of this project, intercultural and socio-economic:*

- 1) Is there a correlation between public attitudes towards climate and migration, and its nature?*
- 2) What can we draw from those surveys in outlining recommendations for regional policy for climate migration in the Euro-Med region?*

**Key Words:** awareness, multiplied threat, psychological distance, security, risk



## Table of Contents

<i>Section</i>	<i>Page</i>
Abstract, Key Words	175
Content	
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations	176
List of Figures	
I. Introduction - Research objectives and framework	177
II. Perceptions on Climate Change and threat awareness	177
III. Climate, Migration and the power coupling	183
a. Climate Migration – what shapes attitudes?	
b. Climate and Migration – the key power between opportunity to threat	
c. Cultural Diversity and social aspects	
d. Climate Migration – place to be optimist?	
IV. Concluding Remarks	189
Reference	

## List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AEJI	Association of Environmental Justice in Israel
ALF	Anna Lindh Foundation
CAT	Climate Action Tracker
CC	Climate Change
CCA	Climate Change Awareness
CCRP	Climate Change Risk Perception
EB	Europe Barometer
EC	European Commission
EIB	European Investment Bank
EU	European Union
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
PCA	Paris Climate Agreement
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

RE	Renewable Energy
Unical	University of Calabria
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

### List of Figures:

**Figure 1.** “Global geographic patterns of climate change perception, for a) awareness, and b) concern [in 2007-2008]. Darker shading shows countries where respondents were more aware or concerned. Light grey indicates countries with no data. Source: Lee et al. (2015).” (Mcsweeney, 2015).

**Figure 2.** Top predictors by country of climate change awareness (a) and risk perception (b) in 2007-2008. (Lee et al., 2015).

**Figure 3:** Major perceived threats around the world in 2018 (Pew Research Center).

**Figure 4:** Increase in climate change concern in select countries between 2013 and 2018 (Pew Research Center).

**Figure 5:** Public perception of the threat posed by global climate change in select countries (Pew Research Center).

**Figure 6:** What are the two most important issues facing the EU? (Eurobarometer)

**Figure 7:** Diversity (Pew Research Center).

**Figure 8:** Education impact (Pew Research Center).

**Figure 9:** Acceptance rates of people who agree to let in migrants with different reasons for migration and different economic and cultural characteristics (Helbing, 2020).

**Table 1:** Proximity aspects influencing attitudes towards climate migrants.

## I. Introduction - Research objectives and framework

In light of the change in the climate discourse in recent years, and moreover the understanding of the influencing factors when examining the impact of the Change in a regional prism, AEJI proposed in frame of a regional work on Climate Change (CC) to the Middle East, a conceptual shift of the paradigm from 'GHG emissions mitigation and adaptation to low carbon economy', to 'Mitigate Climate Risks and adaptation to Climate security', when social protection is essential component. (Gordon, 2017).

In another study initiated and conducted by AEJI (Nordland, 2020), we focused on the link between awareness and concern for cc, and understanding of its causes to influential public advocacy for government policies that mitigate atmospheric warming, while examining public support in order for government climate actions to be successful.

It was realized that the relationship between climate awareness, the concern and the ambition of climate policy in specific countries, especially developing countries, is not well studied or understood (Nordland, 2020). Given the complexity of these interactions, unique confounding factors that exist in the public and political spheres of specific countries, and the general lack of data on climate perceptions in developing countries, the above report examined the correlation between these two variables at the cross-national level, where Israel was one of the target nations to research.

The current study, to a certain extent, in the broadening of the research context, as continuation of previous studies, while it is delimited by the question of migration that is on the global and regional agenda in the Euro-Mediterranean region. By observing factors that influence climate awareness and concern at regional level, also in comparison to the global data, and by examining climate perceptions and migration in wide context of socio-economic, cultural and policy as reflected by recent surveys in European and Mediterranean countries, and thus in order to illuminate these aspects, to create a better understanding of the two crises that are expected to accompany us in the decades to come, climate and migration as nexus.

**The research here is also aimed to initiate a discussion in the public and political arena of the Euro-Med region, which will lead to sustainable political solutions, as part of formulating a climate security strategy in a trans-continental region (Africa-Mediterranean-Europe), and mainstreaming the vulnerable populations in this strategy, for which climate change poses economic and existential threat.**

## II. Perceptions on Climate Change and threat awareness

After a review of dozens of surveys published in recent years (global and in relation to Europe and Mediterranean), the results of the following surveys were chosen to be presented according to thematic fields that are central to the study: culture, environment and climate, social and characterization of the population.


Below is the presentation of the surveys, data and discussion in relation to climate change and threat, and in the 2nd chapter climate and migration.

As it already performed in work conducted in 2020 in the frame of AEJI (Ibid.) of reviewing surveys relating Climate change perceptions and factors that influence them have been disproportionately in Western nations including European countries. But little is known about the progression of public awareness and concern for climate change in developing countries (Capstick et al., 2014). Lee et al. conducted the first global cross-sectional study to identify major sociodemographic factors that impact awareness and concern for climate change, the results of which were published in 2015.


Their data on climate awareness and risk perception was taken from a 2007-2008 Gallup World Poll on climate change awareness (CCA), which surveyed thousands of respondents in 119 countries, representing about 90% of the world's population (Lee et al., 2015). Factors tested include age, education level, urban vs. rural location, income, access to communication, and community engagement on environmental matters (Mcsweeney, 2015).

According to the findings of Lee et al. (2015), there is a wide range of climate awareness and risk perception throughout the world, though there are clear trends by region and by level of country development (Figure 1).

The results for global trends in climate change risk perception (CCRP) were the inverse of CCA, with people aware of climate change in developing countries of Latin America and Africa generally perceiving much greater risk than those in developed countries (Lee et al., 2015). Latin America and European countries displayed greater CCRP when respondents believed that climate change is mostly human-caused, while in several Asian and African countries, CCRP was most strongly associated with perceived changes in local temperatures. Local political ideologies also played a role in the CCRP of some countries. The complexity and specificity of political situations and ideologies around the world made it difficult for Lee et al. (2015) to accurately characterize the influence of local politics on CCRP on a global scale. Though Lee et al. (Ibid) did not posit the reason for the inverse relationship between CCA and CCRP in developed vs. developing countries, other studies apply the psychological distance theory to explain low CCRP in developed countries (Spence et al., 2012). The explanation of 'psychological distance' will be raised in the second chapter relating to migration. According to this theory, members of developed country populations may feel as though the threat of climate change is far removed from them geographically (the threat is physically far away), temporally (impacts of climate change will only be felt by future generations years or decades from now), or socially (climate change is a threat to people that are not like 'me'), and this as a result can lead to apathy, complacency, or even resistance toward climate action by the government and policy-driven societal change (Steentjes et al., 2017).




*Figure 1: "Global geographic patterns of climate change perception, for a) awareness, and b) concern [in 2007-2008]. Darker shading shows countries where respondents were more aware or concerned. Light grey indicates countries with no data. Source: Lee et al. (2015)." (Mcsweeney, 2015)*



*Figure 2: Top predictors by country of (a) climate change awareness and (b) and risk perception in 2007-2008. (Lee et al., 2015)*


The 2018 Pew survey on global attitudes and trends provided interesting insights on what 26 surveyed nations feel are the major threats facing the world today, climate change among them. Of the 26, half of all countries named climate change as the top international threat over terrorism by ISIS and cyberattacks from other countries (Figure 5) (Poushter & Huang, 2019). Thorough comparison of this study to Lee et al. (2015) is limited by the lack of polling in Asia and Africa, but we can see that since 2015, and the Gallup polls of 2007-2008, climate change remains the top concern in Latin America, while in Europe it seems to only recently have emerged as a major perceived threat, **with 71% of surveyed countries in Europe** selecting climate change as their biggest issue (Poushter & Huang, 2019). This Pew survey also examined how concern for climate change has shifted over time by comparing the results of the 2018 survey with the version conducted in 2017 as well as 2013. We can clearly see that overall concern for climate change as a major threat has increased steadily among the 23 countries surveyed by Pew since 2013 (Figure 3, Figure 4) (Poushter & Huang, 2019).



*Figure 3: Major perceived threats around the world in 2018 (Pew Research Center)*

**Since 2013, concerns about climate change have increased in many countries**

*Climate change is a major threat to our country*



Note: Countries shown experienced a 10 percentage point change or greater over this time period.  
 Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, Q22d.


PEW RESEARCH CENTER

*Figure 4: Increase in climate change concern in select countries between 2013 and 2018 (Pew Research Center).*

Compared to the surveys discussed in the report thus far, the EIB Climate Survey is even more fastidious, examining climate change attitudes in the EU, the US, and China exclusively. In general, the overrepresentation of developed nations in public opinion research on climate is an issue, and researchers and policymakers would truly benefit from understanding diverse climate change perspectives on a global scale. But it is simultaneously important to have a robust understanding of how populations of major world powers feel about climate change, as the EU and top emitters like the US and China must lead the charge on ambitious climate action and mitigation policy if there is any hope of achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. For this reason, this survey was included in the report. According to the EIB, about half of Europeans, 39% of Americans, and 73% of Chinese think climate change is a major threat (Figure 9) (Fleming, 2020). Across the studies discussed in this report thus far, climate change concern in the US was typically found to be lower than concern in EU countries by the 2019 European Investment Bank (EIB) Climate Survey.

## In most surveyed countries, majorities see climate change as a major threat

Global climate change is a \_\_\_ to our country



Source: Spring 2018 Global Attitudes Survey, Q22d.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

In Europe, the perceived influence of climate change in daily life is slightly different by region, with over 90% of South and Eastern Europeans perceiving a daily impact from climate change, versus 70% or less of North Europeans (Figure 10) (EIB, 2020). This is an interesting difference considering that among various issues, climate change was found to be of greatest concern for North Europe countries like the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and Germany, while for South Europe countries like Spain and Italy, unemployment overshadowed climate worries, despite the reported toll that climate change is already having on Southern Europe (EIB, 2020).

Figure 5: public perception of the threat posed by global climate change

### III. Climate, Migration and the power coupling

#### a. Climate migration – what shapes attitudes?

Reviewing the vast volume of surveys that published in recent years, led to conservative choice with the results of the European Commission's biannual Eurobarometer public opinion survey, which can be summarized that whilst 'climate change is growing in the public consciousness, migration is still the major issue for more EU citizens' (EC, Euro barometer, 2019).<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> The 'Autumn 2019 – Standard Eurobarometer' (EB 92) was conducted through face-to-face interviews between 14 November and 13 December 2019 across the 28 EU Member States and in the candidate countries. 27,382 interviews were conducted in the EU28 Member States between 14 and 29 November 2019.



The report "How do host–migrant proximities shape attitudes toward internal climate migrants?" was published relating how attitudes toward migrants, refugees, natural hazards and their victims, and climate change, its consequences, and climate actions suggested that a range of factors related to proximity may influence attitudes among host community members toward internal climate migrants. For many – in the Global North at least – climate change and its consequences are abstract phenomena that primarily affect other people, in other places, and in a somewhat distant and uncertain future, that is, they are psychologically distant. Similarly, the literature on immigration suggests that *psychological distance* between hosts and migrants influences hosts’ attitudes toward migration (Hainmueller, Hiscox, & Margalit, 2015; Rustenbach, 2010) and the literature on disasters that increased psychological distance to a disaster and its victims influences helping and prosocial behaviour (Andrighejo, Baldissarri, Lajanzio, Loughnan, & Volpato, 2014; Zageva, 2018). Therefore, they conceptualized a model to understand how host community members’ attitudes toward internal climate migrants' form. One should consider host community members’ proximity to climate migrants in terms of their own distance to potentially highly exposed areas (spatial proximity), personal values and worldviews that shrink or expand the compassion shown to fellow citizens (attitudinal proximity), experiences of similar life events (experiential proximity), and educational, economic and occupational similarity with the potential migrants (social proximity).

Table 1. **Psychological distance** refers to the extent to which an object or event is removed from the self here and now. The ways in which the object or event can be removed from this reference point include the space, and social distance, construing different distance dimensions (Trope & Liberman, 2010).

**Table 1:** Proximity aspects influencing attitudes towards climate migrants

Spatial proximity	Attitudinal proximity	Experiential proximity	Social proximity
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Distance to places highly exposed to climate-related hazard events</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Values and personality</li> <li>Attribution bias</li> <li>In- and outgroup attitudes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Similar past experiences</li> <li>Similar present experiences</li> <li>Similar (anticipated) future experiences</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Educational similarity</li> <li>Economic similarity</li> <li>Occupational similarity</li> </ul>

As mentioned above, while climate change is growing in the public consciousness, migration is still the major issue for more EU citizens, according to the results of the European Commission's biannual Eurobarometer public opinion survey.

Migration remains the top concern across the EU, according to an EU public opinion poll, although the importance of climate change is growing. 34% of respondents in the new Eurobarometer survey rank migration as the most pressing issue, down 6 points from last year. However, the issue topped the list of issues in 21 member states, with Malta, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and the Netherlands having the highest proportion of respondents ranking it most problematic.

For the first time, climate change upgraded to the second most important concern, with 22% of respondents mentioning it, according to the biannual poll conducted by the European Commission. The economy, member states' public finances and terrorism tied for third at 18% in the survey, followed by the environment at 13%.




Figure 6: What are the two most important issues facing the EU?

*b. Climate and Migration – the key power between opportunity to threat*

A majority of Europe’s voters do not consider migration to be the most important issue, according to a new poll. The subjects that were examined are corruption, living standards, housing, unemployment and health rank above, or alongside, migration as key issues for European voters. Despite anti-immigration rhetoric across Europe, many voters view domestic issues as chief concerns. Voters in Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania and Spain are more concerned about people leaving their country than coming in.

It seems that if someone who is involved in the field of climate and migration policy, and would like to be grounded on surveys, but also to remain optimistic, it is right to examine in depth the following survey that concerned the public's position among young people in Europe, as suggested the online YouGov study for the Germany-based TUI Foundation (TUI, 2019). This is third annual "Young Europe" study surveyed more than 8,000 young people in 11 EU countries — Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, the United Kingdom, Italy, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Spain, between January 21 and February 12, 2019, published in May 2019 by TUI foundation.

The bottom line is: Migration and the environment are top issues for EU youth. Here are the main findings:

1. Young Europeans in most EU countries rank migration, the environment and the economy as the bloc's "**key political problems**".  
The online survey found that "asylum and migration" were the most important issues for Europeans aged 16 to 26, but as the authors noted, this doesn't mean that respondents reject open borders, as 43% of those highlighting these issues say the EU's open borders are an "opportunity," versus 27% who see them as "a threat."
2. A majority of young people in the EU (55%) see climate protection and environmental policy as an opportunity rather than a threat for their own personal lives.
3. 43% said they had engaged in political action over environmental protection in the past year.

According to the TUI Foundation Managing Director Elke Hlawatschek, following the results: "We see a generation that no longer regards climate and environmental protection as a necessary evil, but as a natural component of the political agenda," said 58% of the young people surveyed believe that democracy is "the best form of government," with the strongest support for this in the only Mediterranean country in the survey, Greece (73%), Germany and Sweden (both 66%), and Denmark (65%). Support for democracy was lower among respondents in France (38%), Italy and Poland (both 46%).


*c. Cultural diversity and social aspects*

Since the prism of the current project is intercultural, it's important to examine surveys where diversity is the central theme. indicates that "Europeans not convinced growing diversity is a good thing, divided on what determines national identity" (Wike, R. et al. 2016).

The Pew Research Center survey (Connor, P., et al. 2016) was conducted in 10 EU states, including 4 North Mediterranean countries (France, Spain, Italy, Greece). The attitudes towards diversity - on the backdrop of ethnicity and race, in no country does a majority say increasing diversity is a positive for their country. Only in Spain, France, Sweden and the UK, around a third think "diversity makes their country a better place to live", in which 63% and 53% in Greece and Italy retrospectively say "growing diversity makes their country a worse place to live". More common is the view that cultural diversity is neither a plus nor a minus in terms of quality of life. This is the prevailing attitude in France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, where pluralities say growing diversity makes little difference in their quality of life.

These findings are of great importance for understanding the built-in connection between climatic migration, economic development and especially social integration, and it is important to further and expand the research of these aspects, in countries with high rates of migrants.

Figure 7: Diversity



In another view, the diversity reveals differences based on the educational level of the respondent, with reference to UN international standard of Education (ISCED). As can see in Figure 8, less-educated people are more critical of diversity than more-educated. Interesting to note that in the two Mediterranean countries the rate of less educated people who have critics view on the diversity is the lowest among the surveyed countries.

Figure 8: Education Role

**Those with less education say increasing diversity makes their country a worse place to live**

*An increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in our country makes this country a worse place to live*

	<b>Less education</b>	<b>More education</b>	<b>Diff</b>
	%	%	
Netherlands	43	22	-21
UK	37	17	-20
Spain	26	12	-14
Sweden	30	17	-13
Germany	39	27	-12
France	27	17	-10

Note: Only statistically significant differences shown. For the purpose of comparing educational groups across countries, we standardize education levels based on the UN's International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The lower education category is secondary education or below and the higher category is postsecondary or above.

Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, Q44.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

d. Climate Migration – place to be optimistic?

One of probably founding research in understanding the public attitudes towards climate migrants, considered as a single study so far on how open western societies are towards climate change migrants and whether or not they feel morally obliged to help these migrants (Helbling, 2020). The research focused in climate change, social psychological aspects, and intergroup relations together, and targeting two questions:


) To what extent are citizens in industrialized societies willing to accept climate change migrants, especially in comparison with other groups of migrants?

(2) Under which circumstances and according to which principles are they willing to accept them?

Answers to these questions are crucial in understanding the extent to which western societies are willing to carry the consequences of climate change, to which they substantially contributed, and to better prepare governments for potential conflicts that might emerge with the increasing migration flows.

To answer these questions, a representative online survey was carried out in Germany in June 2018. The increasing number of migrants in Germany since 2015 has demonstrated to what extent migration issues can polarize a society. So, besides assuming that Germans have strong opinions about migrants, on the Climate change perspective Germany is also one of the main emitters of GHGs.

*Figure 9: the marginal means of acceptance rates of people who agree to let in migrants with different reasons for migration and different economic and cultural characteristics.*



"It can be seen that many more people agree to accept political migrants (66%) in comparison with economic migrants (48%). As for migrants who left their country because of climate change, as increasing droughts or sea levels, we see that attitudes towards these two groups are reasonably similar (60% and 63%), and that the degree of acceptance is comparable with that of political migrants. Climate change migrants are thus clearly not seen as economic migrants even though these two categories are highly interrelated. The mean differences between economic migrants, on the one hand, and political and environmental migrants, on the other hand, are statistically significant at conventional levels. Ultimately, they are perceived as people in need of protection who were forced to leave their country, similarly to political migrants" (Helbling, 2020).

#### IV. Concluding Remarks

The study of 'Climate and Migration – Power, Perception and Policy' (2021), is a preliminary research that came to answer the questions: what can be learned from public opinion Surveys in Euro–Med region, and if there is a link between the public attitudes in the two assigned fields, and as a theoretical exercise - that very soon or even urgently, we will have to think together how the results can be translated into practical tools to be used in policy outlining - of climate migration' strategic plan in a Euro-Med regional perspective, where both the local population in the absorption countries and the migrant population are on the same cultural and political zone of the Earth's climate history.

Several studies in the past have linked awareness of and concern for climate change and understanding of its causes to strong public advocacy and tolerance for government policies that mitigate climate warming, while others have emphasized the need for public support in order for government climate actions to be successful (Leiserowitz & Howe, 2015; Bord et al., 2000). In general, however, the relationship between climate awareness and concern and the ambition of climate policy in specific countries, especially developing countries, is not well studied or understood. Given the complexity of these interactions, unique confounding factors that exist in the

public and political spheres of specific countries, and the general lack of data on climate perceptions in developing countries, this report will not attempt to establish a robust correlation between these two variables at the cross-national level. However, by observing factors that influence climate awareness and concern at the global and regional level, and by examining climate perceptions and mitigation policy in several key countries, AEJI hopes to contribute to critical discourse on the link between public climate awareness and political climate action, especially on climate migration.

The following points should be considering in any further discussion:

Public perception toward climate change becomes a potentially significant determinant of the strength and ambition of climate mitigation policy, and this report aims to explore this potential association.

Education has a critical role in the engagement of climate and migration in the Euro-Med region, especially in countries with a high rate of migrants' absorption. Both climate surveys and migration public opinion attitudes providing the background reasons can facilitate better understanding of this complex of climate, migration and attitudes towards new migrants.

It is hereby proposed to conduct in-depth surveys as part of the biennial Eurobarometer initiative in Euro-Med countries, to assess the level of knowledge of the (local) population in this region, relating the reasons for migration. The discussion should focus on "economic migration" and the need to make it accessible as part of understanding the severe effects of climate change on low income / poorest households' ability to keep sustain themselves with threatened agricultural sectors that are under extinction due to the harsh climate changes in part of African countries, including fishery and food security.

Instead of conclusion, I would like to raise my perception which opened to a wide-ranging, stand-alone discussion, and is the need for a paradigm shift and its essence: focused not only on mitigation of GHGs emissions but on mitigate of climate risks and to adaptation to climate security, including social and economic protection for climate victims in climate disaster-stricken countries. In which the issue of economic development, the development of sources of employment, especially for the weak links of the very vulnerable societies - must be at the top of the priorities of the international community.

This necessity lies at the doorstep of the international community, international foundations and international institutions, and we as representatives of civil society will continue to accompany the issue, hopefully with addressing as well of public opinion polls that will enable policy facilitation to be effective.

## References

*2nd EIB Climate Survey: Citizens' perception of climate change and its impact.* (2020). European Investment Bank.

*Awareness of climate change in key countries 2015.* (2015, July). Statista.

Bord, R. J., O'Connor, R. E., & Fisher, A. (2000). In what sense does the public need to understand global climate change? *Public Understanding of Science*, 9(3), 205–218.

Capstick, S., Whitmarsh, L., Poortinga, W., Pidgeon, N., & Upham, P. (2015). International trends in public perceptions of climate change over the past quarter century. *WIREs Climate Change*, 6(1), 35–61.

*Citizen support for climate action.* (2019). European Commission.

*Countries.* (November 2020). Climate Action Tracker.

Connor P., & J., M. Krogstad (2016) Immigrant share of population jumps in some European countries.

Dennison, J., (2019), Impact of public attitudes to migration on the political environment in the Euro-Mediterranean region. *First chapter: Europe. Technical Report, EUI RSCAS, Migration Policy Centre, OPAM*.

Eurobarometer Press Release (2019), Autumn 2019 Standard Eurobarometer: immigration and climate change remain main concerns at EU level.

Fagan, M., & Huang, C. (2019). *A look at how people around the world view climate change.* Pew Research Center.

Fleming, S. (2020). *What do people around the world think about climate change?* January 8, World Economic Forum.

Goldberg, M. H., Gustafson, A., Ballew, M. T., Rosenthal, S. A., & Leiserowitz, A. (2020). Identifying the most important predictors of support for climate policy in the United States. *Behavioral Public Policy*, p. 1–23. August 24.

Gordon, J.A. (2017), Edited: C. Lubanov. "Mitigation of Climate Risk and Adaptation to Climate Security in Israel and the Middle East: Policy Measures toward Geopolitical Cooperation and Regional Transformation, *Association of Environmental Justice in Israel, AEJI New Series on Climate Change Strategy.*

Helbling, M. Attitudes towards climate change migrants (2020). *Climatic Change* 160, p. 89–102. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-020-02697-3>

Jacobsson, S., & Lauber, V. (2006). The politics and policy of energy system transformation—Explaining the German diffusion of renewable energy technology. *Energy Policy*, 34(3), 256–276.

Jugendstudie 2019 der TUI Stiftung: Enttäuscht von Europa? (2019), Junge Europäer für mehr Integration und politische Teilhabe in Europa. TUI Stiftung.

Lee, T. M., Markowitz, E. M., Howe, P. D., Ko, C.-Y., & Leiserowitz, A. A. (2015). Predictors of public climate change awareness and risk perception around the world. *Nature Climate Change*, 5(11), 1014–1020.



Leiserowitz, A., & Howe, P. (2015, July 27). *Climate Change Awareness and Concern in 119 Countries*. Yale Program on Climate Change Communication.

Levy, R. (2016). Editors: Lubanov, C & Rabinowitz, D. *Budgeting Policies of Plans for GHG Emissions Reduction and Adaptation to Climate Change – International Comparison* (No. 4; Climate Justice and Economic Policy, p. 8). The Association of Environmental Justice in Israel (AEJI).

Lubanov, C. & Rabinowitz, D. Editors (2015). *Survey of Public Positions Regarding Climate Change, Globally and in Israel.*, The Association of Environmental Justice in Israel (AEJI).

Lujala P., S.& Bezu, I., Kotad, M., Mahmud, A., Wing Chr Michelsen Institute (CMI), (2020) How do host–migrant proximities shape attitudes toward internal climate migrants? *CMI Working Paper number 2*, February.

Mcsweeney, R. (2015). *Global survey: Where in the world is most and least aware of climate change?* Carbon Brief.

Milman, O., & Harvey, F. (2019). US is hotbed of climate change denial, major global survey finds. *The Guardian*. May 8.

News, DW.com, Most Germans support drastic climate change measures  
<https://www.dw.com/en/most-germans-support-drastic-climate-change-measures/a-49856490>

Nordland O., Editor: Lubanov, C., (2020) *Climate Awareness and Action, Is there a link between public perceptions and government performance on climate policy? An international comparison. Series of Public Perceptions and Climate Strategy | AEJI Synthesis Report No. 2 | September.*

Poushter, J., & Huang, C. (2019). *Climate Change Still Seen as Top Global Threat, but Cyberattacks Rising Concern*. Pew Research Center.

Schuster, R. (2012). *What is Israel doing about climate change? Nothing, says watchdog*. Haaretz.

Smith, N., & Leiserowitz, A. (2012). *The Rise of Global Warming Skepticism: Exploring Affective Image Associations in the United States Over Time*. *Risk Analysis*, 32(6), p. 1021–1032.

Spence, A., Poortinga, W., & Pidgeon, N. (2012). *The psychological distance of climate change*. *Risk Analysis: An Official Publication of the Society for Risk Analysis*, 32(6), p. 957–972.

Steenjens, K., Pidgeon, N., Poortinga, W., Corner, A., Arnold, A., Böhm, G., Mays, C., Poumadère, M., Ruddat, M., Scheer, D., Sonnberger, M., Tvinnereim, E. (2017). *European Perceptions of Climate Change: Topline findings of a survey conducted in four European countries in 2016*. Cardiff University.

Lubanov, C. & Rabinowitz, D. Editors (2015). *Survey of Public Positions Regarding Climate Change, Globally and in Israel*. The Association of Environmental Justice in Israel (AEJI).

Torres M. J., (2019), *Migrations in the Mediterranean Public Opinion toward Immigration, Refugees, and Identity in Europe A Closer Look at What Europeans Think and How Immigration Debates Have Become So Relevant*. *IMED Mediterranean yearbook 2019*

Wike, R., Stokies B. and Simmons K. (2016) *Europeans not convinced growing diversity is a good thing, divided on what determines national identity*. Pew research.

## **FOURTH SECTION**

### **Open Resources**

## **11. 'Climate Migration – New Chapter'**

### **Mapping of Information Sources and an Outline for Future Activity**

Carmit Lubanov, Association of Environmental Justice in Israel (AEJI) and

Mark Causon, Genista Research Foundation Malta (GRF)

#### **Introduction**

The articles included in this report are the result of research work that was conducted in the first half of 2021, and have great importance in raising the socio-economic and intercultural aspects, as part of raising the 'Climate Migration' subject on the agenda in the Euro-Med region. But, as it is known to those who engage with this field, the subject of "Climate Migration" has already been discussed in various committees, research groups and local initiatives. Therefore, this document as the final chapter is aimed to present selective publications and initiatives, in order to address the three main goals:

A. Provide Access to international reports and different selected documents published in recent years on the subject, as well as TV and other media channels documentation to produce broad initial information infrastructure. These info sources aimed to be available for researchers, practitioners, policy advisors, and other stakeholders and to facilitate in reducing knowledge gaps about the subject, as we identified this need in the working process.

B. To create an Outline for recommendations for further activity in the field, particularly by civic society organizations, thanks to the accumulated knowledge and better understanding of climate change humanity impacts, and the importance in raising the socio-economic and intercultural multi aspects of climate change field.

C. To provide a platform to mobilize regional policy for the migration crisis related to climate change induced in other regions.

The above mentioned first two directions will be briefly presented in this document.

Part A presents a selection of publications in the field of climate migration by selected categories of key issues, including: geographical area, gender and equality, civil rights with an emphasis on labor issues and workers' rights, and multicultural initiatives.

The choice of these categories is not accidental. According to a BBC research article, 80% of displaced people from an environmental background are women. Also, in the category of geographical area, we chose to focus on Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. Unlike common climate migration discourse in a world prone to extreme climate change that forces people to leave their homes and migrate in Africa and the regions of the islands in the Far East, lesser known is the forced migration of Europeans in rural areas in the former Balkan regions and in Eastern and Southern Europe, so a series of TV articles documenting climatic, 'inland migration', was selected to be accessible to learn this phenomenon.

In this context of 'inland migration' within European countries, although is less known geographically on public discourse, it is similar to the terminology of climate migration adopted by international institutions such as the United Nations, according to which migration is inland and does not cross continents, occasionally described as 'forced displacement', where climate migration is part of the migratory engine due to economic background, loss of livelihoods such as agriculture, fishing, and







related economic sectors as of food production and trade due to shrinking agricultural and fisheries areas in African countries.

Our view is that exactly this context of climate change impact on human life can lead to drawing up economic policies for the prevention of climate-induced migration in the countries of origin, by shifting the focus in which climate migration should be part of the formulation of solutions to the climate crisis, advance initiatives to be developed in countries of generating of 'forced migration' and not just focusing in projects of integrating refugees in the destination countries of migration.

The resources table (Part A) will be updated online. The aim is to create an interactive platform of interface between diverse stakeholders as researchers and CSOs policy advocators, as well as between different sub-research fields addressing climate change and migration patterns, social integration and inter/multi-cultural impact in migrant destinations, broad climate policy that raises the issue of displaced people, in wide prism of climate economy and human rights.





Part B presents a target where should be the focus for the development of future activity in the field. Based on our work experience and review of the professional literature in the areas of climate, migration, cooperation in the Euro Med countries.







**Legend:**






Material source Image	Info type	Page
	Research, Policy position paper	
	Human Rights, labor, worker rights	
	TV, Video	
	Cultural Initiative	
	Key words, tags	
	Online reference	







**Part A: Defined sources of information according to key categories in the construction of climate migration discipline.**

*Table 1: Information Sources – by key categories*








		<b>Characterization Category</b>	Material source
	<b>I.</b>	<b>International Reports</b>	
1.	Title	<b>Migration and Climate Change No. 31, IOM Migration Research Series</b>	
	Authors	Oli Brown	
	Publishers	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	
	Publication year	2008	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
2.	Title	<b>Climate change and migration legal and policy challenges and responses to environmentally induced migration</b>	
	Authors	Albert KRALER, Danube University Krems Caitlin KATSIAFICAS,	
	Publisher	International Centre for Migration Policy Development Martin WAGNER, International Centre for Migration Policy Development	
	Publication year	July 2020	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
3.	Title	<b>Changing Migration patterns in Mediterranean</b>	
	Authors /	Edited by Lorenzo Kamel	
	Publishers	IAI, New Med Research Network	
	Publication year	2015	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
4.	Title	<b>Migration from Middle East and Africa to Europe Past developments, Current status, Future potentials</b>	





	Authors / Publishers	Edited by Michael Bommers, Heinz Fassmann, Wiebke Siers Amsterdam University Press	
	Publication year	2014	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
5.	Title	<b>Global Compact for safe, orderly and regular migration - Intergovernmentally negotiated and agreed outcome</b>	
	Authors	UN	
	Publication year	2018	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
	Tags	Forced migration, induced climate migration, irregular migration, Global compact	
	II	<b>Geographical Region - Europe / TV</b>	
1.	Title	<i>Ghost town: The Moldovans who refuse to be climate migrants</i>	
	Source	EURONEWS	
	Publication year	2020	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
2.	Title	<i>How fire turned a goat herder into climate migrants in 'empty Spain'</i>	
	Source	EURONEWS	
	Date	12 March 2020	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
3.	Title	<i>How climate change triggered a second exodus in Bosnia and Herzegovina</i>	
	Source	EURONEWS	
	Date	5 March 2020	

		<a href="#">Link</a>	
4.	Title	<b><i>Extreme weather exiles: how climate change is making European migrants</i></b>	
	Source	EURONEWS	
	Date	22 February 2020	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
5.	Title	<b><i>Climate change and Migration: A Hot issue for Europe</i></b>	
	Source	EURONEWS	
	Date	10 July 2015	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
	Tags	Climate Risks, Enforced relocation, East-South Europe	
	<b>III.</b>	<b>Gender and Equity</b>	
1.	Title	Climate change 'impacts women more than men'	
	Author	Mary Halton   BBC News, science reporter	
	Publication year	2018	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
2.	Title	<b>Migrant women and remittances: Exploring the data from selected countries</b>	
	Authors	Mehtabul Azam, Yana Rodgers, Michael Stewart-Evans, and Inkeri von Hase  UN Women	
	Publication year	2020	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
3.	Title	<b>Gender and migration in the context of climate change</b>	
	Author	Ann-Kristin Matthe, United Nations University	
	Publication year	2016	

		<a href="#">Link</a>	
4.	Title	<b>Climate Change and Gendered Vulnerabilities: Accounting for Women and Patriarchal Systems in Climate Governance Policy</b>	
	Source	Economic & Political Weekly (EPW)	
	Publication year	2 April 2020	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
5.	Title	<b>Assessing impacts of water and climate-induced migration on women and girls</b>	
	Source	UNU-INWEH	
	Publication year	2020	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
	Tags	Vulnerability, education, economic development, gender empowerment, secured livelihood	
	<b>IV</b>	<b>Human Rights, Labor, Worker Rights</b>	
1.	Title	<b>The Slow onset effects of climate change and human rights protection for cross-border migrants</b>	
	Source	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights office of the High Commissioner and Platform on disaster displacement	
	Publication year	2018	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
2.	Title	<b>With Millions Displaced by Climate Change or Extreme Weather, Is There a Role for Labor Migration Pathways?</b>	
	Authors	Michelle Leighton and Meredith Byrne   Migration Policy Institute (MPI)	
	Publication year	2017	



		<a href="#">Link</a>	
3.	Title	<b>Climate change and labour: Impacts of heat in workplace</b>	
	Source	UNDP   Editorial contributors: Matthew McKinnon (UNDP), Elise Buckle (UNDP and UNI Global Union), Kamal Gueye (ILO), Isaiah Toroitich (ACT Alliance), Dina Ionesco (IOM), Eva Mach (IOM), Marina Maiero (WHO)	
	Publication year	2016	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
4.	Title	<b>Climate Refugees - Gaps in the Present Protection Regime</b>	
	Source	Othering & Belonging Institute, University of California, Berkeley	
	Publication year	2019	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
5.	Title	Climate change, displacement and labour migration	
	Source	International Labor Organization (ILO)	
	Publication year	2019	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
	Tags	Education, employment, green deal and the right to work, social and economic integration	
<b>V.</b>	<b>Intercultural initiatives</b>		
1.	Title	<b>The Role of Culture and the Arts in the Integration of Refugees and Migrants</b>	
	Authors / Source	Elaine McGregor and Nora Ragab, European Expert Network on Culture and Audiovisual (EENCA)   PANTEEIA Research to progress and SMIT Verije Universiteit Brussel	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	

2.	Title	<b>Selected publications on the inclusion/integration of refugees and migrants in European societies through culture and arts</b>	
	Source	European Commission, Library and e-Resources Centre	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
3.	Title	<b>Community theatre setting the stage for refugee integration</b>	
	Source	Rotterdams Wijktheater	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
4.	Title	<b>Guide to implement inclusion theatre projects with refugees</b>	
	Source	REACT Refugee Engagement and integration through Community Theatre, and acta Community Theatre Ltd (UK)	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
5.	Title	<b>The Acting Project: theatre and refugee integration in Greece</b>	
	Source	UNHCR   Global Compact on Refugees Digital platform	
		<a href="#">Link</a>	
	<b>Tags</b>	Arts, Education, empowerment, solidarity, cultural diversity	

## Part B: Climate Migration New Chapter - Future activity, CSOs perspective.

Part B presents target areas for the development of activity in the field. Based on our work experience and review of the professional literature in the areas of climate, immigration, cooperation in the Euro Med countries. A topic that the authors of the document believe should be the focus of activity for years to come.

The recommendations are to focus on the following five fields:

- i. *Integrative research* - which includes a combination of experts from various fields of knowledge, including those with a background in environmental migration, experts in the field of mitigation and adaptation of social and economic aspects of climate change, climatic resilience in places affected by extreme weather events. Climate migration should be considered against the background of geographical areas, inland (Europe), war and risk areas, areas that have been economically affected due to climate change and especially agriculture and fisheries.

- ii. *Policy* - to formulate a proposal for a comprehensive policy for the Euro Med space. On the subject of policy, economic and fiscal mechanisms should be devoted to assisting in tackling the climate crisis amid the loss of livelihoods in sensitive areas, which are the main exporters of migration to the EuroMed area, in Africa and the Far East.
- iii. *Civil rights advocacy* - with an emphasis on workers' rights and employment. To develop training programs for migrants in the economic fields of Green Jobs, such as agriculture, agri-tech, agricultural trade, renewable energies, etc.
- iv. *Community initiatives for social and cultural integration* - to encourage the integration of migrant populations in European countries, by providing support and tools for local communities and to the absorbed population, empowerment and development of community resilience based on the fact that diversity and ethnic diversity are a source of shared resilience, not foreign, separate communities.
- v. *Working with European youth* - who according to opinion polls are more open than adults to absorbing migrants, and more aware of the climate crisis, in order to build a sustainable common future.



Join us:

<https://www.facebook.com/Climate-Migration-in-Euro-Med-Region-102913168514020/>